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The coming religion

THE COMING RELIGION

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THE
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BY

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PREFACE

INTENSE occupation with the history of man's religious life naturally tends to create an interest in the future. We are standing in the midst of a stream. Whence does it come? In a general way its course can be traced to its remote fountainheads. To some extent its windings may be followed through thousands of years. Whither is the river flowing? Is religion destined to disappear like so many other products of the social evolution? Will the time come when the historian shall group it with those systems, great or small, which had their day and ceased to be? The answer, no doubt, depends upon the definition of religion. If it is conceived of as something apart from man's natural development, unrelated to the rest of his experience, of other than human origin, it is likely to be involved in the fate that inevitably overtakes a no longer tenable view of the world. If it is regarded as identical with any of the organized forms it has assumed, the transiency of such historic manifestations inspires no confidence. On the other hand, if it is so defined as to set forth clearly the category to which it belongs, to include all phenomena that according to a legitimate use of the term fall within its sphere, and to indicate what, in the last analysis, is common to them, it is scarcely conceivable that this motive force should cease to operate as long as there is an upward trend, a striving for perfection, in the human race. Such a definition would seem to be both proper and desirable. Theology, as the science of religion, is to-day dealing with the whole field of religious experience, and not merely with one preferred section. It is not possible at present to maintain the artificial distinction once made between natural and revealed religion. Nor would it be expedient to invent other terms than religion and theology for a specific order of phenomena and the scientific treatment of these.

From this standpoint, what is here referred to as the coming religion can only be envisaged as an anticipated fresh expression of what religion essentially is, as a new type of religious fellowship. The need of it is obvious in view of the unmistakable trend away from the older forms, the loss of a worthy and steadying purpose in the conduct of life, and the dissipation of moral and religious energy even among those who are rightly attracted by the claims of science, art, and social idealism.

Leadership is necessary, but the true function of the prophet should be understood. The hope of a new Messiah to lead mankind with unerring wisdom, fullness of power, and supreme spiritual authority is futile, because it is based on a serious misconception of man's nature. The coming religion can only become a reality in a republic of fellow workers.

The immediate occasion for the writing of this book is a request of the publishers that an address delivered at a meeting in celebration of the one hundredth anniversary of the Community Church, New York, March 15, 1925, and published in *Unity*, March 29, 1926, be expanded into a volume of modest size. In recording his convictions, growing out of many years of experience, study, and reflection, the author's sole desire is to contribute in some measure to the reverent treatment of the past, the resolute abandonment of dangerous compromise, the clearer vision of what ought to be, and the joy of walking in paths that promise an approach to the ideal.

N. S.

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THE COMING RELIGION

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CHAPTER I

WHAT IS RELIGION?

RELIGIOUS experience may quicken the mind to eager inquiry in every direction. If it does not always have this effect, the reason is to be found in the natural bent of the mind, the training it has received, and the character of the experience. One may come into intimate contact with religion, feel intensely its uplifting power, apply it loyally to the conduct of life, and derive spiritual benefit from it, without ever asking what it is. There may be no curiosity as to its origin and nature, and no interest in the history of its development. That is true of all the great forces at work in the world. Practical acquaintance with their use is obtainable and helpful apart from any theoretical knowledge of their nature. An electrical apparatus may be handled efficiently and serve its purpose well, even if the operator has never reflected on what electricity is. But there can be no marked advance in the employment and direction of any force without a growing awareness of its peculiarities. It would be hopeless to consider the form religion is likely to take in the future, were it not for the earnest study that has been devoted to man's religious experience in the past. The prolonged effort to discover the various manifestations of religion and to interpret their real significance must furnish the basis for a rational forecast. Moreover, the problem cannot be discussed intelligently and with profit unless an attempt is made at the very outset to define religion. To avoid harmful confusion there should be a clear understanding from the first of the meaning that is attached to the term.

It is important to distinguish between the historic forms religion has assumed and its inner substance. Religion must be defined in such a way as neither to exclude from it anything that really enters into its character nor to include in it anything that does not necessarily belong to its nature. Some attempts at definition have failed because religion has been made synonymous with a particular form of religion, some because its complex nature has not been realized and in consequence one aspect emphasized at the expense of others. When we speak of Judaism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam as different religions, the underlying assumption is that, whatever the differences between them, they have in common something that may be designated as religion. We recognize that, in spite of many divergencies, the term is applicable to all of them, and also that, because such variations exist, none of them can be regarded as exhausting the conception. Religion is not identical with Christianity, or Judaism, or Buddhism, or Zoroastrianism, or Islam. Still less can this be said of any of the great divisions within each, such as Catholicism and Protestantism, Orthodox and Reformed Judaism, Hinayana and Mahayana, the Gathic and later Avestan Mazdaism, Sunna and Shi'a. No one would think of making religion identical with any of the numerous ethnic faiths and cults that never laid a claim to universality. Though there are still students who would exclude some systems of belief and practice generally regarded as religious, and prefer other designations for them, the prevailing view at present is that these also should be considered forms of religion. It certainly would be most arbitrary to exclude Buddhism, the religion of pity, in its earlier and more vital form, while recognizing it in certain later and less typical manifestations.

What is the substance? It cannot be monotheism, for some religions are polytheistic. It cannot be theism, for some religions are atheistic. Not only are there primitive religions that have not yet developed a god-conception, but there are advanced religions that have abandoned it. Buddhism and Jainism do not admit the existence of a deity; and of the six leading systems of religious thought in classical Brahmanism only two, Yoga and Advaita, or Vedanta, consistently proclaim a belief in Iśvara or a godhead, while four, Sankhya, Nyaya, and Vaiseshika in their original form, and Mimamsa, reject it. Religion expresses itself, sometimes in polytheism, sometimes in monotheism, sometimes in pantheism, sometimes in atheism. It may exist without any definite belief concerning the nature of ultimate reality.

Belief in the immortality of the soul, or even in the existence of a soul, cannot be a *sine qua non* of religion. While some religions have regarded the soul as so closely linked to the body that the latter must be preserved or restored in a resurrection of the flesh, one great religion has denied that there is a soul at all and sought deliverance from existence itself. Other religions have looked forward without hope to a shadowy quasi-existence after death, devoid of all that is characteristic of life, even the exercise of religion, in a realm where there is no moral distinction, no reward for virtue, and no punishment for sin. It would be palpably unjust to consider men like Amos and Hosea, Isaiah and Micah, Jeremiah and the author of Job as less truly religious, because they did not cherish a belief in life after death, than the authors of Daniel, Enoch, and Fourth Ezra, who in their day adhered to it.

In the religions of India the stress is laid on knowledge. There is indeed discipline, and perhaps nowhere in the world more rigid, and there is a bewildering variety of cultic performances, but these are means to reach an end, and the end is knowledge or intuitive perception of ultimate reality. Esoteric insight was what the Gnostic sought. Even in Christianity this element is very marked. An early evangelist put upon the lips of Jesus the statement: "This is life eternal that they should know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, Jesus Christ" (John xvii. 3). To an ancient Christian creed the solemn warning was added that any one who failed to accept its marvelously acute and carefully balanced definitions would without a doubt be eternally lost. So essentially is religion in this view bound up with what is known, or supposed to be known, that confession of faith in it is made the condition of salvation. Another early Christian maintained that "pure religion and undefiled before our God and father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world" (James i. 28). This shifts the emphasis from knowledge and belief to moral conduct, from forms and formulas to practical service and self-discipline. It reveals the growing influence of morality upon religion. But morality and religion are not the same. Historically they have developed from different origins. In their growth they have become closely related. Yet at no time can it be said that they have been identical. Religion may become ethical; morality may become religious. Neither is exhausted in outward conduct. Like morality, religion is concerned, not only with how man acts, but also with what he thinks, and how he feels.

When Schleiermacher declared that it is the heart that makes the theologian, he rightly called attention to the part played by the emotions in religion. He had in mind chiefly the exponent of the Christian religion. By theology we understand to-day the branch of science that deals with the phenomena of man's religious life, and by the theologian the scientist who is engaged in interpreting them. His labor of collecting, observing, classifying, verifying, and explaining these phenomena is not a function of his feelings, but of his reasoning faculty. Yet even with this extension of the field and consequent modification of the methods of work, it is of great importance that he approach the subject in the right spirit. He must be able to deal with it sympathetically as well as objectively, to feel in a measure as others have felt, and to realize their experience through his own. The nature of the material demands this, for sentiment is a vital part of religion. But religion is not only a matter of the heart. No definition of its essence can be satisfactory which fails to recognize that it has to do alike with the intellect, the will, and the emotions.

It is not always easy to find the derivation of a word, or possible to determine the meaning that should be assigned to it, by its etymology. Cicero[1] derived the Latin word *religio* from *re-legere,* gather anew, re-collect, take up a thing to give it fresh attention. Lactantius,[2] with more probability, derived it from *re-ligare,* bind, attach. The idea of attachment is good. But what is the character of this bond? Certain terms in other languages which we properly translate religion primarily signify hope, fear, judgment, reverence, or illumination. Usage must decide; but words are loosely used. Theologians who identified with religion their own form of religion and looked upon all other forms as false religions, having a different origin, being counterfeits of the true one, or having arisen through perversion of a primitive revelation, could define religion only by describing their own faith and practice. Cardinal Newman's[8] definition is typical. "By religion," he says, "I mean the knowledge of God, of His will, and of our duties towards Him." When under the influence of the developing natural sciences, thinkers, especially in England, began to demand that religion should be demonstrated as being in harmony with reason, the defenders of dogma vied with its assailants in maintaining the reasonableness of Christianity. The main difference was that the deists found it necessary to reject the miraculous element and to prove Christianity to be the true exponent of the natural theology of man. This position was still occupied by the great German philosophers, though their historical horizon was wider and their insight deeper. Even Hegel drew the line between Christianity as the

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[1] *De natura deorum,* II, 28, 72.

[2] *Divinæ Institutiones,* IV, 128.

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[8] *A Grammar of Assent* [2], 1892, p. 389.

"absolute religion" and all the others. Schleiermacher's contention for the emotional element in religion could only become fruitful after a wider acquaintance with religious phenomena had been gained and a more objective attitude made possible.

Max Müller[4] defined religion as "a mental faculty which independent of, nay, in spite of sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the infinite under different names and under varying disguises." The influence of Indian thought is noticeable. While an apprehension of the infinite can scarcely be said to exist in all stages of religious development, the idea of an independent faculty leading to a conflict of interests is suggestive. Albert Réville[5] declared, "Religion is the determination of human life by the consciousness of a bond uniting the spirit of man to that mysterious spirit whose government of the world and of himself he recognizes, and with whom he loves to feel himself united." A longing for union with a world-ruling mysterious spirit is not universally present in religion. The same applies to A. Sabatier's[6] definition: "Religion is a commerce, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul in distress enters with the mysterious power on which it feels that it and its destiny depend." C. P. Tiele[7] regarded the constituents of religion as "emotions, conceptions, and sentiments produced by contact with higher beings in whose power man feels and perceives himself to be, and with whom he longs to come into touch." This excludes Buddhism as well as the earlier forms of religion.

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[4] *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion,* 1880, p. 23; *Physical Religion,* 1891, p. 294.

[5] *Prolegomènes de l'histoire des religions,* 1886, p. 34.

[6] *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion,* 1895, p. 27.

A greater familiarity with the ideas and practices of primitive peoples and a keener understanding of psychology have affected most recent definitions worthy of note. Many examples might be given. It must suffice, however, for the present, to mention those of J. G. Frazer, James H. Leuba, and E. H. Mayer. Frazer[8] describes religion as "propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man, which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life." Propitiation is not characteristic of all forms of religion, and does not cover all that seems essential even where it exists. Leuba[9] rightly stresses the fact that thought, will, and feeling coexist and interact upon one another, and that religion is a kind of activity, a mode or type of behavior. He declares that "it is the agent or the power with which man thinks himself in relation, and through whom he endeavors to secure the gratification of his desires, which alone is distinctive of religious life." It is at least difficult to apply this to Buddhism or to affirm it concerning the pre-animistic stage of religion. When he suggests that "any solution will have the right to the name religion that provides for the preservation and the perfectioning of life by means of faith in a superhuman psychic power," it is not quite clear what is meant by this object of faith, and why it should be deemed essential to religion. In his discussion of the nature of religion, Mayer[10] indicates the methods—introspection, individual psychology, and group psychology—by which a solution may be reached, eliminating super-conscious and sub-conscious processes. He suggests that religion meets "a practical need in the satisfaction of which all the mental faculties co-operate," and that "religion is not only the product of the morally indifferent or morally determined will to live, but one that depends upon confidence-establishing emotional experiences of a somehow realized satisfaction of that will to live."

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[7] *Elements of the Science of Religion,* 1899, II, pp. 1ff.

[8] *The Golden Bough,*[2] 1900, I, p. 63.

[9] *The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion;* 1909, pp. 15, 95.

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[10] *Die Religion in der Geschichte und der Gegenwart,* V, 1913.

The present writer [11] many years ago, attempted to define religion as "the consciousness of some power manifest in nature, determining man's destiny, and the ordering of his life in harmony with its demands." Each term was carefully explained so as to cover, as far as possible, all the essential aspects of religion and all important phases of its historic manifestation. The intellectual, volitional, and emotional elements of consciousness were recognized, and "power" was interpreted as referring either to a personality, a force, or a law which may be discovered, impose its authority, and operate within. But the necessity of giving to every word the widest scope language will permit is somewhat awkward. Possibly a much simpler definition may be as satisfactory. It might be put in a few words. Religion is devotion to the highest. Devotion implies a reverent and intense direction of thought, will, and feeling. It implies, not only an awareness of something and a relation to it, but a specific relation, a consciousness of its worth, a sense of need of it and of duty toward it, an effort to satisfy whatever it requires. It is a bond, but of a peculiar character, a strong attraction toward something, a voluntary attachment to it, a persistent connection with it. It involves the ordering of one's life with reference to something objective, the bestowal upon it of ever fresh attention, the regulation of conduct in harmony with its demands. It is an emotional experience with its fears and hopes, an active desire, a will to live in a particular way, a mode of behavior, a special trend given to thought.

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[11] "Fundamental Conceptions and Methods of the History of Religion," in *Congress of Arts and Sciences* held at Saint Louis, 1904, Boston, 1905, pp. 449ff.

In religion, this devotion is turned toward the highest. That which is absolutely the highest, the most perfect, cannot be comprehended by finite intelligence, cannot be consciously present as the object of the exertions of the will, cannot be immediately reached by the emotions. The highest can only be that which appears to man as the highest, temporarily or more permanently, with varying degrees of adequacy. Religious devotion is the direction of the mind toward what is conceived to be the highest truth, of the will toward the highest duty, the chief thing to be done, and of the heart toward the highest beauty, the most complete harmony and satisfaction. It is the elative faculty, the force that drives man upward, the tendency that impels him, not only toward the better, but toward the best. Whether to satisfy his curiosity, his craving for fresh activities, or his love of new sensations, man leaps from the near to the distant, from the seen to the unseen, from the visible to the invisible. He pushes aside the lesser good, for the time being or habitually, to reach what seems to him the highest good. When there is a choice among objects of devotion, he selects what appeals to him most and seems to give the greatest assurance of satisfaction; when there is a choice of means, he adopts what appears to have the greatest efficiency for his purpose. One step is not enough; he overleaps the obstacles, and seeks to ascend. There is always in religion something of Soeren Kierkegaard's Either-Or, the intransigence of Ibsen's Brand, the struggle between a recalcitrant real and a beckoning ideal, however dimly perceived. Hence the apparent conflict with sense and reason, and the impression upon some students of irrationality. In reality this devotion to the highest is not an alien force, hostile to sense and reason. It is the strongest impulse that from within has raised mankind. It operates, though often denied its religious character, not as an influence added from without, but as an integral element, in the achievements of science, philosophy, art, commerce, industry, citizenship, home-building, love, and friendship.

If this is the essence of religion, we naturally expect to find it in all stages of religious development. Nor are we disappointed. When primitive man was aware of some peculiar quality or power in a certain object, held it to be unapproachable, untouchable, inviolable, felt it to be akin to himself, sought to discover its will in order to impose it upon himself, endeavored to share its experiences, and adorned himself with some fragment of its body or symbol of its being, we call it manaism, tabuism, totemism, muraism, animism, divination, magic, fetichism. But it was his religion; and at bottom it is ours, not only because of such conceptions and practices still surviving in altered form, but because, like ours, it was a devotion to what to him was the highest. We are led to the same conclusion in observing the dominant traits in civilized nations and advanced religions. To the ancient Chinese the overarching sky seemed to be the highest, and his society the heavenly kingdom which in its ordered life should represent its celestial pattern. Hence his conservatism and emphasis on proper conduct. The subtle intellect of India sought to remove all limitations from the highest. This led from polytheism through pantheism to atheism; from personal obligation to, and communion with, the divine to recognition of the redeeming moral law and the impermanence of what is, from the joy of the senses to the ecstasy of suppressing all sensations. The stars in their courses represented to the Babylonian the highest; while the Egyptian tended to a solar monotheism, and stressed the hope of permanent survival near the source of light, heat, and life. To the Persian nothing seemed higher than the personified principle of creative power, light, wisdom, and goodness, and coöperation with it in its conflict with evil. The Canaanite, like many others, seems to have been especially attracted by the relation of the active and the passive, the male and female principle in nature's life, and showed great willingness to undergo suffering in imitation and service of his divinities. On the other hand, the ancient Jew removed from his conception of the highest the female element and the close relation to nature, and regarded his unique divinity as essentially a celestial righteous man, possessed of boundless power and wisdom. To the Greek man was the highest. His gods and goddesses were beautiful men and women. Man was the measure of all things. Man was the answer Œdipus, the Greek, gave to the riddle of the Egyptian sphinx.

Out of Jewish monotheism and passion for righteousness, Greek philosophy and worship of the perfect man, and Oriental syncretism Christianity was born. Here the highest is one in three, and three in one, and one of the three the ideal man, who has assumed our nature, shared our sufferings, satisfied the demands of divine justice, and opened the way to eternal life to all that believe in him.

It is not otherwise when we turn our attention to representative individuals. If we would know what religion is, we cannot afford to deal only with systems of thought and types of practice. There are great personalities in whom the religious tendency has appeared with exceptional strength. It is indeed a difficult task to become really acquainted with them. Many a religious genius who exercised a profound influence in the earlier ages must of necessity remain for ever unknown. In many cases where we have the liveliest interest the documents are exceedingly scanty and fragmentary. Even where the sources flow more freely and are more trustworthy, there is much of importance that escapes the searching eye. These spiritual heroes keep their deepest secrets in spite of every effort on the part of their interpreters to live themselves into their lives. Sometimes their remoteness in time and social milieu, their language, style, and type of thought, their immediate environment and historic background offer serious obstacles. Nevertheless, enough is known concerning a large number of these leading personalities to make it abundantly clear that they owed their distinction and power above everything else to their devotion to what to them was the highest. This also holds true of men and women personally known to us whose lives particularly impress us with their religious quality, and whose spiritual attitude we are able to observe more fully.

Religion is an individual experience; but it is also a product of social life. Man has never lived alone. At no time has he existed as a solitary individual without kith and kin, without connection with a group. His faculties have always been at work in some sort of society. The rudiments of these go back to his pre-human ancestry; their fuller development belongs to his distinctly human stage. Numerous forces operate in his life. There are impulses driving him to seek for food and shelter, to reproduce his kind and care for his offspring, to protect himself and what is dear to him, to knit together social ties and produce solidarity, to play, make pretty things, and enjoy himself. There are intellectual, moral, and artistic impulses leading him to acquire knowledge, establish customs, and create beauty. There is also the religious impulse, the upward urge, that leads him to seek for the highest and to enter into proper relations with it. Each of these forces has its distinct origin and field; but none of them operates without a constant interplay with the rest. Sometimes one dominates, sometimes another. A perfect equilibrium is never attained. Even religion may upset it, though it often tends toward stabilization. In its outward manifestations it may appear as though its function were preëminently to secure material prosperity, insurance against future evil, esoteric knowledge, recognition for a certain type of customs, or æsthetic satisfaction. But in its essence it is everywhere and always that one of the social factors which reveals itself in devotion to the highest.

CHAPTER II

EARLY RELIGION

If religion is a congenital element in man's nature, an impulse set in motion by the necessities of his life, a motive power seizing upon all his mental faculties, mind, will, and heart, an elative force lifting him in utter devotion toward that which to him appears as the highest, a psychic endowment naturally acquired, and a social factor, distinct from others yet closely associated with them, operating more or less consciously in the direction of perfectionment as its goal, its first manifestations on the human stage of development must be sought in the earliest forms of thought, activity, and sentiment it is possible to discern. These are found chiefly among peoples which through isolation and lack of initiative have continued to live in relatively primitive conditions; in archæological remains that testify to man's life in the earlier periods of his existence; in survivals among more advanced groups, and in the psychological experience of the child. They may also to some extent be inferred from observed facts in the life of higher animals, especially among the primates.

Everywhere great caution is necessary. Absolute stagnation is inconceivable. Even a people living to-day or until very recently in stone-age conditions cannot be supposed to have preserved through thousands of years without change the customs and ideas of long ago. Occasional innovations must have taken place. Degeneracy is inevitable. The interpreter is liable to error. However great his familiarity may be with uncivilized peoples, he may not be able to free himself entirely from the world of thought that is more natural to him. He may read into what he sees and hears a meaning that is not there and never was. In the case of archæological remains the difficulty increases. The material is at best very fragmentary; and it is silent. It can be made to speak only in terms borrowed from the language of modern savages, and that language must be well understood. It can be made to function only in ways suggested by analogy from other realms and later periods.

The earliest civilizations of Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia, Crete, Greece, and Anatolia, Iran, India, and China, Mexico and Peru, exhibit a wealth of religious conceptions and practices obviously derived from ideas and customs similar to those we find among peoples still living in relatively primitive conditions. But there is much that is new, modifications, combinations, borrowings, and advances. The old is there, but in novel manifestations; the new appears, to guide the currents of the past into fresh channels. The same holds true of the later civilizations. Discrimination between real survivals and evolutionary accretions is necessary. In a certain sense the life of the individual is a recapitulation of the life of the race. But the process is so accelerated and subject to such special effects of heredity and environment that conclusions become extremely hazardous. There are distinct analogies between the mentality of the child and that of primitive man. Seldom, however, is it possible to observe the operations of a child's mind that has not been affected by adult teaching or is not influenced by the unconscious suggestions of the questioner.

In spite of the striking similarities of physical structure and mental characteristics the distance is very great between the most highly organized animal and the lowest savage of the present day. Two intervening periods at least have to be recognized. One covers the life of man's immediate ancestor, if the Neandertal man appearing in the third inter-glacial epoch is considered as *homo primigenius;* the other that of a man far more primitive than any found to-day among the Australian aborigines or elsewhere. Concerning the former our only direct information is derived from the pre-Chellean, Chellean, and Acheulean tools and weapons he left behind. It is still doubtful whether he is represented by the skullcap discovered at Trinil in Java and the jaw found at Mauer near Heidelberg, or these are to be regarded as belonging to a different, though kindred, species more highly developed than any now existing anthropoidal ape, yet incapable of the pre-Mousterian types of industry. Even if there should come to light skeletal remains of a primate more clearly in the ancestral line of *homo primigenius,* inferences as to its mentality would necessarily have to be drawn in a large measure from pithecanthropoidal psychology; and in this field a large amount of work is still to be done.

As regards the second period it is, of course, quite obvious that the most backward peoples at the present time cannot be thought of as primitive in the sense that their ideas, feelings, customs, and institutions give us a sort of replica, preserved as in a museum, of the psychosis and social organization that prevailed in the earliest groups of human beings. Henri Berr[1] has rightly protested against any such equation, and called attention to some of the vast changes that must have taken place in the life of primitive man before he could have reached the level attained by the least advanced peoples of to-day, even though they have continued to live until very recently in essentially stone-age conditions. We know something about primitive man from the remains of his body, his artifacts, and his environment. In order to enter into his life we can only proceed cautiously by inference from this fortunately growing material and from what preceded and followed him in the course of evolution. *Homo primigenius* seems to have died out in Europe, although possibly surviving elsewhere, as in Africa and Syria; but before he disappeared, Aurignacian man became the heir of what he had to transmit and was able to carry the development further. The fact that in Australia, which was separated from the mainland already in tertiary times and felt the effects of the last glacial epoch, practically all types of eolithic and paleolithic stone industry have been found is significant, because it shows how long nascent humanity and distinctly human life have existed in this huge island, what social transformations are likely to have occurred, and how far from absolutely primitive, albeit exceedingly suggestive in its archaic features, the life is with which recent observers have made us familiar. Besides, the fossils have all been found on the surface, and no remains of the worker have yet been discovered there.

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[1] Foreword to A. Moret and G. Davy, *From Tribe to Empire,* 1926, pp. xiiff.

Nevertheless, these sources have yielded an abundance of information which has been carefully sifted, verified, classified, and interpreted. While there is a difference of opinion on many points, and here, as in other fields of science, the results are of necessity tentative and subject to revision, certain conclusions have been reached that seem to indicate at least the main steps in the development of man's religious life. It has become increasingly evident that the belief in a soul, or spirit, dwelling in or outside of an object appeared only at a comparatively late stage. Animism, a term derived from *animus, anima,* soul, can no longer be regarded as the earliest form of religion. A multitude of facts has accumulated tending to show that during long periods of his existence man had as yet no conception of a soul. As it seems improper, and is certainly misleading, to designate as animism a view to which the notion of a soul is still foreign, ethnologists have proposed the use of the term animatism, from *animatus,* living, rather than primitive animism, for this earlier conception, since it seems to be characterized by the ascription of life to objects of every kind, whether we consider them as living or not. If this term is employed, however, it is important to bear in mind that what is typical of the pre-animistic view is not only the failure to distinguish clearly between the animate and inanimate, but also the tendency to ascribe to certain objects whether animate or inanimate, a peculiar quality, an extraordinary power. It is precisely because we find this peculiar element of power ascribed by backward peoples to certain individual objects, regardless of whether they are men and animals or stones, trees and stars, that the inference has been drawn that at least in very early times all things appeared to man as being alive. The analogy suggested by some actions of very small children may easily be overstressed. They are in part, no doubt, unconscious and involuntary reflex actions or due to emotional stimuli. The primitive man whose customs and ideas we seek to study was in many respects a child, but he was after all an adult specimen of the human species. Even animal life furnishes a wealth of examples of a very acute sense of essential differences between natural objects. But there is enough to intimate that man carried with him from his remote ancestry a certain vagueness of apperception that made it possible for him to attach to some inanimate as well as to some animate things a quality it is more natural for us to limit to the latter. In fact, the awe inspired by unusual phenomena is also found in the animal world, and is likely to go back to man's pre-human experience. Strange objects or occurrences in nature seem to affect uncivilized men and higher animals in very much the same way, producing a sense of fear, driving them to flee for safety, and a fascination that holds them to the spot and draws them nearer. Their minds are apt to be filled with wonder. Whether terror or curiosity prevails, or the effect is relatively slight, depends upon individual sensitiveness which greatly varies. With the growing consciousness of man an explanation is sought. The simplest is that the object or phenomenon possesses an extraordinary force, a hidden power.

For this power R. A. Codrington[2] found among the Melanesians the designation *mana*. Essentially the same conception, under a variety of names, has been discovered in various parts of the world. Not only the Polynesian *tabu* or *tapu* and the Australian *arunkulta,* but also the *orenda* of the Iroquois, the *manitu* of the Algonquins, and the *wakonda* of the Sioux, as well as the *hasina* of the Malagasis and the *eki* of some of the Congo tribes, refer to this force. N. Söderblom[3] has suggested that the same applies to the neutral *brahman* of India, the Homeric *thymos,* and the Scandinavian *hamingya.* The Egyptian *ka,* in its original meaning, is no doubt another example. Just as tabu, indicating that which is withdrawn from ordinary use, is especially marked, holds an exceptional position, has become generally employed as a term for the object possessed of the power, so mana has, largely through the studies of R. R. Marett,[4] come to be the common term for the power itself that makes it dangerous to approach the object, imposes the necessity of careful treatment, and yet awakens the desire to share in its peculiar quality. Marett's opinion that manaism represents the minimal content of religion and a most primitive form of human thought has recently been questioned. It has been suggested by several students that some very backward peoples seem to have no notion of extraordinarily power-filled objects, and maintained by R. C.

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[2] *Melanesian Anthropology and Folklore,* 1891.

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[3] *Gudstrons Uppkomst,* 1914; German tr. *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens,* 1916, pp. 65ff., iii.

[4] *The Conception of Mana,* 1910.

Thurnwald[5] that this conception presupposes an already somewhat highly differentiated society, a social stratification based on recognized distinctions of mental capacity. But animals and savages, like children, are also quite apt to take things for granted and to feel at home in their environment, without being much disturbed by anything that happens in it, however extraordinary. It is not every child that looks out upon the world with open-eyed wonder; it is the sensitive, imaginative child. In early society he becomes the seer, the dreamer, the questioner, the experimenter, the pathfinder; and tribe differs from tribe in mental endowment. It may well be that the Kpelle negroes in West Africa, studied by Westermann, and the Bambara, observed by Henry, to whom Thurnwald[6] calls special attention, not only do not make a distinction between animate and inanimate in the manner we do, have no idea of a soul, or of soul-stuff, and draw no boundary line between "rational and irrational, natural and supernatural, the possible and the impossible," but actually divide all sorts of things, inorganic as well as organic, in those that seem to them living and those that appear to them as dead, from the point of view of their practical importance as they have to be dealt with in everyday life. In all realms things may possess the quality that makes them appear animated; all things do not possess this quality; some things are negligible and need not be considered. At bottom this distinction seems to be of the same nature as that involved in the mana-conception elsewhere, except that there would be no sense of unusually power-laden objects, no reflection upon varying degrees of animation, if the observations are correct. The presence of totemism among these tribes renders this dubious.

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[5] "Mana" in Ebert, *Reallexikon der Vorgeschichte,* VIII, 1927.

[6] "Primitives Denken," *Ibid.,* X, pp. 306ff.

No doubt the forms of social organization have always influenced man's thought. Those found among the backward peoples to-day have unquestionably had a tendency to intensify the idea of tabu. Some of them are obviously late. It does not follow, however, that the conception of mana and tabu is a product of any particular system now surviving. The fact of leadership must indeed be earlier than the attempt to account for it. But leadership and social organization antedate humanity. When Eduard Meyer[7] declares that "the state is older than the human race," the expediency of using the term "state" may perhaps be questioned, even if the line between man and his ancestor is drawn as late as he is inclined to do.[8] Essentially Aristotle was right in calling man a "political animal," and this applies to *homo primigenius* and his predecessors as well. Wherever there is social life there must of necessity be some sort of organization, involving leadership and inequality of capacities and functions. Such an organization is exemplified in the animal world. Of special interest are the loosely organized bands of anthropoidal apes. This type of association is well known to occur in gibbons, baboons, macoques, langurs, proboscis monkeys, and guerezas. The circumstance that mana is so generally ascribed by uncivilized folk, not only to animals and men, but also to inanimate things, and that the sense of awe and fascination, fear and curiosity, shared by the higher animals, so naturally would have led, with the growth of consciousness, to the simple explanation that there was a peculiar power resident in certain phenomena, individuals, and groups, renders it highly probable that we have in this conception, and the practices and feelings associated with it, the earliest form of man's religion.

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[7] *Geschichte des Altertums,* I, 1,^{3} 1910, p. 11.

A particularly close relationship existed between early man and the animals. Some of them were small, weak, and harmless; others were large, strong, or otherwise dangerous. Against the latter man had to defend himself, and the struggle was hazardous and cruel. When with his superior intelligence and his weapons he succeeded in overcoming them, he could eat their flesh and drink their blood. Some were very different from him, others were like himself; with some he could cohabit, with others not. At the appearance of a powerful animal or a specially cunning beast he was filled with awe. He wanted to run away for shelter; he also wanted to stay, to watch, and to try his strength. It was an object possessed of mana, and this peculiar power at once repelled and attracted him. The quality of one animal impressed itself upon one group of men, that of another animal upon another group of men. Animals of one kind fought with animals of another kind. It seemed desirable to enter into friendly relations with some against the others. This could be accomplished by not approaching them in a hostile manner, not hunting, catching, and killing them, but showing regard for them and doing them favors. The striking quality observed in them made them dangerous, and therefore valuable allies. Such an alliance amounted to an identification. If the animal was a bear, the allied human group became bears, called themselves bears, regarded themselves as bears, and expected to be treated as bears by their animal friends. As the sharp distinction we are accustomed to make between the animal and the plant, the organic and the inorganic, was still wholly foreign to man's mind, it seemed possible to enter into the same relations with a tree, a stone, or a stream, as with a beast, a bird, or a reptile.

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[8] *Ibid.*, 1, 2,[3] 1913, p. 944.

For this special application of the mana-principle the term totemism has come into use. Already in 1791, G. Long[9] reported this "religious superstition" among the Ojibway Indians. He said "they never kill, hunt, or eat the animal whose form they think the *totam* bears." The same custom was found among the Hurons, the Iroquois, and the Sioux, and the name *totem,* "tribal mark," seems to be derived from *ote,* "clan," "tribe," and the possessive suffix *m.* In 1841 G. Gray[10] described an identical custom in Western Australia, where the term *kobong* was used, and since then totemistic ideas and practices have been found widely prevalent among uncivilized peoples. A vast amount of direct observations in various fields is now available. Especially valuable are the descriptions by B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen of totemism in Australia and by F. Boas in North America. Important accounts have also been given by other competent observers in Africa, Melanesia, and Polynesia. Its real significance was first pointed out by J. F. McLennan.[11] The most comprehensive collection of the material was provided in the monumental work of F. G. Frazer,[12] and contributions of great value were made, particularly by Andrew Lang,[13] E. Durkheim,[14] B. Ankermann,[15] and R. C. Thurnwald.[16]

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[9] *Voyages and Travels of an Indian Interpreter,* 1791, p. 86.

[10] *Journals of Two Expeditions of Discovery in North-West and Western Australia,* 1841, pp. 225ff.

As to the origin of totemism, its effect upon the social organization, and its religious importance the views of these investigators differ in many respects, but the points on which they agree are more significant. After discarding several theories proposed by himself and others, Frazer seeks its origin in the startling impression made by some animal, or other object, upon a pregnant woman unaware of the cause of her condition. Andrew Lang derives it from the name attached to a human and animal group. Durkheim finds it in the impersonal force associated with the animal, creating the social consciousness of the clan. Ankermann ascribes it to the actual relation of the two groups and the playful imitation of the animals. Thurnwald looks for it in the belief of a group, forming a spiritual bond between those belonging to this faith, in the common descent of a family, sept, or clan, and the sense of dependence upon the power, assistance, and protection of a certain animal, or other object. Since totemism in this sense does not seem to exist among hunters and collectors like the Pygmies, the Veddas, the Bergdama, the Bushmen, the Eskimos, and others, he thinks that it originated among planters of gardens, chiefly women, and shepherds.

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[11] *Fortnightly Review,* 1869, VI, pp. 407ff., 562ff.

[12] *Totemism and Exogamy,* 1910.

[13] *The Secret of the Totem,* 1905.

[14] *La Vie Religieuse,* 1912.

[15] *Anthropos,* X, 1915, pp. 586ff.; in Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religiongeschichte,* 1925, I, pp. 165ff.

[16] "Die Psychologie des Totemismus" in *Anthropos,* 1919-1920, pp. 3ff.; "Totemismus" in *Reallexikon der Vorgeschichte,* 1929.

According to Spencer and Gillen some Australian tribes are ignorant of the connection between the sex act and the birth of a child, and the same has been reported concerning the natives of the Trobriand Islands, east of New Guinea. Such ignorance may well have been characteristic of primitive man. The sudden appearance of an animal coincident with the first sign of life in the body of a mother may help to explain the rise of individual totems, where the totemic idea already existed, but not of the clan totem. It points, however, to the mana-conception as the source of totemism. A common name of both groups, no doubt, aided the growth of totemism. But the question still remains why a group of men should adopt, or accept for themselves, the name they applied to a certain animal. That can scarcely be due to anything else than a quality perceived in the totem. Both groups were supposed to share in this peculiar force, and its symbol naturally tended to increase the solidarity of the human group and to differentiate it from others. But a sense of belonging together and of having common interests certainly existed before the notion of kinship could be extended to an animal group. Playful mimicry, disinterested and purposeless, undoubtedly facilitated the rise of the totemic idea; but the idea itself comes to light only when an imitation of sound and gesture is employed as a useful means of ingratiation, is put to the service of inviting and maintaining friendly relations. These are themselves based on practical needs for alliance and the desire for participation in the striking quality of the totem. It is not necessary to suppose that all tribes of men have passed through the stage of fully developed totemism, which is a special application of manaism. But its apparent absence, or only rudimentary presence, among certain very backward and decadent peoples is not decisive. That Australian totemism is a foreign importation from an agricultural or nomadic people cannot be proved. Even within the human group the sense of belonging together is likely to be much earlier than speculations on a common descent. The idea of kinship was sufficiently vague to allow its being extended to an animal group. This is to-day generally admitted, and appears to indicate clearly an origin of totemism in the manaism of the pre-animistic period.

That totemism in the course of time had an important effect upon the domestication of animals and, when the totem was a plant, on the development of agriculture is universally recognized. Its immediate influence upon social life is not so unmistakable. The fact that it is very frequently associated with exogamy has naturally led to the inference that there is a direct connection. This has been denied by Frazer who looks for a separate origin of the latter in a deliberate attempt to put an end to promiscuity. Whether complete promiscuity characterized the life of *homo primigenius,* or even his immediate ancestor, or there was already at least a strong tendency toward more permanent attachments, cannot easily be determined. The data derived from backward peoples are indecisive. Recent investigations of the sexual behavior of anthropoidal apes, especially by Gerret S. Miller, Jr.,[17] Herbert Fox,[18] and O. L. Tinklepaugh,[19] seem to point to promiscuous intercourse, with no sexual cycle, but also to instances of concentrated affection and pathetic grief in the absence of a preferred mate. Miller's suggestion that the inability of the human infant to cling to its mother for nourishment and the assistance of the male may have aided in the development of a deeper and more permanent attachment is worthy of consideration. In any case, it is improbable that the obviously late and logically constructed system of Australian exogamy was immediately preceded by universal promiscuity and introduced, contrary to prevailing custom, by legislative action, great as the powers of the elders may have been.

Andrew Lang's theory has the advantage of tracing exogamy back to primitive man. The brute ancestor drives his sons away from his women and forces them to seek for mates elsewhere; he subsequently compromises by allowing them to come back home with their wives. This procedure, born of jealousy, is assumed to have set the custom; every man must capture his female companions outside the clan. That a legal system must be a crystallization of long-continued custom, and that this custom must have had a fairly simple natural origin, is obvious. But even this theory does not go back far enough, and in its assumption of the patriarchal family at the very outset fails to account for the rise of the uterine clan, and the bisection of the clan into two regularly intermarrying parts. In spite of its tendency to confuse things that to us are distinct and to ascribe mana or animation to objects of all sorts, the mind of primitive man must have occupied itself intensely with the difference between his own kind and other kinds and between males and females. When it was found necessary even in civilized nations like the Hittites and the Hebrews[20] to legislate against lying with beasts, it is evident that in the earliest times this custom must have been much more common. Among animals with whom cohabitation was possible, some were very closely akin to the human race. Between the various branches of the anthropoids the urge in this direction is known to be especially strong. The lure of the strange, dangerous, and difficult must have exerted a very strong influence, while the totemic idea may well have led to general avoidance of one kind and preference for another, and this in turn to a similar attitude toward differing groups within the human race. Thurnwald and others also assume original ethnic differences between the intermarrying moieties of the clan.

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[17] "Some Elements of Sexual Behavior in Primates," *Journal of Mammalogy,* IX, Nov. 1928.

[18] "The Birth of Two Anthropoid Apes," *Ibid.,* X, Feb., 1929.

[19] "The Self-Mutilation of a Male Mæacus Rhesus Monkey," *Ibid.,* IX, Nov., 1928.

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[20] Frederic Hrozny, *Code Hittite,* 1922, 187, 188; J. F. H. Zimmern, *Hethitische Gezetze,* 1922, 73, 74; Lev. xviii, 23; xx, 15f.; Ex. xxii, 18.

To Durkheim and his school the most elementary social unit, the clan, is totemic and exogamous, and exogamous because totemic. The original clan was characterized by uterine kinship and exogamy. Endogamy and reckoning of descent through the father are everywhere later developments. The majority of Australian and North American tribes have preserved the primitive type; the Arunta in Australia have departed from this original practice, and the passage from patrilinear to uterine totemism in the case of some American tribes is improbable. The phratry is at once the initial totemic grouping from which the various clans are sprung and the total grouping of such secondary clans, hence of totemic nature, while the matrimonial classes, having no distinct totems, represent different generations in the clan, and the tribe, which is a political society of later growth, becomes endogamous and tends to break up the totemic system. This process has been recently set forth, with marked logical consistency, by G. Davy.[21] It is difficult, however, to accept his interpretation *in toto.* Not only may descent in respect to the totem, as Davy recognizes, be either uterine, patrilinear, or local, but the idea of descent of a group from either a totem or a human ancestor is probably less primitive than the simple notion of kinship, or friendly relationship. There is too wide a prevalence of divergent types of practice among savage peoples, and the distance from primitive man is too great, to exclude other possibilities, and the explanations of facts that seem to contravene the theory are sometimes more ingenious than convincing. The social organization may have developed in different ways in different areas under the influence of physical conditions, occupations, and mental characteristics, and the story of the earliest migrations, customs, and ideas is still very largely a matter of conjecture. Nevertheless the bold attempt of Durkheim and Davy to trace, from their point of view, the evolution of human society is stimulating and helpful. It leaves a distinct impression that, whatever may be the validity of the main thesis, totemism has greatly affected the marriage relations of early man, and that the system of uterine kinship is likely to go back to the pre-animistic period, even though it be not the only one in vogue then.

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[21] A. Moret and G. Davy, *From Tribe to Empire,* 1926.

Frazer and others have denied that totemism has any religious significance, chiefly because their definition of religion excludes certain phenomena they would count as belonging purely to a stage of magic preceding the rise of religion. A more adequate definition of religion and a clearer understanding of magic as a distinct and concurrent derivative of the mana-conception tend to deprive this view of its plausibility. On the other hand, Durkheim puts the strongest emphasis upon the religious character of totemism. It is not the totem-animal as such, but the invisible force, or mana, in which both groups share, that creates the solidarity and community of life in the clan. The totemic principle is the clan, its consciousness of itself, its cohesive force. The attitude toward this force, though it is impersonal, is essentially the same as in all other phases of religion, and resembles indeed that of the modern scientist to the forces of nature. All members of the clan are in a relation of consubstantiality with the totem; its essence is theirs. It resides more particularly in the blood, which is the sacred vehicle, and woman's blood is more sacred than man's. When she periodically loses blood, this allows the sacred principle to escape and exposes it to the dangers of contact, hence she is tabu. But the prohibition applies only to those of the same totem; for others it does not exist. That is how marriage came to be lawful only between clans of different totems. To emphasize the sacredness of the totemic force, Durkheim has not hesitated to speak of it as a divinity. Since he also identifies it with the clan, this has led to a misunderstanding, as though he intended to apotheosize a group of human beings. This has been corrected and placed in its right perspective by Davy.

A statement of the religious meaning of totemism in such terms as Durkheim uses is apt to seem more extravagant than it really is. When a group of primitive men observe in a group of animals about them certain similarities to themselves, but also a certain power beyond their own, inspiring awe and fear, curiosity and confidence, and for their protection seek to enter into profitable and friendly relations with them, employing the same means, imitation, respect, and service, that they use in dealing with their own kind, this is at bottom a devotion, not to the animal as such, but to the mana residing in the totem, which to them appears as the highest object to be attained. This devotion to an impersonal force, manifested in peculiar customs and tabus, assists in a marked degree the differentiation of a group from others, and enhances the sense of a common life and the importance of maintaining it. By a share in this force, obtained through appropriate actions, the clan can be kept alive and increase. Its members must not be killed, because something of the mana resides in them. Whether originally its females became tabu to its males because of the periodic loss of blood may indeed be questioned. It may have been a relatively early attempt to account for an already existing tabu. But within any species the most fundamental physical distinction is that between male and female. Each to the other is an object of danger and attraction, fear and desire. The peculiar quality, revealing itself in form and function, evokes the same two sets of sensations that the totemist experiences in dealing with the mana-filled animal. Were it not for nature's imperious demands for some sort of an equilibrium between these conflicting sensations, there might have been a universal tabu and consequent extinction, or a perpetuation of promiscuity with possibly the same result. But just as totemism naturally led to an injunction against killing the members of the clan and of the allied animal group, except under definite restrictions, while others were freely allowed to be slain for protection and nourishment, so it seems to have had a tendency to introduce a tabu against the women of the clan effective upon its men and also against the women of some other clans, while allowing sexual intercourse with a specially designated group for the increase of the clan, and similar restrictions in the totemic endogamous clan. The religious effect of these tabus, derived from the totemic principle, has been very great. They have paved the way for the conception of the inviolability of man's life and the sacredness attached to his sexual relations.

Even more intimate than with the animals were the relations of early man with the members of his own species, his fellow men. Among them, too, there were individuals who distinguished themselves from the rest. They could accomplish what others could not do, see what others were incapable of seeing, express themselves in a manner impossible to others. They succeeded where others failed, they were the leaders whom others followed, they possessed mana. The extraordinary things they could accomplish were a matter of observation; what limits there might be were not at all obvious. They could make tools and fashion other things with these, produce weapons and perform marvelous feats, find substances that gave them special strength, lay down rules and see that they were obeyed. It was dangerous to approach them, to offend them, to injure them. Could they create trees, mountains, and rivers, fish, fowl, beasts, and men? Such as they must have made them, men filled with hidden power, working laboriously with their hands to finish the product. When they had fashioned these objects and left useful instructions as regards the means of obtaining nourishment, they departed, crawled into the earth, trekked toward the north, went into the clouds or into the shining places in the sky. As they were gone away, there was no need of bothering about them. No gift could be offered to them, no measures of defense against them were necessary. They were beyond reach. That they were not conceived of as a horde, a large race of titans, but as especially power-filled individuals is evident from the fact that attention concentrated on a limited number of them, two or even one only. They were not spirits or gods, not *dei otiosi.* They were not, at any rate originally, considered as ancestors. It is doubtful whether those who first thought about them were acquainted with the secret of paternity. They were foregoers, mana-filled human beings, who once upon a time had fashioned things and founded ceremonies, and then disappeared.

For this special application of the mana-conception the term muraism, or mura-muraism, is now employed. It is derived from a word used by the Dieri, a people living in stone-age conditions in the neighborhood of Lake Eyre in Central Australia, to designate such primeval powerful artificers and founders of tribal rites as have been described above. *Mura* in their language seems to mean "holy" in the sense of "apart from others," "distinguished." The plural *mura-mura* refers to the class, the singular *mura* to the individual. A. W. Howitt[22] gives the following account: "Mura-muras, male and female, are nothing more than the legendary predecessors or prototypes of the Dieri, who roamed over the country, resembling the present natives in their customs and mode of life, though they excelled them in their magical powers and the wonderful feats they performed." "These mura-mura," says W. Wundt[23] quite accurately, "are phantastic beings of former times who have left to the present generations magical tools and instructed the forefathers in the magical ceremonies, and besides have, according to some legends, created the totem-animals or changed themselves into totem-animals." Much information concerning muraism and similar conceptions in various parts of the world have been gathered by C. Strehlow,[24] M. Leonhardi,[25] Leo Frobenius,[26] A. Le Roy,[27] Mrs. Langloh Parker,[28] and other observers.

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[22] *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia,* 1904, pp. 475ff.

[23] *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie,* 1912, p. 229.

More clearly than any other primitivologist Nathan Söderblom[29] has, in a lucid exposition of the available material and in a trenchant criticism of the pertinent theories, set forth the nature and significance of this religious phenomenon. Especially convincing is his critique of the attempt by P. W. Schmidt,[30] an eminent ethnologist, to find in it the evidence of a primitive monotheism. A tendency is indeed noticeable, here and there, to give to one of these "Urheber," or originators, a particularly exalted position and to assign to him or her a descriptive name and a very extensive creative function in the past. It is, therefore, tempting, if the religious context is not sufficiently considered and the underlying assumption as to the course of religious development seems to demand it, to imagine a weak and vanishing echo of a primitive revelation where the facts are more naturally explained in connection with the phenomenon as a whole. These originators are not spirits or gods. There is no effort to conciliate them, no sacrificial cult, no personal relations. So little is there of what is generally associated with religion that some muraistic tribes have been declared to be utterly devoid of religious sentiment. It is not strange that names of these beings occur, like Mungan ngana, Olorum, Bayami, Bundyil, Ngambi, Nuralie, Batara. Whenever men themselves, or at least their chiefs, began to be referred to by a descriptive word, their mighty predecessors may well have received such appellations. Where things come from is a problem that already excites the curiosity of the child and the savage, and the simplest answer is that some one has made them.

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[24] *Die Arunda-und Loritja-Stämme in Centralaustralien,* 1907-11, edited by M. Leonhardi.

[25] "Der Mura und die Mura-mura der Dieri" in *Anthropos,* 1909, p. 1095ff.

[26] *Die Weltanschauung der Naturvölker,* 1898.

[27] *La Religion des Primitifs,* 1909, pp. 176ff.

[28] *More Australian Legendary Tales,* 1898, pp. 184ff.

[29] "Die Allväter der Primitiven, zur Frage nach den Anfängen des Gottesglaubens," in *Religion und Geisteskultur,* 1907, p. 315ff.; *Gudstrons Uppkomst,* 1914, and numerous other Swedish publications referred to in this book; *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens,* 1916, pp. 114ff., new ed. 1926.

[30] "Grundlinien einer Vergleichung der Religionen und Mythologien der Austronesischen Völker," in *Denkschriften der K. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien,* 1910; *Ursprung der Gottesidee,* 2d. ed. 1928.

The idea of creation is quite primitive; it is not a *creatio ex nihilo,* however, but a fashioning of various objects in essentially the same way as man makes things. It seemed as necessary, and no more marvelous, that the mura-mura should be able to fashion men as that they could produce the first *churingas,* the bull-roarers, which are whirled and emit a sound that has magical properties. This ability raised them to a lofty plane, yet their character as human beings, though capable of many changes, was not substantially affected by their migrations. Neither were they a product of ancestor-worship or nature-worship, nor were they identified with their later abodes as spirits or gods. The effects of muraism upon subsequent phases of religion, have, without a question, been incalculably great, as Söderblom has shown, even though there be much that is tentative in his valiant endeavor to follow its traces through various religious systems.

Such appear to have been the typical features of man's religion in the earlier periods of the Mousterian age before the emergence of animism. There is as yet no idea of a soul, no conciliation or worship of spirits, no sacrificial cult. But there is a distinction between objects possessing a peculiar impersonal power and others devoid of it.

If the former are designated as sacred and the latter as profane, it is important not to read into these terms the full content we assign to them, but to see in this division the fruitful germs of later conceptions. It is also necessary not to stress too exclusively either fear of the gruesome, the uncanny, the terrible or trust and delight in the fascinating, the dependable, the satisfying. Both elements are present and priority can be ascribed to neither, any more than to one rather than the other of the simple sensations of like and dislike, pain and pleasure. The significant thing about manaism in all its expressions, and especially in totemism and muraism, is that it raised man above himself and directed his thought, will, and feelings toward what to him was a realm of the highest realities. It was the elative faculty within him that lifted him upward and brought him in touch, however unconscious he may have been of their processes, with the forces operating in the life of the community and in the universe.

CHAPTER III

SPIRITS AND GODS

RELIGION can no longer be regarded as having its origin in animism. Edward B. Tylor[1] who, in 1867, introduced the term was quite aware of some of the facts that make this assumption impossible. But he failed to discern their real significance, coördinating and confusing the distinct ideas of "animated life in all nature" and "the presence of innumerable spiritual beings." Today it has become evident that religion manifested itself, during long periods of man's life, in the simpler forms of manaism, totemism, and muraism, intelligible only as products of an earlier preanimistic mentality. Yet it is probable that already in the latter part of the Mousterian age the conception of a soul, or spirit, began to appear among men of the Neandertal type. Indications of a special care for the body of the dead in connection with the remains of *homo primigenius,* found at La Chapelle-aux-Saints, Le Moustier, and

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[1] *Lectures at the Royal Institution:* "Traces of the Primitive Culture of Man," 1867; *Primitive Culture*^{4}, 1903.

La Farrassie, may not be considered as unmistakable evidences of such a belief. But they at least point to an advance in this direction. Attention has been recently called, especially by Hans Naumann[2] and G. Wilke,[3] to the conception of the living corpse. The dead body is treated as though it were alive. It is provided with food and drink, tools and weapons, covering and fire, ornaments and companions. The dead is looked upon as still living, and death as a phase of life. Even in the case of a very powerful individual, the mana, or peculiar strength, residing in him seems at times to desert him. He occasionally fails to perform what he has undertaken; he cannot do any mighty deeds; he is overcome by man and beast, is injured, becomes weak and diseased. But the mana reasserts itself, and he is again an object of fear and trust. Sometimes these conditions, though temporary, last long and have all the aspects of death. What was in reality death may, therefore, have been accepted as an actual survival, without any distinction being made between the body and a soul. With the character and slow development of primitive mentality, this may long have been sufficient to satisfy such curiosity as existed.

[2] *Primitive Gemeinschaftskultur,* 1921, pp. 18ff.

[3] "Lebender Leichnam," in *Reallexikon der Vorgeschichte,* XVII, 1926.

In course of time, however, other experiences and observations in connection with the dead must have given rise to further speculation. If the especially mana-filled individual, on whom naturally attention was first centered, was still thought of as alive, though the power was in abeyance, the failure of a change for the better to set in created a painful suspense. No cover or fire could warm the body, no smearing with red stuff restore the normal color of life, no pleasing odors remove the stench of putrefaction. Horror and disgust mingled with feelings of affectionate regard and confidence. What had become of the secret power? The inability to move and to act was not so startling. In sleep the body remained where it was, often very quietly, and in sickness it was incapable of work, often of the most ordinary activities. But something seemed to have gone that was always there before, especially the breath that used to come out of the mouth, and the image that used to be seen in the pupil of the eye. In the case of those slain with sharp weapons it was also noticed that the blood came out in a stream, but this did not happen to all who died. How could the dead be still alive, if the breath had disappeared, and yet, if any object in nature, even a stone, might be mana-possessed, how could the mighty dead, even though deprived of his breath, be otherwise than living?

A way out of this dilemma of thought was found in animism. The breath began to be regarded, not so much as the sign of a secret impersonal force, as of the presence within the body of a corporeal entity distinct from it, an image of it, like that in the eye, in the water, or in the shadow. This conception of an image-soul tended to explain certain experiences in sleep, hysteria, hallucination, swoons, and epilepsy. In his ordinary dream-life and in disordered mental states, man had communication with the dead, saw them as they had been, talked with them and heard them speak, was frightened by them and fought with them, or loved them and rejoiced with them, as well as with the living far and near. As the body remained in its place, it was naturally supposed, when the idea had once taken root, that it was the double within that had these experiences. The independence with which the image-soul could move in time and space led to the notion of the free spirit, as Wundt[4] has shown. It also enhanced the consciousness of self and curiosity as to its nature. Was there within man only one soul or several? Was the image-soul which left the

[4] *Völkerpsychologie,* IV; *Mythus und Religion,* I, 2,^{2} 1914.

body with the breath the same as that which roamed about in his dreams? Were there several souls, or centers of soul-stuff, corresponding to differently functioning parts of the body? When a man wanted to do something, wondered about something, or felt something deeply, he concluded that it was the action of his soul, or of one of his souls.

The new egocentric orientation forced reflection on the relation of will, thought, and emotion to some such entity. It likewise caused a change in the conception of other things. Not only did the dead have ghosts that must be reckoned with, but animals were invested with souls, all kinds of objects became the abodes of spirits, and spirits without any permanent dwelling-place were moving freely, hither and thither. The ghosts were still corporeal. They hovered about the dead body, required sustenance, and demanded service, evoked the same feelings as the living corpse, intensified by their more definite character. They were more to be feared, more to be trusted, more capable of beneficent or maleficent action. They could punish their enemies or those who slighted them and reward their friends. It became necessary to conciliate them, and a sacrificial cult developed. Propitiatory rites grew up. Ancestor worship was possible, whether paternity was understood or not, whether descent was counted in the mother's line or the father's. Partly, at least, for protection against the mischievous activities of ghosts, the body was removed, exposed to the wild beasts, mutilated, contracted, tightly wrapped, covered with stones, buried in the ground, or burned. When endowed with a soul, the sacred animal was treated in a similar manner, with essentially the same expressions of caution and respect, even after death. What was allowed or forbidden in regard to the totem was more minutely prescribed. Every mana-filled object, whether a tree, a stone, a mountain, a volcano, a stream, or a star, as the abode of a spirit, became more dangerous and more fascinating. A greater sanctity attached itself to human personalities whose extraordinary ability betokened the presence of a powerful soul. Where the conception of mura-muras had prevailed, these mighty foregoers tended to become ancestral souls or nature-spirits, though their peculiar creative functions helped to preserve through ages clear traces of their original character.

Ankermann[5] has rightly emphasized how hazardous it is to assume that any particular type of primitive thought or custom must of necessity have existed at some time in every group of men and appeared everywhere, in an inevitable sequence of such types, as a phase of religious development. Nevertheless, the evidence of animistic conceptions, collected and examined by numerous competent investigators, is so extensive and comes from so many different parts of the world that it is scarcely possible to doubt that they were once well-nigh universally held, and their origin is becoming increasingly manifest. Where and when they first emerged cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. They may have originated in one group and spread from there or arisen independently from the same considerations in different groups. It is possible that they go back to the end of the Mousterian age, and were taken over and more fully developed by Aurignacian man. In the Magdalenian period, and the contemporaneous Capsian, their presence is clearly indicated by archæological remains scattered over wide areas. The tremendous effect of animism cannot be questioned. Ideas of a soul and its survival after death, and of spirits like the human soul, dwelling in certain objects, or moving freely in space, have dominated the course of later religious development down to the present day. Together with survivals of manaism, totemism, and muraism, imperfectly or not at all merged with it, animism prepared the way for the gods.

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[5] In Alfred Bertholet and Edvard Lehmann, *Lehrbuch der Religiongeschichte,* I, 1925, p. 133.

Out of the realm of ghosts and spirits the gods came forth. Ultimately they owed their existence to the sense of impersonal forces manifesting themselves in special objects, in a natural environment where anything might be conceived of as animated. But the most important factor in bringing them into being seems to be the inferences drawn by man, in a later stage of his mental growth, from observations of himself, dead and living, and the ascription by analogy of an image-soul like his own to other things. This does not preclude the possibility that, here and there, a god may have been derived immediately from some simple form of manaism, without having passed through the stage of distinct spirithood. No date can be assigned to the birth of the first god. He can no more be found than the first man. It is not possible to draw a line of demarcation between spirits and gods at the point where the peculiarities of the latter begin to reveal themselves. The gods were made in the image of man, but this image itself was gradually unfolded to his consciousness. Perhaps the safest statement is that the gods possessed more human qualities than the spirits and some of these in an intenser degree. They continued to be attached to the same objects, but acquired more freedom, and associated themselves in a more personal way, more effectively and more permanently, with the growing social organizations, and in turn reacted upon them.

One phase of this development is suggested by Ankermann: [6]

> Tribes among whom each sept lives by itself, without other connection than that caused by intermarriage, have only ancestral cult and magic; gods come into existence only when, with the growing together of the sept into larger communities, the possibility arises of a class of powerful beings superior to the dead and the magical objects.

Very slowly the gods rose above the ancestral spirits, and freed themselves from their close connection with the totem or with other natural objects. Ancestor worship continued and became characteristic of some important civilizations; while especially mana-filled individuals, endowed with a soul, tended to become gods. Animal worship continued and became typical of other civilizations. Wiedemann[7] has lucidly described its place in Egyptian life and shown its relation to neolithic totemism. A multitude of other things in nature, similarly provided with a spirit, remained objects of worship. Among them the waxing, waning, and disappearing moon, and the stars attracted the special attention of shepherds tending their flocks by night, while the sun, giving and withholding its light and heat according to the seasons, and the earth producing its fruit, acquired particular importance to tribes settled down to agriculture. An advancing technique permitted a more adequate expression of ideas and sentiments.

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[6] *Loc. cit.*, p. 175.

How the struggle of the gods for preëminence continued is revealed in sculpture, pictures, and systems of writing. It is, no doubt, in the larger political field, tribal, urban, or ethnic, that the functions proper to the gods develop. They are defenders against common enemies, providers of all things needful, protectors against natural calamities, directors of collective activities, and upholders of the recognized customs. There are gods many, male and female, great and small, of sterner or gentler aspect. Like the spirits, who may be good or evil demons, they are predominantly terror-inspiring or of friendly disposition, even to their worshipers. If they have developed out of the totem animals, something of the beast lives in them; if they were once ancestral spirits, something of their incalculable willfulness still resides in them. They are subject to the same vicissitudes as men. Their strength is not always the same; they pine away and die, but they also come back to life again. They move at times from their customary abodes, take on other forms, reveal their presence in new ways. Art represents them sometimes as animals, sometimes as mixtures of man and beast, sometimes as men, living or dead. This at once reflects the conception of them, and helps to perpetuate it. There is a tendency toward the human form. In Mesopotamia the gods represented as men are always higher and kindlier than those appearing as mixtures of man and animal, or as animals. But whatever the form, the community looks upon the local god as the highest. Even a strong god of another locality, who has been conquered and whose image has been carried away, takes a secondary place.

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[7] *"Der Tierkult der alten Aegypter,"* 1912.

Only the further political development and the intenser occupation with the celestial, atmospheric, and chthonic powers gave rise to divinities holding a wider sway. When a sanctuary becomes the meeting place of a tribe, or several tribes, or a city becomes the capital of a large kingdom, and the local god is also associated with the earth, the storm cloud, the sky, the moon, or the sun, his power is greatly increased. Lesser divinities take a rank below him, and those who might be considered his rivals likewise grow in stature. Thus hierarchies of gods arise. Groups of gods are formed and arranged in order of importance or seniority, in pairs, in families made up of father, mother, and son, in heptads, enneads, and dodecads. If the matriarchate prevails, the mother, if the patriarchate, the father, becomes the head of the pantheon. Dyaush-pitar, Zeus and Jupiter, Ishtar and Cybele, Marduk and Assur, Ptah and Amen Re are examples. Several roads lead from such a divine monarchy to monotheism. Monolatry, or the worship of one great god to the neglect and ultimate exclusion of all others, is one of these. Yahwe became the sole god of the Jews, Ahura Mazda of the Zoroastrians. Kathenotheism, or the ascription of all the qualities and functions of divinity for the time being to the particular god addressed, is another. This seems to have led to the monotheism of Ikh n Aton in

Egypt, and tendencies in the same direction are seen elsewhere. Still another way is that of abstract thought, seeking for unity in multiplicity and the reality behind the phenomena, and removing from the god-conception its more obvious limitations. This was tried especially in India and in Greece.

The conviction that there is only one god brought distinct relief to the religious sentiment, widened the intellectual horizon, and gave to devotion a more adequate object. It was no longer necessary to conciliate and depend upon a multitude of divinities, with conflicting interests and divergent demands. There remained indeed, a world of spirits, good and evil, degraded gods, metamorphosed into celestial princes of the nations, angels and demons, powers of the air, the stars, and the realms below, at home in their former dwelling-places or roaming about at large, performing in a limited way their usual functions. But worship was concentrated upon one divine being. The world and all that is in it, history and all its determining events, could be attributed to one creative, preserving, and controlling will. Manifestations of this unique power could be seen everywhere in a universe of whose extent and nature man became increasingly aware. The personal relations to it became more intimate, and reflected the growing improvement of the standards of morality.

Yet monotheism also introduced new difficulties. While there were many gods, one could act in a more humane manner than others. In the Babylonian story of the flood, Ishtar protests to Enlil, who had brought on the deluge: "Why hast thou destroyed my men?" The Hebrew Yahwe, beside whom there is no other god, in his anger covers the whole earth with water, and afterwards repents that he has destroyed mankind. Anthropomorphism and anthropopathism continue to characterize the one god. He has a face that may or may not be seen, hands and feet, a heart that understands and bowels that feel, a living breath and a spirit. Whether images of him in painting and sculpture are forbidden, as in Judaism and Islam, or permitted, as in Mazdaism and Christianity, his form is seen in dreams and visions, and described in inspired word-pictures. Although he moves with freedom throughout space, he dwells by preference on a mountain he has selected, in a house built for him, in the sun, or in the highest heaven. He may have no progeny at all, or an only begotten son, as in the case of Aton and the Christian god; but as a father pities his children, so he takes pity on those who fear him and may be adopted as his children in a special sense. He loves and hates, is generous and jealous, merciful and cruel. His wrath is easily kindled, and his favor may be obtained by merit and persuasion or generously bestowed. He goes forth to battle, puts his enemies to rout, and makes peace in the world. He rewards and punishes, sends his chosen ones to eternal bliss in heaven, and the non-elect to perpetual torture in hell. The heavens and the earth declare his consummate power and his marvelous skill. The growing moral sense demands with ever stronger insistence that the course of human events shall also reveal his justice and love. Prophetic voices proclaim him as a righteous god, requiring above everything else justice, mercy, and humility. In the face of disturbing facts faith clings to the confidence that what he does is right, or that, whatever the appearances may be, he will punish the sinner and reward the saint before life's journey is over. When his actual dealings with men raise questions that perplex the mind and agonize the heart, the feelings may be calmed by consideration of the mystery of his ways, by mental inertia, and servile resignation. Or relief from the oppressive weight of these problems may be sought in adjourning their solution to another world. Yet this cannot be done without leaving a disquieting uncertainty as to the fate held in store, whether in a permanently fixed destiny, or in segment after segment of a never-ending existence.

Even the jubilant hope inspired by Christianity could not remove the dread uncertainty. It was indeed most reassuring to learn that the one living god so loved the world that he had sent his only son to atone for its sins by his death and by his resurrection to open the gates of paradise to all believers. But the anxious soul could never be quite sure, in spite of all subjective experiences and all objective means of grace, that it was predestined to persevere unto the end and reap the final reward of true faith. In proportion as the transcendent glory of the deity was emphasized, its functions, at first those that seemed incongruous with its nature and then those also that were connected with creation and redemption, were transferred to subordinate beings, intermediaries between the Most High and his creatures. Among these none had a greater importance than the Jewish Messiah who, in his Christian transformation, became the supreme object of devotion. In his personality were blended some of the noblest conceptions of god and man, powerfully affecting the outlook upon life, aspiration, and conduct, but also some of the elements of weak-ness that attach to all constructions of human thought. On the other hand, as the immanence was stressed, the distinction between the divine being and nature was obscured. In either case, it tended to become less of an entity and more of an abstraction. Whether the name is preserved or not, the new conceptions to which searching inquiry has led have little in common with the idea of a god. No personal relations are possible with "the infinite," "the absolute," "the élan vital," "the ultimate reality"; and sacrifices, ceremonies, prayer, and intercession cease to have any urgency or meaning.

Inevitable as the outcome of this long development appears to be, it has had a very deep significance. Germinating in various forms of the primitive mana-conception, the belief in a soul and its existence after death, in spirits and gods, has blossomed forth and borne fruit for the nurture and healing of man's nature. Whatever its aberrations, it has been a precious product of the mighty force within that lifts him upward. It has enriched and refined his sentiments, forced his mind to face the problems of existence, and supplied his will with motives for deeds of valor, endurance, and unselfish devotion.

CHAPTER IV

MAGIC, MYTH, AND MYSTERY

In every stage of human development simple emotions, due to objective stimuli and subjective tension and movement sensations, play an important rôle. Pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, trust and fear, gratification and anger, love and hatred express themselves in various ways, in rhythmic movements, in sounds and gestures. The necessities of life stimulate desires, and these can be satisfied only by some sort of action. Experience teaches that certain ends can be obtained by the employment of certain means. Primitive man, like the animals around him, was conscious of what he wanted and familiar with some methods for achieving his end. To these he habitually resorted without immediate reflection. They had become instinctive reactions, the results of age-long efforts, innumerable trials, failures, and successes. In providing himself with food and shelter, protecting himself against enemies, and satisfying his needs of companionship, he developed his technique. With the improvement of his tools and weapons, his confidence in their efficiency increased, though he was well aware of the fact that he frequently failed. But his mentality being such that he was still incapable of making distinctions that are more obvious to us between the animate and the inanimate, the possible and the impossible, real and imaginary causes of effects, it was also natural for him to ascribe a practical value for the accomplishment of his purposes to possession of a share in the power apparent in certain objects and to certain actions that to a defective generalization seemed to be conducive to success. This peculiar quality, or impersonal power, inherent in some thing, whatever its nature, was not only an object of devotion. It was also conceived of as serviceable for the attainment of man's wishes and could be made so by special actions. These were themselves at first of a very ordinary character. But because of the intellectual limitations of man's mind, and his consequent manner of thinking, particularly in the preanimistic period, it seemed possible to assign to them effects quite out of harmony with our conceptions of causality.

Thus the expression of simple emotions, like joy or anger, love or hatred, in ejaculations, words, songs, dances, roars, grunts, or threatening gestures could be regarded as in itself effective, having the power of bringing about a result. Involuntary mimicry could turn into conscious imitation to achieve a purpose. The image of an object could be confused with the object itself and invested with something of its power, and an action affecting the former could be considered as affecting the latter as well, either because of an identification of the two or because of association by contiguity or similarity. Such conceptions and practices seemed to be justified by experience. Observation showed that sometimes the expected results followed, sooner or later. Belief in the efficiency of the rites was strengthened by the apparent success and it was in harmony with the general mental attitude. Failures did not count, and could be explained by imperfect performance or countervailing influences. Just as weapons and tools were relied upon, regardless of defeats and useless products, so the efforts to utilize for practical purposes the hidden power residing in certain objects and actions were resorted to, regardless of incidental failures.

That customs and ideas of this nature prevailed in the earliest periods of man's life, even though their fuller development belongs to the age of animism, may be regarded as certain. If the first tangible manifestations come from the remains of the industry of Aurignacian man, this is obviously due to the higher development of his artistic faculties. Paintings and decorated objects found in the caves of Altamira in Spain, De la Mouthe, Font de Gaume, and Combarelle in Dordogne, Pair non Pair in Gironde, Niaux in Ariège, and elsewhere unmistakably indicate the type of thought described above. Already the fact that these drawings and paintings of the Magdalenian period were discovered in the innermost recesses of the caves, sometimes three hundred feet from the entrance, where the artists had to illuminate the darkness with torches or stone lamps, is significant. It was necessary to hide these treasures. It was also necessary that these representations of reindeer, bisons, wild boars, bucks, horses, and men be as perfect likenesses as possible. The position of the animals, the arrows in their side, the hands seizing them, the ithyphallic figures, the peculiar decorations of wands and weapons all point to a relation supposed to exist between the imaged and the intended object. The natural interpretation of this art, in the light of our present knowledge and with full recognition of the æsthetic impulse, has been well presented by Karl

Beth.[1] An enormous amount of information concerning similar practices and beliefs among savage peoples of the present day, in the ancient civilizations, in connection with the great historic religions, in folklore and folk ways, in learned circles, and among children has been collected by careful students and is easily accessible in numerous works.

For rites and concepts of this kind the term magic is to-day used. It is derived from the Old Persian *magu.* In his Behistun inscription Darius I refers to Gaumata as *magush.* Herodotus (I, 101) mentions the Magi as one of the six Median tribes. As five of these are obviously Iranian, the name of the sixth is also supposed to be Aryan. Since *bag* appears in Gothic and *bug* in Old Irish with the meaning of "boy" or "servant," it has been thought that the name was applied to the aboriginal population, enslaved by the invading Aryans and incorporated as a distinct caste among the Medes. J. E. Moulton [2] has suggested that certain practices associated with the Magi point to this origin. Such are the exposure of the dead, marriage with next of kin, interpretation of dreams, astrological observations, fear of mountains as the abodes of evil, and the peculiar rites now spoken of as magical. These are not characteristic of the earliest type of Mazdaism found in the Gathic hymns, but come into more or less prominence in the younger parts of the Avesta or in the later history. Although some of them may be otherwise explained, this view is not lacking in plausibility. Whatever their ethnic origin, the Magi ceased to play a political rôle, devoted themselves to their occult arts, and became zealous and influential promoters of Mazdaism. Analogies are furnished by the Levites and the Chaldeans. It is doubtful whether *rab mag,* the title of Nergal shar ezar in Jeremiah xxxix, 3, means "Chief of the Magi"; and the branch that the elders in the temple at Jerusalem, alluded to in Ezekiel viii, 17, held before their faces when worshiping the sun god may not be identical with the Persian *bareçman,* which was a bunch of stalks, or derived from it, but simply a feature of the local Shemesh cult, expressing the same wish for a quickening of vegetation. In Theodotion's version of Daniel a Babylonian loan-word in Hebrew (i, 20) and Aramaic (iv, 4), signifying "enchanterers," is translated *magoi;* in Matthew ii, 1, 7, 16, the astrologers who came from the East following the star are called Magi;

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[1] *Religion und Magie bei den Naturvölkern,* 1914, pp. 111ff.
[2] "Magi" in *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics,* VIII, 1916.

in Acts xiii, 6, a Jewish sorcerer named Bar Jesus is designated as Magus, and in Acts viii, 9 Simon is said to act as a magus in Samaria.

The denominative verb is used already by Euripides, *Iphigenia,* 1338, and there are frequent references to the Magi in the later Greek writers. Through the Persian wars the Greeks became acquainted with conditions and institutions in the Achæmenian empire. The achievements of the Magi and the growing impression of Oriental wisdom gave rise to a new development of long-existing tendencies that may be traced back to the days of Homer, and beyond. In the Hellenistic period this process was accelerated. The magical papyri, now available in good editions, are of great value as sources. Their significance has recently been set forth in an admirable manner by Th. Hofner.[3] They throw light upon practices and ideas surviving among backward peoples, in the ancient civilizations, in Mediæval Europe, and clandestinely in modern times. It is no longer possible to connect all phenomena of this sort with a belief either in Angra Mainyu or in Satan. They have deeper roots and wider ramifications. But much that could not find a place in the

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[3] "Mageia" in *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft.* Neue Bearbeitung von Wissowa-Kroll, 1928, pp. 30ff.

Christian cult was long ascribed as black magic to Zoroaster and the Magi. This was done by many of the church fathers and as late as 1489 by Jacob Sprenger and Heinrich Krämer in the notorious *Malleus maleficarum,* or Witchhammer. The discovery of the Avesta and a more thorough acquaintance with Oriental lore and primitive customs tended to loosen this historic connection, place the Magi against a larger background, bring their astrology, oneiromancy, divination, and theurgy into closer relations with Babylonia, Syria, Anatolia, and Egypt, and center the attention especially on the earlier and simpler practices surviving among uncivilized peoples, while keeping in view the later developments.

Concerning the origin and nature of magic, and particularly its relation to religion there is still difference of opinion, but also a decided trend toward some important conclusions. On the basis of comprehensive studies of magical practices among uncivilized peoples, J. G. Frazer[4] elaborated a theory that proved very stimulating. It took cognizance of the distinction between imitative and contagious magic, but was in some respects quite inadequate. Frazer failed to realize the significance of emotional rites, overlooked the fundamental relation to manaism, gave too wide a scope to the homeopathic principle, and stressed unduly the principle of coercion in magic and the element of pure reason in the mentality of savages. Hence he found an analogy between magic and modern science, the fundamental conception of both being that of immutable laws, and assumed that reflection upon the futility of magic led to religion, which thus is the result of an intellectual process and consists in "a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life." [5] The transition from ordinary expressions of feelings to emotional rites was pointed out by Irving King,[6] and affective magic is now generally recognized. That magic has a distinct relation to manaism was seen by Durkheim,[7] but his emphasis upon the collective character of the mana caused him to regard it as a private, illicit, and antisocial use of this impersonal power. His view was more fully worked out by Hubert and Mauss.[8]

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[4] *The Magic Art,* 1911, I, pp. 220ff.

A confusion of white and black magic and the disrepute in which the latter has been held in some of the higher religions have affected the thinking of many students. While Marett[9] accepted the derivation of both magic and religion, as distinct social valuations, from the mana-concept, Söderblom[10] sought to trace good mana, which became religion, and bad mana, which became magic, back to mana undifferentiated, and A. Bertholet,[11] referring magic to the same sense of a mysterious potency, seemed inclined to look upon a belief in the infallibility of magical force as characteristic of an earlier stage of development and religion, consisting in a relation to personal powers, as later. Wundt[12] drew attention to the fallacy of regarding the observed sequences in nature as immutable laws. Neither did primitive man have any conception of immutable laws, nor are the "laws" of modern science immutable. The systematization of observed facts is subject to change as more facts are observed. His own theory did not go beyond animism for the origin of magic. Leuba[13] defined magic as "those practices intended to secure some definite gain by coercitive action, in essential disregard of the quantitative relations implied in the ordinary and in the scientific dealing of the physical world, and of the anthropopathic relations obtaining among persons." In addition to the principles of repetition and transmission of an effect from one object to another, he recognized that of efficiency of will-effort. As a criterion for distinguishing magic from religion he used the relation to an impersonal power, mana, as characteristic of the former, and a relation to personal unseen powers, or beings, as characteristic of the latter.

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[5] *The Golden Bough,*^{2} 1911, I, p. 222.

[6] *The Development of Religion,* 1910.

[7] *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse,* 1912.

[8] "Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie," *L'Année Sociologique,* 1902-1903, vii, pp. 1ff.

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[9] *The Threshold of Religion,* 1909, pp. 45ff.
[10] *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens,* 1916, p. 218.
[11] *Das Wesen der Magie,* 1927.
[12] *Völkerpsychologie,* 1906, II, 2, p. 180.
[13] *A Psychological Study of Religion,* 1912, pp. 154ff.

In a recent study of magic from the standpoint of experimental psychology, E. Frances Wells [14] has reached some conclusions of which a brief summary may be given. Magical phenomena are rites, things, and beliefs which involve the use of mana by persons. The psychological conditions of magical phenomena are modes and functions of contextual experience. Magical rites are acts which are accompanied by the emotion of mana, subservient to man. These are of four types. There are emotional, imitative, metaphoric, and associative rites. An emotional rite is a fusion of a mana context with a primary emotional context. An imitative rite is a fusion of a mana context with an empathic context. A metaphoric rite is a fusion of a mana context with a transferred kinæsthetic context. An associative rite is a fusion of a mana context with two or more associated kinæsthetic contexts. When the associated cores are similar, the rite is called homeopathic; when they are contiguous, contagious. Magical things are object cores whose context is the emotion of mana or an integration including it. From a genetic point of view these classes may be distinguished. A primary magical thing is a thing whose primary significance is magical due to its strangeness, unusualness. A derived primary magical thing is a thing which has acquired a magical significance through transfer of the context of a primary magical thing to it. An associate magical thing is a thing which has acquired a magical significance through association with a magical thing. Magical beliefs are beliefs whose contexts include the expression of mana and whose cores may be expressed in the formula: "If A happens, B happens," or "A causes B." It should be explained that, following E. B. Titchener, she terms the primary experience, which is always dependent upon an external stimulus, the core, and the secondary experience, which is always dependent upon the organism itself, the context. She regards the mana experience as derived from the emotion of fear modified by repetition; at first unpleasantly toned, hence bad mana, it becomes later pleasantly toned, as the avoidance reaction is replaced by attraction.

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[14] *The Psychology of Magical Phenomena.* This thesis, prepared at the suggestion of the present writer as a part of her work with him for the doctorate, has not yet been published. It was written in 1927.

> The mana *per se* is neither religious nor magical; it merely supplies the common matrix. When a mana context integrates with the context of the idea of subserviency, submission, we have religion; when a mana context integrates with the idea of dominancy, non-submission, we have magic; in magic the mana is subservient to man, in religion man is subservient to the mana.

Investigations of the steadily accumulating material from every land and age and of the mental processes involved tend to clarify our views of these phenomena. The interpenetration of magic and religion makes it also desirable to give attention to the manner in which each has influenced the other. Magic may have little or nothing in common with modern science or even with modern technology, but it furnished incentives to observation and experimentation, to art and handicraft, and to the expression of religious sentiment. It lent to religion some of its technique, and religion invested some of its practices and objects with its peculiar significance. When magic is no longer identified with anti-social black magic, and the presence of magical rites even in the more advanced religions is understood, it cannot fail to be recognized that these may, on a certain stage of development, be useful for the ends of religion. An act looked upon as effective *ex opere operato* may assist the growth of devotion to what is conceived to be the highest; and religion, always concerned about meeting man's needs, may seek to satisfy them with such means as seem to promise success. The use of forces, impersonal or personal, real or imaginary, even with all the strength available and a measure of importunity, for the promotion of human ends is in itself quite as legitimate as contemplation of them and willingness to be used by them. It is the moral quality of the ends and the intelligence in the choice of means that determine the intrinsic value.

If magic, though still running in wrong tracks may in a sense be considered as a forerunner of technology, myth may be regarded as a precursor of science, though still ignorant of its peculiar methods. It is customary to distinguish between myths as imaginary stories about gods, and legends as imaginary stories about historic personalities. This distinction is convenient and may be kept, even if it should be doubtful which term to use in regard to stories of an actually existing ancestor whose spirit has become a god, or of a hero whose historic existence is questionable. Both words refer to something spoken. The mythopoeic faculty did not begin to operate with the emergence of the god. The elements out of which longer stories concerning the objects of devotion grew were already extant in the pre-animistic period. Something was told about the mana-filled object, the totem animal, the mura-mura. But it was when the cult of spirits and gods commenced that myth-making began really to flourish. Myths developed concerning the departed ghosts, the nature-spirits, and the gods. There was an endless gossip about these invisible neighbors. All the vicissitudes of their life were of absorbing interest, their joys and sorrows, their envies and jealousies, their wars and alliances, their love affairs and offspring, their birth, and death, and resurrection, the forms they could assume to reveal themselves, their relations to human friends and foes. They had their abodes in the sky or in the air, on the earth or under the earth. Hence there were celestial, atmospheric, terrestrial, and chthonic myths. They had been in the beginning and would remain to the end. Hence there were cosmogonic and eschatological myths. Their action explained the origin of names, customs, and institutions. Hence there were ætiological myths. This great variety of motives must not be overlooked. When too much stress is laid upon one particular type, and in one realm all the available material is reduced to solar or lunar myths, in another to astral myths, and in still another to eschatological myths, it leads to an one-sided interpretation, even if tendencies in these directions, in different countries and periods, may be actually observed. Myth-making has had a great importance in man's life. It has assisted the growth of poetry and literature in general. It has also furnished incentives to scientific and philosophic speculation. When the impression could no longer be avoided that it exercised a baneful influence on morality and religion, only a temporary relief was obtained by the allegorical method employed by Dio Chrysostomus of Prusa in the case of pagan myths, and by Philo of Alexandria in the case of the Jewish myths. In proportion as this method is abandoned, and they are rightly understood, they lose their harmful quality, while retaining their perennial charm and relative historical significance.

In early societies the feeling seems to have been widely prevalent that there were things that could only be known by those who had passed through some ceremony of initiation and must not be told to everybody. There were traditions guarded by the elders of the clan, or in special groups, knowledge hidden from members of the opposite sex and from the immature, secrets that could not be divulged. In course of time some of these initiation ceremonies became a part of the official cult and were openly practiced, without losing their character of having a deep, hidden significance. Especially was this the case in connection with the great annual festivals, celebrating the changes in nature's life, caused by the birth, death, and resurrection of solar and chthonic divinities. Recently discovered Sumerian and Assyrian texts have revealed such ceremonies, as Alfred Zimmern[15] has shown; and W. Brede Kristensen[16] has, in a thoroughgoing and suggestive manner, set forth the similar rites in Egypt. As our knowledge advances, it becomes increasingly clear that the tendency to seek for fresh experiences, more intimate communion with the divine powers, and greater assurance of their assistance by particular initiation ceremonies continued to operate, with more or less recognition by the state.

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[15] *Der alte Orient,* xxv, 3, 1926.

[16] *Livet fra doeden,* 1925.

We have a considerable amount of information, and it is steadily increasing, in regard to secret cult-societies growing out of such needs in Greece at least from the eighth century B. C., in the Hellenistic states, and in the Roman empire. They were called *mysteria.* This name is derived from the verb *myein* which means "to close," "to shut." The reference is to the eyes and the lips. The eyes of the candidate were closed, and his lips were sealed by the holy vows. The things revealed could not be seen by the uninitiated; the secrets must not be divulged by the members; the fellowship was closed to the world outside. Attention was called to the Eleusinian, Orphic, and Samothracian mysteries already in the seventeenth century by Michael Maier.[17] These and similar cults were later discussed by William Warburton,[18] Friedrich Plessing,[19] C. F. Dupuis,[20] and others. In a more comprehensive and scientific manner, Christian A. Lobeck[21] described, from classical sources, the Eleusinian, Orphic, and Samothracian mysteries, in a work entitled *Aglaophamus,* the name of the hierophant who initiated Pythagoras in the mysteries, according to Iamblichus. In the last generation numerous scholars have occupied themselves with these cults. The Eleusinian mysteries have been described by H. S. Anton[22] and P. Foucart.[23] The Orphic mysteries have been discussed by Erwin Rohde,[24] Otto Gruppe,[25] and many others. Valuable contributions have been made by A. Dieterich,[26] R. Reitzenstein,[27] and Jane Harrison.[28] Franz Cumont[29] has published the documents concerning the Mithras mysteries and set forth their place in the Roman world. W. Brede Kristensen[30] has presented the Isis and Osiris mysteries as well as the Greek. The relation of all the ancient mys-

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[17] *Arcana arcanissima, seu hieroglyphica ægypto-græca,* 1614.

[18] *Divine Legation of Moses,* 1737-38.

[19] *Memnonium,* 1787.

[20] *Origines de tous les cultes,* 1794; new ed. 1822.

[21] *Aglaophamus, seu de theologiæ mysticæ Græcorum causis,* 1829.

[22] *Die Mysterien von Eleusis,* 1899.

[23] *Recherches sur l'origine et la nature des mystères d'Éleusis,* 1895; *Les grands mystères d'Éleusis,* 1904.

[24] *Psyche,*^{2} 1897.

[25] *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte,* 1912.

[26] *Nekyia,* 1893; *Abraxas,* 1897.

[27] *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen,* 1910.

[28] *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek religion,* 1903.

[29] *Textes et monuments relatifs aux mystères de Mithra,* 1894-1901; *Les religions orientales dans le paganisme romain,*^{2} 1909.

[30] *Livet fra doeden,* 1925.

teries to Christianity has been discussed by Gustav Anrich,[31] Paul Wendland,[32] Salomon Reinach,[33] Joseph Huby,[34] Cyril Martindale,[35] and others. Striking similarities in customs and ideas have been pointed out between the Christian and the pagan mystery cults, and also marked differences. The explanation given by Justin and Tertullian, that the former are due to diabolic imitation of the true religion, is regarded by Martindale as "insufficient," and that of Origen, who looked upon the pagan mysteries as expressions of a universally human religious tendency, as more profound; but he suggests that the celebration of Christmas and the *Natalis invicti solis* of the Mithra cult on the same day may be due to "the competition of the two religions." It is quite likely that, in this competition, certain features were also taken over by the Christians. Such adoption of pagan customs, with a new meaning given to them, is of frequent occurrence in the history of the church. In various Christian groups of later times, attaching much importance to an exact reproduction of the initiation ceremonies and practices of the early church, there has been an unmistakable approach to the fellowship of these ancient cult-societies.

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[31] *Das antike Mysterienwesen und sein Verhältnis zum Christentum,* 1894.

[32] *Rie hellenistisch-römische Kultur und ihre Beziehungen zum Judentum und Christentum,* 1907.

[33] *Cultes, mythes, et religions,* 1904-08; *Orpheus,* 1909.

[34] *Christus, Manuel d'histoire des religions,* 1913.

[35] *Christus,* 1913, p. 387.

The term mysticism is derived from the same word as mystery. In a general way it designates the same tendencies that find expression in the mystery-cults. But usage does not clearly indicate how far in the direction of these tendencies, and particularly how far beyond their ordinary reach, a man must go to be considered as a mystic. The conviction that one may, through an initial experience or a process of enlightenment and purification, be regenerated and pass from spiritual death to a life characterized by an intimate communion with the divine, an immediate awareness of the divine presence, and a firm assurance of survival and eternal blessedness, meets us in different religions. It is so common that, unless manifested in an unusual manner, it is scarcely considered as a sign of mysticism. It often coexists with a decided recognition of external authority and a deep attachment to prevailing forms of worship. In view of this, it is perhaps doubtful whether the term should be so understood as to associate it chiefly with the tenets and practices of certain dissenting groups in Christendom. Rufus M. Jones [36] defines mysticism as "the type of religion which puts the emphasis on an immediate awareness of relation to God, a direct and intimate consciousness of the divine presence." This definition would seem to apply to most genuine piety in all Christian communities, and in Judaism, Islam, and some other religions as well. But the illustrations of what he regards as "religion in its most acute, intense, and living stage" are, aside from the Bible, mainly drawn from the history of some mediæval and modern sects such as the Waldenses, the Spiritual Franciscans, the Lollards, the Brethren of the Common Life, the Anabaptists, and the Quakers. His well-documented account of these movements is very valuable, and he is quite right in assigning to them a great importance. But his own definition appears to suggest something wider. On the other hand, it clearly excludes Buddhism, Jainism, and kindred manifestations of religion. Either the conception of mysticism will have to be greatly extended, or else considerably restricted. It is worth considering whether it would not be expedient to limit it to attempts of the human mind, by means of spiritual exercises, to rise, not only above sense-perceptions and inferences from them, but also beyond every process of ratiocination, to a contemplation of ultimate reality unattainable by reason. This would exclude the ordinary products of concrete religious imagination, and also the efforts to project reason into a realm of supersensible reality. Occasional admixture of a mystical element where other tendencies predominate would be recognized. If religion is defined as devotion to the highest, mysticism even in this sense is an expression of it, though its value no doubt lies, not in anything actually gained beyond the bounds of rationality in a pathological state, but in the stimulus it may afford to intellectual exertion, moral purification, and exaltation of the feelings.

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[36] *Studies in Mystical Religion,* 1909, p. xv.

CHAPTER V

REVELATION AND ATONEMENT

ALREADY in the earliest forms of religion, the attitude of subserviency to the mana, the peculiar inpersonal force manifest in certain objects, although predominantly an emotional reaction, had in it also an element of intellectual curiosity and admiration, and expressed itself in acts designed to establish proper relations. The presence of this power in the totem was an inference from observed facts, and the animal was approached with gestures, sounds, and gifts calculated to further the assumed alliance. Its existence, in a very high degree, in the mura-mura, the mighty human predecessors, was a similar inference, and though they were supposed to have gone away, regard for them was shown by conformity to the traditions they had established. But only the development of animism made a direct revelation possible and a cult necessary. The ghosts of the dead, the nature-spirits, and the gods could now communicate with the souls of living men, and the need of propitiation and conciliation was felt.

The impersonal forces had taken on personality. No longer confined within the bounds set for them by a cruder mentality, they were able to move about with the same freedom as souls attached to human bodies. Their thought, disposition, and will could be made known in many ways. Striking occurrences in nature were not simply manifestations of extraordinary force, but were omens and portents, signs and tokens, produced for their own purposes by conscious beings. They spoke in the earthquake and the flaming mountain, the hurricane, the hail, and the rain, the rustling of the leaves and the murmur of the waters; in strange forms of animal life, curious shapes of the entrails, especially the liver, and the soaring of birds; in the flight of the arrow, the fall of the lot, and the movement of the sacred object; in the darkening of the sun and moon, and the courses, conjunctions, appearance and disappearance of stars. More clearly did they express themselves in certain psycho-physical experiences of man, in dreams, hallucinations, trances, and ecstatic states, when visions are seen and voices are heard. They could also appear in human form, assumed for a special occasion, or taken on more permanently. In this shape, a god could come from his home, wherever it was, take part in a meal prepared for him, and make known his intentions, or reveal his interest by fighting on the side of his worshipers in a battle. If his abode was in heaven, he might descend himself or send a subordinate celestial being. As monotheism developed, and the transcendence of the one god was emphasized, the intermediaries between him and the world also rose in importance. It became possible to conceive one of these, who shared in the divine substance, as coming to earth, to be born of a woman, live the life of a man, die, and rise from the dead, in order to give a most complete revelation of the divine nature, the purpose of man's existence, and the way to perfection. The development of this thought, though observable elsewhere, was especially facilitated by tendencies within Hellenistic Judaism and by the deep impression of the historic character, tragic fate, and posthumous influence of Jesus. To the revelations that had come of old time by divers portions and in divers manners in the experience of those capable of receiving them, there now appeared to be added a perfect revelation of the divine nature in a human life, to be apprehended in the experience of beholding it and being transformed by it from glory into glory.

All such experiences, whether they consist in observations of peculiar natural phenomena and inferences from them, or ecstatic visions and conclusions from them, or impressions of extraordinary personalities and the attaching of special significance to them, tend to become normative. But their continued effectiveness depends upon the manner in which the memory of them is preserved. Oral transmission is at best an uncertain method. The written word alone can in a measure perpetuate the content of the original experience. Just as the painted landscape gives permanency to the fleeting scene that stood before the artist's eye, as George Santayana[1] has well pointed out, so the written record gives permanency to the vision of the seer. Where a script is in use, it is instinctively felt that omens, oracles, inspired songs, laws, and wise sayings, and stories concerning important persons should be collected and committed to writing. The great religions, especially those of prophetic origin, have their sacred scriptures. In them the products of past religious experience become fixed rules of faith and practice. Thus enshrined, the revelations once vouchsafed become precious treasures, venerated and loved. A distinct value attaches itself to the words themselves, whether in the original language or in a long-used translation. Inaccuracies and contradictions are explained away, inconsistencies and far-reaching differences are harmonized by an ingenious apologetic. The methods employed in interpreting literature in general, and even books held sacred by others, are not applied. By frequent repetition the expressions become so familiar that they no longer arrest the attention and arouse inquiry as to their exact meaning. Frightful imprecations, immoral utterances, gross superstitions, and utterly incredible statements are solemnly recited as though they were expressions of the noblest sentiment and the highest truth. Bondage to an external authority warps the judgment, corrupts the moral sense, and prevents spiritual progress.

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[1] *The Sense of Beauty,* 1896, p. 161.

Against the tyranny of the past a present vital experience may react in various ways. The diminished attention to details allows the mind to disregard things that, if reflected upon, would appear morally abhorrent and intellectually unacceptable, while concentrating on things that stir the conscience, stimulate the will, and illuminate the thought. This unconscious discrimination, involving as yet no disapproval, is of great practical value, and is an important step toward a deeper discernment. To search the scriptures of every religion in order to find the best there is in them, for purposes of edification, is a most valuable exercise. By an allegorical method of interpretation it is possible to read into the sacred texts any meaning that is desired in harmony with any view of the world. This permits a great latitude of freedom, independence of thought, moral discernment, and spiritual insight, as may be seen, e.g. in the Upanishads, Philo, Origen, and Swedenborg. Quite unconsciously, however, this method destroys the authority it seeks to enhance.

On the other hand, a conscious break with the past may be the result of what is sincerely regarded as an immediate revelation. Thus the sacrifices enjoined, not only by immemorial custom, but already to some extent by written laws sanctioned by Yahwe, were set aside by some of the great prophets in Israel and Judah, like Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, and Jeremiah, on the ground that they were contrary to the revealed will of this righteous god, and Jeremiah[2] even regarded as a forgery what, after the discovery of the Deuteronomic Code, was proclaimed as "the law of Yahwe." Their tremendous emphasis upon justice, mercy, and humility as qualities for which no cultic performances can be a substitute have given to the term prophet a depth of meaning it would not otherwise have acquired. But it is well to remember that they considered themselves only as spokesmen for Yahwe whose words had been revealed to them, and that their denunciation of inevitable judgment upon every sinful nation, including Israel and Judah, tended to foster the notion that national adversity is a revelation of divine anger caused by iniquity, and national prosperity a revelation of divine favor caused by good behavior, and the application of the same idea of divine punishments and rewards to the fate of the individual. In the dialogues of the Book of Job this doctrine is represented by the friends, and especially by Eliphaz, as revealed in moments of inspiration, while it is questioned by Job whose anxious search for truth by observation of the facts obviously represents the attitude of the author himself. A similar reaction may be observed in the Book of Jonah. Prophethood, with its typical eagerness for punishment of the guilty, and particularly the oppressing foreign nation, and its anxiety for the fulfillment of predictions, is here subjected by a true prophet to a criticism, not less searching and effective because it is cast in the form of a fictitious story, full of gentle humor and caustic satire, and conveys in a parable the truth implied in a great text, rather than in the usual oracular style. That it retained its place among the cherished treasures of the synagogue may have been due to the mention in II Kings xiv, 5, of Jonah as a prophet uttering a favorable oracle in the time of Jeroboam II.

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[2] Jeremiah vii, 22; viii, 8.

It is deeply significant that, so far as we can judge from the fragmentary record, the idea of a perfect revelation in these sacred books seems to have been wholly foreign to the mind of Jesus. Although no doubt his religious life had been nourished by early acquaintance with many of them and he had often listened to the reading of selected texts, he does not seem to have derived from them his distinctive views, or appealed to them as a final authority. He was impressed by some of the prophets of the past, but even more by a contemporary prophet whom he ranked higher than them. He apparently made no claim to mantic inspiration. He did not declare: "Thus saith Yahwe," but like the prophet he had heard on the Jordan: "I say unto you." As in the case of John the Baptist, this was the straightforward expression of a profound conviction. He drew upon his own inner consciousness; and his appeal was to the reason and conscience of his hearers:

"Why judge ye not of yourselves what is right?" Not in biblical lore, but in nature and the simple social life about him, he found the illustrations of his teaching. Toward the law his attitude was critical. Some of its fundamental principles he rejected as out of harmony with what he regarded as implied in a higher righteousness. When the common people are said to have heard him gladly "because he spoke with authority, and not as the scribes," this impression was certainly created both by his calm assurance and his original method. There does not seem to be any evidence that he either regarded himself as a king in disguise or hoped to become a lord over men after his death; but there can be little question as to his ardent faith that there is a father in heaven who reveals himself to his children, and that all men are his children.

Paul looked upon the law as having been revealed through angels, and divinely appointed as a taskmaster, but repudiated it as an external authority. In this general rejection of the law he included not only ordinances as regards sacrifices, rites, tabus, ceremonies, and sacred days, but also the decalogue, specifically mentioning this part written on tablets of stone as having passed away in the new dispensation. But the relative importance of the earlier revelation seemed to him very great, owing to its types and prophecies, and its function of revealing sin as transgression and the hopelessness of salvation except by grace. In its place has come the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus. The life hid with Christ in God has its own law written, not in books, but in the heart of the believer. Here is the new revelation of the divine reality. If the church, instead of using the Magna Charta of Christian liberty penned by Paul in his letter to the Galatians as a means of advancing to ever greater spiritual freedom, has canonized the epistle, raising it to the rank of an infallible external authority, and substituted a new set of carnal ordinances for those he condemns, this is but an indication of the essential soundness of the apostle's reasoning that, until the heir has reached his majority, he must needs remain under the rule of the taskmaster.

How a new experience may cause an even more complete rejection of long-recognized sacred scriptures is exemplified in the case of Gautama, the Buddha. When he discovered, as it seemed to him, the full meaning of life and the moral law that alone can lead to deliverance, there was no room left for an external authority. To the Vedas, Brahmanas, Aranyakas, Sutras, and Upanishads he could not even assign the relative importance Paul ascribed to the Hebrew scriptures. With the passing of the gods, hymns and prayers, sacrifices and ceremonies became meaningless; with the passing of the *atman,* the self, communication became impossible between a world-soul and a human soul. Similarly, when, in modern thought, the idea of a limited, created world gives place to that of an infinite, uncreated universe, and the idea of an individual god yields to that of a cosmic order, implying a spiritual ideal, the gradual unfolding in man's experience of its nature and demands may still be called a revelation.

Animism imposed the necessity of propitiating the souls of the dead. The provisions made for the living corpse must be continued, and with greater care, inasmuch as the ghosts were more to be feared and more to be trusted. Their anger was easily kindled and it must be placated; their aid was needed, and it must be sought. Food and drink must be given them regularly; shelter, covering, and ornaments provided for them; the bodies of foes and valued companions placed beside them; the blood of men and beasts poured out to them. If the mana they possessed made them dangerous in life, they were more dangerous as souls, and measures of defense against their sudden appearances were necessary. If they were well disposed, their good will must be preserved. The awe and confidence they inspired developed the cult. Security and peaceful relations were its object. In its essential features it remained the same when the characteristics of the departed souls were transferred to nature-spirits and to gods. Differences there were in the forms of the offerings, the times and places for their presentation, the implements employed, the formulas used, the functions of the ministrants. Hunters and nomads might offer of their prey or their herds and flocks, while fruit gatherers and tillers of the ground presented the products of the earth. Ancestral spirits and gods might demand for their appeasement the blood of enemies and for their assistance the first-born of man and beast. Blood alone might atone and conciliate, though animal sacrifices could be substituted for human; or bloodless sacrifices, furnished with life by a helpful magic, might be accepted. An advancing knowledge might connect the sacred seasons with the movements of the celestial bodies, and an advancing technique provide more elaborate houses for the gods. Mythical tales, engendered by the cult, might inject into ceremonies and formulas a variety of meanings; and the priestly services might be restricted or extended, specialized and developed in many directions. The regard for certain tabus, the performance of certain rites, the observance of certain sacred days might satisfy a god, even if his only temple should be in ruins, and no sacrifices elsewhere should be acceptable. But fundamentally the cult retained its peculiar character throughout the successive stages of animism.

When a special emphasis was put upon the offering of blood as necessary to effect the atonement, a growing faith in one unique and holy god would naturally enhance the importance attached to sacrifice. It alone could "cover" or, as Bertholet[3] has plausibly suggested, "wipe off" certain impurities that had attached themselves to men by personal guilt and to sacred objects by contamination, and restore them to a condition in which they could participate in the cult or be used in it. In the case of flagrant crime the blood of the sinner was required. He atoned for his sin by his death. In other instances the blood of an animal was demanded. Only for minor offenses was a libation of water sufficient. It was possible to apply this idea to the whole people, as it is in Isaiah liii, where Israel is the servant of Yahwe who, having received double punishment for all his transgressions and therefore acquired a measure of merit sure to be rewarded, by his sufferings even unto death, the complete extinction of the national life, makes an atonement for sin and brings assurance of a long-continued existence and a restored prosperity. It could also be applied, as it later was, to the Christian Messiah, whose death was conceived of as an atoning sacrifice for the sins of the world, a means of securing divine pardon, since "without the shedding of blood there is no forgiveness," a vicarious act whose merit might be imputed to the believer, and a guarantee to those justified by faith of divine favor and an eternal life.

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[3] "Versöhnung" in *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart,* 1913.

While Judaism through historic circumstances was largely weaned away from the thought of atonement by the blood of an animal sacrifice, Christianity thus came to center its attention on the blood of a human sacrifice. Whether with Augustine it was considered as a purchase-price paid to the devil to his discomfiture, or with Anselm of Canterbury as a satisfaction to the divine mind by a meritorious deed beyond the human duty, or with Luther as a vicarious bearing of the just penalty, the moral difficulties involved have naturally led serious Christian thinkers to abandon the conception. Not the least factor in bringing about this change has been a truer appreciation of the attitude of the great preëxilic prophets in Israel, and of Jesus himself. The denunciations by the former of sacrifices and temple cult were not limited to the local shrines, but extended to the great sanctuary in Jerusalem as well, and not directed against assigning too much importance to some commandments of Yahwe, while neglecting others, but against the sacrificial system itself which they regarded as not having been ordained by Yahwe. Nor did Jesus differ in this respect from his spiritual predecessors. There is no evidence that he ever offered an animal sacrifice. That his outburst of indignation in the temple was not occasioned solely by the presence of money-changers, who accommodated the purchasers of animals to be sacrificed, is clearly indicated by the prophetic word he quoted: "My house shall be a house of prayer for all nations." In defending his disciples, charged with having broken the sabbath, he did not argue that there had been no real sabbath-breaking, but took the opportunity to lay down the far-reaching principle that, as man was not made for the sake of the sabbath, but the sabbath for the sake of man, so man is lord also of the sabbath. His disregard for many customs regarded as sacred and open criticism of what had been said to them of old by Moses and others was responsible for much of the opposition he met. He encouraged men to pray for forgiveness, and assured them that, if they forgave others their sins, their heavenly father would forgive them, without the slightest suggestion that such forgiveness would be conditioned upon satisfaction of divine justice by sacrifices of one kind or another. In spite of the occasional coloring of the accounts by later speculation, the general tone and tenor of his reported teaching seems to preclude the assumption that his mind was greatly occupied, if at all, by the idea of an atonement, while he obviously sought in every way to illustrate the love of the heavenly father, to set forth what appeared to him to be the perfect way of life, and to impress men with the laws of that kingdom of heaven on earth which he expected.

Even when the ideas once current concerning communion with spirits and gods, propitiation of them by sacrifices and ceremonies, merits that may be acquired and transferred, and eternal punishments and rewards, disappear in the presence of a different estimate of the universe, some facts that sought expression in them remain. There is an unveiling of truth to man's mind; and there is a way of establishing and maintaining right personal relations. Wrongs done cannot be undone, but may in a measure be made good. Sins should be forgiven; all are sinners and fall short of the glory of the ideal, and even the worst in the deepest sense know not what they do. Vicarious suffering exists and may produce rich spiritual results. Each people has its function to fulfill, and its experience may serve for the healing of the nations. The prophet's death as well as his life may exercise a profound moral influence. To establish peace on earth and good will among men is an object worthy of strenuous effort and patient endurance. In seeking through the ages for a divine revelation, and in performing what seemed his part in a system of reconciliation, man has manifested his unquenchable thirst for truth and his ineradicable longing for harmony.

CHAPTER VI

A GRAMMAR OF DISSENT

RELIGION has its own language. Its ideas, sentiments, and volitions express themselves in a distinct vocabulary. This universal language has its families of speech and its dialects; it grows and decays according to ascertainable laws; it has its phonology, morphology, and syntax; it is subject to processes of standardization and disintegration. A systematic account may be given, or at least essayed, of its usages and of the principles observable in its varied expressions. Such a systematization may be undertaken from different points of view. If religion is understood to be primarily a matter of the intellect, however it may affect or be affected by the emotions and the will, if it is something to be known, the task resolves itself into an examination of its content, the means by which it may be apprehended, the degree in which certitude may be gained, and the logical arrangement of the knowledge obtained. If religion is identified with some particular form of religion whose doctrines demand intellectual assent, the inquiry will be concerned with the basis of such an authoritative demand, the rational character, or harmony with reason, of certain definite propositions, the types of assent to these, and the mental processes by which real assent may be reached.

This is the manner in which the subject was approached by Cardinal Newman in his famous *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.* To him religion is "Knowledge of God, of His will, and of our duties to Him." [1] Without this knowledge there can be no religion; without a revelation such knowledge cannot exist. There was a primitive revelation. Natural religion depends ultimately on "those endemic traditions which have their first origin in a paradisaical illumination." [2] Through man's fall this revelation in the terrestrial paradise was lost or became greatly perverted. Since then God has disowned his creatures and hidden his face; "another will, besides his, has had a part in the disposition of his work." [3] Without the elements that have survived of the original illumination or "some portion of those inward aids which Christianity imparts to us" no higher forms of natural religion have developed in any people. Where there has been no special revelation, the beliefs and sentiments of natural religion have manifested themselves in conscience, creating a dread of "One who threatens evil" and a certainty of punishment here and hereafter; in the voice of mankind, speaking through the universal presence of rites and ceremonies, prayer, sacrifice, priestly mediation, and vicarious atonement; and in the course of human life and human affairs, indicating a divine providence. It is especially among barbarians this religion of nature is found. The artificial religion of so-called civilization does but contradict the religion of barbarism. "It has no sympathy either with the hopes and fears of the awakened soul or with those frightful presentiments which are expressed in the worship and traditions of the heathen"; "it comes of a one-sided progress of mind and contradicts informants which speak with a greater authority than itself." [4]

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[1] 1892 [2], p. 389. [2] P. 408. [3] P. 399.

The revelation which not only supplements natural religion but completes the communication of truth to man came first to the Jews as the chosen people, and then, after their rejection of Christ, in its fullness to the Church as the new people chosen by God. It is deposited in the Church, in its records of the Old Dispensation with its history, types and prophecies, its apostolic account of the incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity and its significance, the ecumenic creeds formulated with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, and the official pronouncements of the divinely appointed shepherds of the flock when especially guided by the Spirit. It is made manifest in the character of the experience, the institutions, the history, and the life of the Church. The truth of revelation presents itself to our minds as a series of propositions which demand assent because they come from God himself, the only supremely authoritative source. "Without a proposition or thesis there can be no assent, no belief at all."[5] Propositions may be interrogative, conditional, or categorical. They correspond to three mental acts. A question is the expression of a doubt; a conclusion is the expression of an act of inference; an assertion is the expression of an act of assent. Doubt is only an assent to a proposition at variance with the thesis and may therefore be dismissed. Inference requires no apprehension of the things apprehended. Assent may be notional or real. Notional assent follows upon acts of inference. Real assent, or belief, presupposes some apprehension of the things believed. While inference deals with formulas, abstract things, belief deals with things concrete, is imaginative apprehension. This imaginative apprehension has its degrees. It may be limited and yet imply real assent, as when the child assents to a proposition because he is sure of the veracity of his parent and is willing to sacrifice his life for this conviction, or more inclusive, as when e.g. the maturer mind assents to the proposition that there are three persons in the deity. Real assent, as distinct from notional, in the latter case is an acceptance of the proposition based on apprehension mediated through the imagination and verified through experience in dealing with the three persons as concrete realities, each of them being God, and not on notional apprehension of the theologically formulated dogma as a system of truth. The organ of this imaginative apprehension is "the illative sense or the power of the mind of judging and concluding, when in its perfection." [6] As in every field of mental activity it is the mind itself that judges and the authority of its judgment depends upon the comprehensive acquaintance with the facts and the insight it displays, so in religion those possessed of this illative sense, acting upon an extensive and profound experience, are fitted to convey the truth revealed and to pronounce authoritative

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[4] P. 396.

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[5] P. 119.

[6] P. 353.

judgments to which assent must be given. Knowledge thus gained precedes the exercise of the affections and the will and stimulates them, while they are not affected by logical reasoning. "Logicians are more set upon concluding rightly than on right conclusions."[7] Scientists are more concerned with correct observation of facts and correct inferences than with the nature of the conclusion. They go beyond their proper limits when they assert the uniformity of nature. "From probabilities we may construct legitimate proof, sufficient for certitude,"[8] but the probabilities must be cumulative, and even if they are cumulative the conclusion is inadmissible, if it contradicts revelation which declares that miracles do happen. Indefectible certitude can only come when the illative sense through imaginative apprehension lays hold of the concrete realities of divine revelation.

This brief summary must suffice to indicate the line of reasoning adopted by a far-seeing and circumspect observer, a keen and subtle thinker, an honest and devout seeker after truth, and presented by him with a wealth of illustration from life and a warmth of religious feeling that make a strong appeal. It is not the purpose of this chapter to examine the validity of such a sustained

[7] P. 94. [8] P. 411.

argument, the premises from which the conclusions are drawn, the strength of each link in the chain, the firmness of each step that leads to a visualized goal. Essentially the same approach has characterized many apologies for other forms of religion and for other expressions of the Christian religion. There is a marked family likeness to those of Jewish and Muslim thinkers. Wherever the presuppositions are in substance identical, the process of rationalization is likely to be similar. Whether, in a monotheistic religion, the source of man's knowledge of the one god is conceived to be in the Vedas, the Avesta, the Jewish Scriptures, the Koran, the Christian Bible alone, or it together with other divinely authorized standards, an Arya Samai, a Parsi, a Jew, and a Christian, Catholic, or Protestant, will find an assurance of the truth of his faith, for which he may be willing to make the supreme sacrifice, in the same way and follow the same path in convincing himself and others of the reasonableness of his convictions. Nor is there at bottom any difference in kind between the spiritual attitude of those who believe in a codified and systematized revelation of one god and that of others who give their assent to the more sporadic oracles and signs vouchsafed to them by many gods.

Rather is the present object to point out that, if religion has been aided by assent, it has also been aided by dissent, and that there is a grammar of dissent as well as a grammar of assent. Just as there is in nature a centripetal force and a centrifugal force, in the world of organisms a tendency to perpetuate the type and a tendency to deviate from the type, and in human society a conservative impulse and a progressive urge, so there is in religion a disposition to assent and a disposition to dissent. Dissent from a series of propositions, non-conformity with a set of rules, disinclination to respond to certain emotional stimuli are as indispensable to a healthy growth of religion as assent, conformity, and responsiveness. It is, of course, true that much doubt is unwarranted and lacking in sincerity. Much curiosity is idle and to no purpose; much reasoning is ill-informed and fallacious; much rebellion is unjustifiable and ill-mannered; much failure to respond to emotional appeal is a mark of moral indifference or perversity. The same applies to much assent, conformity, and emotionalism. But doubt is not necessarily an assent to a proposition at variance with the thesis. It may be simply a questioning that seeks for another answer and is temporarily at a loss to find one. Curiosity and questioning may be the signs of an awakening soul and imply a search for the truth. Reaction against a set of propositions may reveal a deep sincerity. Inferences and conclusions at variance with a given thesis may be drawn from a vast amount of observed facts in harmony with ascertained laws of human thought. Logical reasoning may, without imputation of willfulness or arrogance, be more concerned with concluding rightly than with an assumed right conclusion, more with the correctness of its methods than with the harmony of its results with prescribed tenets. Neglect of, and even opposition to, a religious custom may be prompted by a high sense of duty, and inability to respond to one type of emotional stimulus may arise from sensitiveness to another and nobler type. The apparent concreteness of things imaged forth and the experience in dealing with them provide no guarantee that they may not be abstractions, existing only in the minds of men.

If a child asks questions concerning some statement on a religious subject made by his father or mother and wonders whether it can be true, this does not by any means necessarily show that he has lost all faith in his parent's veracity. Even if such reasoning as he is capable of leads him utterly to reject the categorical assertion that, unless he changes his conduct or suppresses his doubt, he will be tortured after death through all eternity, he may regard this as a mistaken view honestly held and lose none of his confidence in the parent's veracity, general truthfulness, and sincerity of belief in this matter. Serious conflicts, within and without, harmful to the moral and religious development of both parent and child may indeed arise, because it is so natural for the child to believe implicitly what he is told, and so natural for the parent to transmit what he himself implicitly believes. They can be averted and a wholesome growth facilitated, when a reasonable freedom is permitted to the child, and a wise guidance is given by the parent. A sound pedagogic method seems to require that no professions of belief be demanded in theological propositions that it is beyond the child's power to deal with in a profitable manner, and that acquaintance with them be imparted in such a way as to allow an unhampered liberty of acceptance or rejection. Especially in the age of puberty is it dangerous to chain the mind, to force the will, and to overcharge the emotions. Spiritual violence defeats its own ends. Its aim is to assist the religious development. But religion can only thrive in an atmosphere of freedom, and freedom implies the exercise of doubt, inference, and dissent, as well as the exercise of confidence in the illative sense, though it never is infallible, in reason, though it has its limitations, and in the imaginative apprehension, though the thing apprehended may be an abstraction.

What is true of the child is true of the race. Had it not been for doubts, inquiries, reasoning, and dissent, there would have been no advance from simple manaism, and totemism, and muraism to animism, and from animism with what it held of the earlier elements of religion, to polytheism. We do not know the individual agents through which, during vast periods of man's history, these changes came about. But the changes themselves, of which we have unmistakable evidence, must have been effected, however gradually, through human personalities and their activities. Traditions and customs, enormously strong, must have been undermined, overthrown, or modified by this long line of dissenters unknown to us. With the invention of a system of writing a more intimate knowledge of the operations of the human mind becomes possible. However fragmentary and imperfect the historic documents may be, it is possible to cite a multitude of well-authenticated examples among different peoples and from different periods to illustrate the importance of religious dissent and the mental processes that lead to it.

Ikh n Aton, who reigned over Egypt c. 1375-1358, has been called the first monotheist in history. There may indeed have been many before him who not only felt, spoke, and acted in the presence of a god as though for the time at least he were the sole object of their worship, but actually regarded the various divine personalities as nothing else than different modes of manifestation of the same supreme being. He, however, went beyond this in declaring that Aton was the only god, denying the existence of the other gods, and suppressing their worship. We have no documents allowing us to follow the mental processes that led to this significant revolt. Yet it is obvious that he at some time began to cherish doubts concerning the character and ultimately the very existence of Amen Re of Thebes, Ptah of Memphis, Thoth of Hermopolis, and other divinities. To him, as to his people, they had once been concrete realities. Generation after generation had had deep experiences in dealing with them. Isis, the mother of sorrows, had comforted them in many a sore affliction. In the hour of death they had hoped to be justified in the after-world by Osiris. Like some of his colleagues at Heliopolis, where he seems to have functioned as a priest, he may have looked upon Atum Re, or Aton, as the highest of the gods whose qualities the others shared in varying degrees, and therefore were entitled to be worshiped. There must have been a chain of reasoning, inference after inference, an accumulation of probabilities, a crystallization of conviction, a verification in a spiritual experience at variance with that of men and women around him, as well as pressure of external circumstances, that finally caused utter dissent and even violent opposition to the ancestral faith. In his "Hymn to Aton" all is serene. Aton, the maker and sustainer of the world, who manifests himself in the heat, and light, and life he gives through the sun's disk to all his creatures in every land, is alone god and there is no one beside him. What if Ikh n Aton, too, stands alone! What if, as he exclaims, "No one knoweth Aton save his son"! Masses of Egyptians outside the sacred area may still clandestinely cherish their ancient superstitions, and the priesthoods may be as hostile as they dare to be and pray for the reaction that must surely come. But the revelation has been made. The dismal failure of Ikh n Aton's reformation matters little. It is quite irrelevant that the old gods returned to their thrones and for fifteen centuries and more continued to hold sway in the land of Egypt. Whether the one god was to have his dwelling-place in the sun, in the storm cloud, on a mountain, in a temple, in heaven, above the created world, or in the universe, the exigencies of human thought, the cravings of the human heart, the devotion to the highest that could be conceived forced religion in the direction of monotheism. Wherever the conclusion was reached, the way was marked by questioning, dissent, and non-conformity.

We do not know with certainty when the Book of Job was written. From internal evidence it seems probable that the author of the dialogues lived in the fourth or third century B.C., but the date cannot be strictly proved. Concerning his name and the external circumstances of his career we are utterly ignorant. But he has allowed us to look very deeply into his inner life. In spite of the foreign setting, involving the careful avoidance throughout the dialogues of the divine name Yahwe and any allusion to the law, the prophets, the singers, or the sages of Israel, Job and his friends clearly reflect tendencies of thought in Jewish circles. The speeches of the friends represent the generally prevailing views, while the addresses of Job clearly set forth the poet's reaction against them. Job's titanic struggles in grappling with the great problems are his own. In the depth of his soul the spiritual storm is raging. There are the doubts that cannot be repressed, the questions that clamor for an answer, the arguments that are summoned to the attack, the observations that are drawn from life to reinforce them, the denials of charges, the dissent from tradition, the rebellion against authority. How do we know what is true and right? Where is the seat of authority? Eliphaz appeals to revelation that comes by divine inspiration; Bildad to tradition, the accumulated wisdom of the ages; Zophar to the voice of mankind, the approval of the majority. Job, on the other hand, makes his appeal to the inexorable facts and to the reason that examines them. From various standpoints the friends present fundamentally the same view that health, wealth, long life, and numerous progeny are the rewards for virtue and piety and the signs of divine approval, while disease, poverty, premature death, and sterility are punishments for vice and godlessness and signs of divine displeasure. By inferences from the observed facts of life, Job is led to deny that there is such a retributive system and to charge the friends with a dishonest apologetic that makes them special pleaders and liars on behalf of God.

Once the thought occurs to him that, if such a thing were possible, God might bring him back into life from the realm of the dead. But he resolutely dismisses the idea as out of harmony with experience and the course of nature; the friends never refer to it; and the argument about a squaring of accounts between the cradle and the grave continues. The most terrible problem involved in the discussion concerns the moral character of God. If the theory of retribution championed by the friends is contradicted by an honest and straightforward interpretation of human experience, what kind of a being is he? Assuming, as even Job does, that he exists and there is no other god, and that he possesses boundless power and knowledge, is he fair and just, generous and merciful? Sits there a cruel and arbitrary tyrant, or a kind and considerate ruler, on the throne of the universe? Job utterly dissents from the current theory of retribution. He spurns and rebels against the god of the popular religion. He can at most find a momentary comfort in the conception of a being in heaven, different from the god of his friends, who has been the silent witness to his career, but will, after his death, declare him to have been just, and, like a surviving kinsman, avenge him on those who had so wrongly interpreted his sufferings. Whatever may be said about his arguments or the rash impetuosity of his utterances, how fruitful for man's religious life have been the free and searching inquiry, the relentless quest for truth by inference and deduction, the readiness to draw conclusions without regard to consequences, the indomitable moral courage, the strength of emotion, and the will to believe nothing that reason cannot approve, so characteristic of this author, whose poem to-day is becoming widely recognized as one of the most significant and beautiful masterpieces in the world's literature!

In some respects we are better informed concerning another great religious genius. Siddhartha Gautama, called the Buddha, or "The Enlightened," was born c. 560 B.C., in Kapilavastu, where a memorial erected by Aśoka was discovered in 1896, and died in Kusinagara c. 480 B.C. Many legends have clustered about that figure, and the documents whence we derive our knowledge of his teaching are of uncertain date. But we are acquainted with the religious system which he finally rejected, and the oldest traditions make the nature of his reaction against it in all salient points quite clear. Little as we know of his early life, it is evident that his observations, already as a youth, led him to doubt and inquiry. He began to doubt the explanations given him, to question the immediate sources of authority, to interrogate eminent teachers, to seek for himself in lonely meditation a solution of the problems that occupied his mind. The conviction that matured in him, as he sat under the sacred fig tree, was the result of his intense and long-continued thinking. The light that illumined his consciousness came from no supernatural source. It was the suddenly emerging capacity to see things through as clearly as his intellectual endowment, his sustained reasoning, his spiritual experience, and his devotion to truth enabled him to do. He became convinced that he had discovered at last, not only the ultimate cause of life's sufferings, life itself, and its apparently endless continuation, but also the way of deliverance from the ever-rolling wheel of existence. It was this conclusion, reached by a process of ratiocination affecting his whole moral attitude toward life, that swept him on to a ruthless disregard for tradition. He denied the external authority of the Vedas, the existence of the gods, even the pantheism of the Upanishads. He rejected sacrifices, prayers, and communion with a divine power. He disapproved of the caste system, war, slavery, and the conventional treatment of woman. Prepared as even this radicalism was in Indian thought, it is difficult to conceive of a more complete dissent from, and non-conformity to prevailing religious ideas and practices. The emphasis was put upon walking in the eightfold path of righteousness, the overcoming of evil with good, the eradication of hatred through love, the sympathy with all that lives. Thus Buddhism became the religion of pity as well as of devotion to duty. From the initial conviction also followed the stress on the law of causality in the universe, the eager occupation with psychological phenomena, and the substitution of a succession of mental states for the old conception of a soul as an entity. It is not necessary to point out how much this man's faith in what to him was the highest, the moral law, in spite of its serious limitations, its pessimism, its retention of the notion of metempsychosis, its tendency to asceticism and monasticism, and other questionable features, has influenced and enriched the religious experience of the human race. Here it has been recalled chiefly as an illustration of the grammar of dissent. It would be easy to multiply examples, and natural to refer to a long line of spiritual heroes, widely honored or still unrecognized, in many lands and different ages. But those who have been cited set forth so clearly both the importance of dissent and the principles involved that they will be sufficient. Dissent, like assent, is essential to the permanence and growth of religion.

CHAPTER VII

THE FALL OF PAN

SUCH are the persistency and recuperative power of religious systems that their vigor does not seem to be impaired, or their hold upon the minds of men lessened, even by a long-continued questioning and a determined opposition. Yet the suddenness with which they sometimes fall or lose their dominating influence shows, in a startling manner, how effective the undermining process may have been. A story told by Plutarch has often led to reflections on this theme. In one of his philosophical essays,[1] taking the form of a dialogue, he puts upon the lips of Philip of Prusa a curious tale. This participant in the conversation relates the strange experience of Epitherses of Prusa, a rhetorician, told by his son Æmelianus, the grammarian, and of his fellow passengers on a vessel bound for Italy. Near Paxos, Thamus, the Egyptian pilot, heard his name called out from the island three times, and was commanded to announce, when he should approach Palodes, that Pan the Great was dead. Scarcely had he done this before loud sighs and cries of surprise, uttered by many persons, were heard from the shore. When the rumor of this marvel came to Tiberius, Thamus was summoned into the emperor's presence. Having listened to the account, Tiberius ordered an inquiry to be made. The learned men in his entourage gave it as their opinion that the Pan referred to was the son of Hermes and Penelope. It was natural that Eusebius[2] and others should have seen in the great Pan, Jesus Christ, the true Shepherd, who died in the reign of Tiberius.

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[1] *De defectu oraculorum,* XVII.

Modern scholars have attempted to discover what the historic nucleus may have been. W. H. Roscher[3] assumed that the pilot, who bore a name occasionally occurring in Egypt, announced to his countrymen settled on the Ionian islands that the ram of Mendes, actually identified with Pan, had died. This would account for the surprise as well as the grief, since no one could know when the sacred animal had passed away. Salomon Reinach[4] also thinks that the story of Epitherses has a basis in fact, but that, in its original form, the passengers on the ship heard voices crying from Palodes: "Thamus, Thamus, Thamus, the very great (*pan megas*), is dead," these being the voices of a company of Greek-speaking Syrians engaged in the annual lamentation of Tammuz-Adonis. This ingenious explanation, buttressed up by ample learning, is in its essential features quite probable. It would gain in plausibility, however, if the article were not somewhat arbitrarily removed, and "the great Pan" were allowed to remain as it stands in Plutarch's text. The lamentation would then be: "Thamus, Thamus, Thamus, Pan the great, is dead." There is no reason why these Syrians, speaking in Greek, should not have identified their native god, Tammuz-Adonis, with the Greek god, Pan, as Greeks in Egypt, and some Egyptians as well, did with the ram of Mendes. If the pilot's name really was Thamus, of whose origin he may have been wholly ignorant, he must have been greatly startled by hearing his name called out three times as he approached one of the Paxos islands. It is within the bounds of possibility that, after some hesitation, he repeated off Palodes, the cry he had heard, with the result that then also a group of Tammuz worshipers burst out into lamentations and shouts of surprise.

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[2] *Præp. evang.*, V, 17.
[3] *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, XXXVIII, 1892, p. 466.
[4] *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, XXI, 1907, pp. 1ff.

Whatever the facts underlying Plutarch's story may have been, there can be no question that the philosopher understood the voice to have announced the death of Pan the Great, and used the incident as an illustrative example. Oracles were becoming rare. The little group at Delphi was discussing the reasons why in so many shrines the gods no longer were consulted or vouchsafed prophetic guidance to their inquirers. Were they dead? This might perhaps be true of some of the minor divinities. Philip's story suggested that even the great god Pan was dead. The "Evening Sun of Paganism," as J. J. Hartmann[5] calls him in his erudite and affectionate memorial to the sage of Chæronea, was deeply disturbed by the many signs that the old system of religion was going to pieces. He was a theologian; to him the end of philosophy was theology. The revolution in men's thoughts and practices which he witnessed perplexed and saddened him, not least because of its concomitant effects upon morality, but it also strengthened his faith in a supreme divinity who could not die. Even the long discussion on the plurality of worlds has no other purpose than to furnish a basis in the unity of the cosmos for this religious conviction.

[5] *De avondzon des heidendoms,* 1910.

Such a presentiment of a coming collapse already at the turn of the first century of our era is significant. A few generations later the whole structure had fallen. Zeus and Apollo, Poseidon and Hephæstos, Hermes, Ares, and Dionysos, Hera and Athena, Leto and Latona, Artemis and Aphrodite, Demeter and Persephone lived while men believed in them. Now they were gone, never to return again; and with them the host of lesser gods and heroes. Their sanctuaries were abandoned or taken from them; their priests offered no sacrifices on their altars; their oracles were silent. If some of them, in earlier days, had temporarily passed into the dark realms of the nether world, it had always been possible to bring them back to life again with mourning ceremonies, sacred rites, mimetic magic. Once they had been the dispensers of material prosperity, protection, guidance, pardon, confidence, and consolation. In their courts piety had found a refuge in every time of trouble. In mystic cult societies, amid impressive ceremonies, they had given to the initiates assurance of redemption from sin and an immortal life. Now they had paid their debt to corruption; the shepherd's crook had slipped from their lifeless hands; they were remembered, if at all, as evil demons; they were as though they had never been.

In this débacle Rome was involved, and so were Egypt, Syria, and Anatolia, and, not much later, all of Europe. Jupiter and Mercury, Neptune and Vulcan, Mars, Apollo and Bacchus, Juno and Diana, Venus and Minerva, Ceres and Proserpina were swept from their thrones. The countless gods and goddesses whom Varro knew so well were degraded. If they did not die, they were reduced to the miserable state of wicked demons to which Augustine consigned them. Their worship ceased; their festivals were kept no longer; their altars received no offerings. The whole system of divination, conjuration, and inspection of omina was discarded. The sacred rites so scrupulously maintained were abandoned. Men had lost faith in their efficacy. Cato and Cicero[6] had observed that when a haruspex met another on the street, he laughed. Wave after wave of Oriental speculation, mysteries, syncretism, and superstition had engulfed the capital. Philosophy had undermined the native religion. In vain the priests of Cybele, whose image, brought from Phrygia, had to simple faith saved Rome in the days of Hannibal, had been suppressed. In vain the philosophers had been expelled, and the rebels against Cæsarworship put to death. Elagabalus had placed the Syrian Baal, whose priest he was, by the side of Jupiter on the Capitolium; Diocletian had made Mithras, the invincible sun, his rival. The gods who had built the mightiest of empires fell.

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[6] Cato quoted by Cicero, *De divinatione,* 2^{24}; *De natura deorum,* 1^{26}; *Brutus,* 72.

In Egypt, Osiris and Isis, Set and Nephthys, Ptah and Khnub, Thoth and Amen-Re ceased to be worshiped. They shared the fate of the Olympian gods with whom they had been identified in the Hellenistic period. The sacred customs associated with them for thousands of years were abandoned. The ram of Mendes and the bull of Memphis were consigned to oblivion, and the cemeteries where these gods had been buried were forgotten. The totemistic survivals that had amused the Greeks disappeared, and neither men nor animals were mummified. In Syria and Palestine, Chemosh and Milkom, Baal Melkart, Resheph and Dagon, Shemesh, Tammuz, and Dusares, Anath and Astarte lost their power. The *dea Syra* yielded her scepter to a new Queen of Heaven; and Yahwe himself was transformed into a new deity, consisting of three persons in one substance, or carried into exile with his unconverted worshipers. In Anatolia, the very memory of Teshub, Ḥatti, and the goddess of Erinna, Sandon and Sabazios, Attis and Cybele, the Greek divinities and the native deities identified with them passed away. In a comparatively short time the wreck of other pantheons followed. Among the Germanic people, Thor-Donar, Odin-Wotan, and Frigga, Freyr, Njord and Freya, Hoenir, Lodur and Heimdall had no longer any worshipers. Even the Balder saga and the cosmology of the Völuspa, with their profound pathos and deep ethical significance, still adhering to pagan myths, though affected by foreign impulses, could not avert the fate that involved all the gods of Valhalla. The gods and goddesses of the Kelts were banished from Britain, Ireland, Gaul, and other lands. Camulos and Tutatis, Dagda and Œngus, Mannanan and Artor, Danu, "mother of the gods," and her son Brian, Brigit and her son Ogma, Morrigan and Badua fled from hills, woods, and verdant fields, from sea and sky. In Eastern Europe, the Balto-Slavs gave up their thunder-god Perkunas, their fire-god Svarog, their sun-god Dazbog, and Triglov, Svantevit, and Khors.

While the old divinities disappeared from Europe, the new god who had conquered them lost his power in many of the lands where he had first been worshiped. In a sudden convulsion Christianity was all but driven out of Palestine and Syria, Egypt, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, Tunis, Algiers, and

Morocco, and ultimately almost vanished from Anatolia. A new religion took its place. Allah was enthroned. His revelations to Muhammed became the law; and neither through crusades nor through missionary work has its dominion yet been shaken. Less drastic, but in some respects as significant, was the fall of the Roman Catholic Church, in the sixteenth century, in many countries where it had once been strongly entrenched. Here many things vanished that had been closely associated with Christianity, such as the authority of the Vicar of Christ on earth, the veneration of "the Mother of God," the merits and intercession of the saints, purgatory, and the monastic life. Similar catastrophic changes may be seen in Persia, and in India. Zoroastrianism, once so mighty, could not maintain itself in the homeland, and only a small remnant survives in a neighboring country. Buddhism, which so powerfully affected India, has only relics left in the land of its birth, and in the vast territory where it still flourishes has for the most part taken on forms that have little in common with the thought of the founder.

It would be a grave mistake to suppose that the fall of an ancient religious system is ever due solely to external circumstances, to wars of conquest or violent revolutions, to persecutions or govern-mental acts, to altered economic conditions and selfish ambitions. These have much to do with it. But there are deeper-lying causes. Spiritual powers inherent in man's nature reveal the inadequacies of the old, the possibilities of conserving in new forms the best that the past has matured, and the opportunities of reaching in new ways higher realizations of truth, beauty, and goodness. The probability of marked mutations rather than slight modifications appearing at any particular time in the process of evolution depends, where human consciousness and will are implied, upon the relative strength of the progressive and the retarding forces.

CHAPTER VIII

SCIENCE AND RELIGION

THERE can be no conflict between science and religion. The more clearly the nature of each is understood, the more obvious this becomes. Etymologically *scientia,* science, means knowledge. But the term is especially used to denote a knowledge that is accurate, comprehensive, and systematized. It implies a high degree of careful observation and rational correlation of facts. The function of science has been described as investigation of truth for its own sake; it may be said to consist in the ascertaining of facts by test and examination and the drawing of logical inferences from them. Science has no other object than the acquisition of knowledge: *scimus ut sciamus,* "we know that we may know." Its sole aim is the discovery of truth in the sense of a conception that is in agreement with reality. Hence it should be distinguished from technology which, according to C. F. Weld,[1] "has always been a general term for a systematic study of the theory, the knowledge, and the rule for attaining practical ends, and has also acquired the technical method of science." Viewed as a product, a science is described by E. B. Titchener[2] as consisting of "a large body of observed facts, which are related to one another, and are arranged under general laws." It is important to emphasize that "laws" are only generalized descriptions, expressing a regularity, an orderly sequence of events. Science does not recognize any immutable laws. Its generalized descriptions are subject to change whenever observed facts make a modification necessary. In no field can science be aware of all pertinent facts, sift them thoroughly enough, or classify them altogether satisfactorily; no theory, hypothesis, or law can ever be quite adequate. There is always room for further exploration, criticism, and correlation, for more accurate description. On the other hand, the relativity of all human knowledge does not justify science in abandoning a general description, however tentatively maintained, unless actually observed facts demand it. The cumulative evidence in favor of certain sequences observed in nature may be so overwhelmingly strong as to raise a legitimate presumption against alleged occurrences being in reality observed facts. This applies to numerous accounts of magical and thaumaturgical achievements and miraculous events in ancient and in modern times. In all such cases science scrutinizes the records, weighs the testimony, examines the mental conditions, investigates the character of the belief and seeks its probable origin. These assumed exceptions to the observed orderly sequences in nature should not be confused with the marvelous performances of technology, which are based on the discoveries of science, and are in harmony with its generalizations.

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[1] *Textbook of Psychology,* 1910, p. 1.

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[2] *Psychology as Science,* 1928, p. 76.

The technique of science has been greatly improved in recent times. Knowledge has been advanced by readier means of communication, by the employment of better tools, new machinery, more dependable instruments, and by the use of more rigid methods. Facts can now be gathered, examined, sifted, compared, and correlated, practical experiments made, and the validity of theories submitted to severe tests in a manner quite impossible in earlier days. In view of this there is a tendency in many quarters to overlook the growth of science, to underestimate the value of really scientific work in the past, and to draw too sharp a line of demarcation between modern science as genuine and ancient science as falsely so-called. Fortunately, every scientist is obliged to take note of what other workers in his special field have done. With the awakening of the historic interest this is likely to lead him step by step beyond any artificial boundary. He comes to recognize the scientific character of much observation, experimentation, and reasoning, before the era of distinctly modern science, on the part of Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hellenists, and Greeks, and in the older civilizations of the Near East.

Nor will it seem sufficient to trace a certain continuity of thought along this particular highway of culture. When Buddhist investigators of truth for its own sake, long unknown in the Western world, neither demonstrably influenced by nor influencing its processes of ratiocination, speculated on the plurality of habitable worlds, on ether, atoms, molecules, sense-organs, mental states, and patterns, the total impression of their cosmology is not so much that of a "pseudo-science," as rather that of an amazing structure of thought built by the intellect of man in search of the certain and systematized knowledge which is science, a process of reflection rich in acute observations, ingenious classifications, and fundamental assumptions tested in the alembic of reason. The strangeness we feel is largely due, on the one hand, to the vocabulary, on the other, to the absence of our modern technique. The terms never quite correspond to those that must be used to convey their meaning to us. We have here an astronomy not based on exact mathematical computation and spectral analysis; a geology not yet aware of the earth's true form, the real strata of its crust and their fossil inclusions; a chemistry not feeling the need of a laboratory; a biology ignorant of anatomical facts and evidences of evolution; a psychology hampered by the notions of *karma* and metempsychosis.

Yet the Buddhist thinker looked upon the world in which he lived, not as a house with upper and lower stories, erected a few thousand years ago, but as a universe stretching out through boundless space, without beginning of days or end of life. His earth had large continents and vast oceans. Behind the phenomena he divined invisible elements. He recognized no unbridgeable chasm between living organisms, but assumed, in his way, a genetic connection. He maintained that "the mind ceases to exist when sense-objects and sense-organs cease to interact," and substituted for a permanent ego appearing and disappearing mental complexes. There were no gods in his world or above it, but there was an all-embracing law of causality.[8] With all its crudities, this cosmology, elaborated without the aid of our advanced technique, exhibits a conception of the universe in some respects astonishingly similar to certain views of the world reached by our present methods of investigation. But already the cosmogonic myths that furnished the material for these speculations reveal something of the essential nature of science. The creation stories of the Hebrews and other ancient peoples represent sincere efforts of the human mind to know how the world has come into existence, the orderly sequence in which things have appeared, and the cause of their emergence. There is indeed a kinship, however remote, between the simple tales concerning the mura-mura by primitive man not yet acquainted with spirits and the descriptions of nature by men of to-day who have ceased to believe in spirits.

But the methods and the machinery now employed have, in every branch of science, made possible an incomparably higher degree of certainty, accurate correlation, and logical generalization. The results have been subversive of many traditional beliefs, and have profoundly affected the mental attitude toward reality. Even a cursory glance at some of the outstanding achievements and tendencies of modern science in various fields will suffice to indicate the change that has been wrought. Astronomy has revealed that the earth is only a small orb moving with its sister-planets, now known to include a trans-Neptunian planet, around our sun, that our solar system holds but an insignificant place in a galaxy of similar suns, and that beyond this galacteal system there are others removed from ours by inconceivable distances. By the aid of the telescope and the sensitive photographic plate vast numbers of stars have been registered that are invisible to the naked eye, while the steady increase of such observed celestial bodies renders it improbable that the universe has any ascertainable boundaries. Spectral analysis has shown that the stuff out of which worlds are made is essentially the same throughout the universe, even though the elements are differently distributed, and the spectra of nebulæ reveal no metals but only hydrogen, helium, and nebulium. Chemistry has discovered many new elements and ascertained that there must be ninety-two such primary constituents of matter, though a few of them have not yet been found. It has been able to describe the structure of the atom, with its proton and electrons. Physics has made us familiar with the play of forces and measured their energy with astounding precision, though not quite satisfied with either the undulatory or the corpuscular theory and calling for keener instruments to determine the exact position and speed of the electron. The collaboration of chemistry and physics has been specially helpful. Some of the new elements discovered transmit rays of longer or shorter wave-lengths than ordinary light, and have the power to render air a conductor of electricity. By determining the relation between the energy and the wave-length it has become possible to ascertain the temperature of celestial bodies and of the intervening spaces. The study of radio-activity has added to our knowledge of the atom. In electro-chemistry, dealing with chemical changes productive of or caused by electrical energy, and bio-chemistry, dealing with chemical elements and changes and physical energies involved in the production of living organisms, facts have been observed that contribute to the solution of, though they have not yet solved, such questions as whether electricity itself is a subtle form of matter, whether transmutation of elements is possible, and whether life can be produced in the laboratory.

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[8] William M. McGovern, *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy,* I, *Cosmology,* 1923. Cf. the author's review of this book in *The Philosophical Review,* xxiv, 4, 1925, pp. 403ff.

Meteorology has, with the aid of the barometer and thermometer and by careful observation, determined the general motion of the atmosphere, the effects upon it of the earth's rotation and the solar heat, the distribution of winds and pressures, the mechanism of the hurricane, the disturbances of the equilibrium through moisture by condensation into cloud and rain, the laws of hydrodynamics and thermodynamics. These are discoveries of far-reaching importance, even though weather-prediction is as yet practicable only for a short period. Geology has shown that the earth is at least a hundred million years old, and that the general character and relative age of the various strata of its crust can be determined. A considerably higher age for our planet seems indeed to be demanded by the probable amount of helium in the rocks and by some astronomical considerations. Geography has made us acquainted with the general features of the earth's surface from pole to pole, and with the distribution of land and sea in former ages. Palæontology has found in the fossil inclusions evidences of successive floras and faunas. Aided by the microscope, biology has discovered some of the principles of cellular activity and the evolution of species. That the human species has also been evolved, through mutation and modification, from some earlier form of animal life has been shown by comparative embryology, anatomy, and psychology as well as by palæontological facts. Archæological remains have borne testimony to mammalian races bridging the chasm between the most gifted animal and the least developed human being of to-day. Anthropology has given us vast stores of information concerning man in general, and ethnology has especially increased our knowledge of the various races and peoples, past and present. History, as the science dealing with the social phenomena of man's life from the point of view of their sequence in time and genetic connection, has greatly extended its domain, reaching back into periods hitherto covered with darkness, throwing light upon forgotten civilizations, sifting with rigorous methods the testimony of documents and archæological remains, establishing the probable course of events, and bringing its multitudinous facts into causal connection. Sociology, dealing with human society from a different standpoint, has occupied itself fruitfully with the analysis and classification of social facts, the scientific description of society, and the explanation of human society in terms applicable to other forms of existence.

In the different branches of philosophy, psychology, as the science dealing with mental processes, has connected these with the sense-organs by methods of observation that were not available in former times; logic has by fresh scrutiny of the categories determined more accurately what constitutes a valid process of reasoning; and ethics, the science of morality, has occupied itself, not only with the description, classification, and explanation of *mores,* or customs, but also with a quest for principles of universal validity. Jurisprudence has studied, on a larger scale than heretofore, the codification of common law growing out of generally observed social customs, given special attention to international law, and also considered the line of conduct of which the law should take cognizance and the proper character of its sanctions. By the use of scientific methods of research, medicine has succeeded in making marvelous discoveries as regards the causes of physical and mental disorders and found new ways of preventing and curing disease. Mathematics, the science of numbers and magnitudes, has been quite revolutionized by the invention of differential calculus, introducing the problem of infinitely small quantities. Because it has acquired the method of science, technology has been able to give us new machinery for the advancement of knowledge and for communication, transportation, and production. Finally, theology has greatly furthered our knowledge of what religion is, how it manifests itself, and what causes its varied expressions. As a science dealing with all the religious phenomena of man's life it describes this large body of observed facts, relates them to one another, and arranges them under general laws. It was a failure to understand both the distinct nature and significance of these facts and the possibility of dealing with them in a scientific manner that led Auguste Comte[4] and Herbert Spencer[5] to omit theology in their classifications of the sciences. It is also a mistaken notion that there can be a conflict between theology and other sciences. One branch of science cannot be hostile to, or incongruous with, another. There has indeed been a long and bitter feud between interpreters of religious facts and interpreters of facts belonging to other realms of experience. This has been due in part to an unscientific dogmatism on both sides, in part also to a sincere conviction that vital issues were involved, but chiefly to a difference of approach. So long as theology was understood, not as the science of religion, but as the doctrine of God, derived and systematized from the data given in an infallible book or in authorized creedal statements, it was natural to feel that this is not the way in which science proceeds. Modern theology, however, whether it concerns itself with the history or the philosophy of religion, does not limit its scope by the original derivation of the term, is of purely scientific character, and has no other object than the accurate description of religion.

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[4] *Système de politique positive,* 1851-1854.

[5] *The Classification of the Sciences,* 1864.

Brief and inadequate as this survey necessarily is, it will clearly suggest the great change in the conception of the universe that modern science has brought about. How far it has yet affected the thinking and actions of the masses of men, or how thoroughly it has been experienced even by many earnest and hard-working scientists of to-day, may indeed be questioned. But the fact that scientific methods are rapidly spreading among the educated in all parts of the civilized world is obvious, and the effects on the whole outlook upon life, where the implications have been understood, are of great importance. The advance of science has tended to make men more modest. Man does not seem to hold so significant a position in the universe as was once supposed. Though his knowledge grows from day to day and is capable, in a measure, of verification, it is fragmentary, relative, and subject to constant revision. Dogmatism is out of place, and loud affirmation is not permissible. The method of science proceeding circumspectly, warily, and tentatively, by induction and deduction, from the less to the more adequately known, is at once the most revolutionary element and the greatest agency for fostering humility and modesty. The boundless space, the infinite stretches of time, the seemingly exhaustless energy, the orderliness of all the processes of nature, the unexplored beyond in every direction cannot fail to inspire a sense of awe, mystery, and reverence. Science has engendered a new feeling of solidarity. Man is tied to the past and to the future, bound up with the whole scheme of things in a causal connection, and so are all the manifestations of his life. In spite of his insignificance and close genetic connection with less developed forms of existence, so strongly emphasized by science, it has also made him conscious of something intrinsically great within himself, a capacity to peer into nature's workshop, to observe, compare, verify, conclude, generalize, aspire. This tends to give him a fresh sense of exaltation, zest for renewed effort, and joy in the discovery of truth. The wonders accomplished by scientific technique, far more impressive than any of the miracles he dreamed of in his youth, have revealed that there is in his nature a vast fund of creative ability. He can change his material and social environment; he can change himself; he can change the heredity and environment of his posterity.

These effects accentuate the essential harmony between science and religion. Both are concerned with knowledge. But science seeks it in every field, for its own sake, without regard to its applications or effects, and by purely intellectual processes. Religion seeks it in the realm of what is felt, desired, and conceived of as the highest, for the purpose of acquaintance with an adequate object of devotion and service and the establishment of a satisfactory relation; and its processes are not only intellectual, but also conative and emotional. Science owes a great debt to religion. Through long periods of human history practically all education consisted in the transmission within the clan and the tribe of sacred traditions; and in the ancient civilizations most persons who received a special intellectual training were prepared for some form of religious ministry. As a rule it was among the various priestly orders that the pioneers of scientific research appeared. Their occupation gave them the incentive, their leisure the opportunity, for inquiry as to the origin and nature of things. Their efforts to gather the data and systematize them, and to defend their conclusions even within a limited theological area sharpened their intellectual tools, led them into fresh quarries, and resulted in notable structures of thought. The need of an educated ministry was an important factor in developing higher institutions of learning.

On the other hand, religion owes a great debt to science. It has been affected by the methods and the spirit of scientific research. It has been released from its bondage to tradition, made capable of appreciating its relative significance, and allowed to pursue the quest for truth in new ways. The mythical material has largely disappeared. The dogmas have become valuable records of the past, to be allegorically or historically interpreted, without binding force as tests, or these articles of faith have been abandoned for a more genuine expression of opinion in harmony with observed facts. The infallible authority of prophets, priests, councils, and standards has been subjected to critical examination, and the records of man's religious life everywhere and at all times have come to be studied with the same detachment and the same impartial sympathy. The spiritual attitude has changed. Under the influence of science men of strongly religious nature have become more modest and more truly reverent. They are no longer so sure that they can define in unquestionable terms the object of their devotion, or so certain of their own exceptional position. They are less dogmatic and less assertive, more docile and more humble before the infinite complexity of life. The growing interest in religious views and customs different from those held and practiced by the student himself, and yet presenting certain marked similarities, has created a decided impression of the solidarity of man's religious life, its common origin, and its growth in various directions according to definite and ascertainable laws. Every day brings fresh testimony that science and religion are working together harmoniously in the search for truth and the refashioning of human society.

CHAPTER IX

ART AND RELIGION

RELIGION has always exercised a great influence on art, and art has always been a means of stimulating and nourishing religion. But religion, in its outward manifestations, has not invariably appeared as a friend of all the fine arts, and all expressions of art have not seemed to further the ends of religion. The sense of beauty in nature, leading to creation of beauty by man, originates in a mental tendency distinct from those that produce science, morality, and religion, but allies itself with them. Since it was at first predominantly an emotional reaction, and this was likewise the case with religion, the latter naturally influenced, in a marked degree, primitive attempts to give the effect of beauty, though practical utility, no doubt, was also a motive, and sometimes the chief consideration. As motion, sound, and color first arrest the attention of the child in toys and pets, so early man was impressed with these qualities and began his artistic career by re-producing the movements and sounds in his environment and by decorating his body. Rhythmic movements within his own organism as well as regularities and splendors without caused conscious and volitional activities, such as marching and dancing, singing and chanting, decorating and painting. These exercises themselves gave pleasure. But fresh impulses came from religious sentiments and ideas. The need was felt of imitating the totem animal, of listening carefully to the sound of the bull-roarer invented by the muramura, of correctly using the mana in magic, and of serving it with devotion. Very clearly this influence may be seen in the remarkable art of the Magdalenian and Capsian periods of the later paleolithic age. This art has been recently described in a comprehensive manner by Hugo Obermaier[1] and Herbert Kühn.[2] Especially valuable is Obermaier's illuminating description of Capsian art, and Kühn's thoughtful discussion of primitive art. The latter scholar emphasizes the principle of relativity, the error of judging various types of art by reference to some historical standard of excellence, and the right of primitive art to be considered on its own merits. He makes a distinction between sensory art which reproduces, more realistically or more idealistically, the data immediately given by the senses, and imaginative art which turns away from concrete reality to abstraction, simplification, coördination, and unity. With the Capsian there seems to be a transition from the dominantly sensory to the imaginative geometric style.

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[1] "Kunst" in *Reallexikon der Vorgeschichte,* 1926.

[2] *Die Kunst der Primitiven*, 1923; "Ursprung und Entwicklung der paläolitischen Kunst" in *Mannus,* 1925, pp. 271ff.; "Primitive Kunst" in *Reallexikon der Vorgeschichte,* 1928; "Beziehungen und Beeinflussungen der Kunstgruppen in Paläolithikum," in *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie,* 1927.

While the keen observation and admirable drawing, engraving, and painting of the Magdalenians bespeak a highly developed artistic sense, it is obvious that the painstaking accuracy in reproduction has a magical purpose, and that the special excellence in the representation of animals is prompted by a religious motive. The artist is a totemist. Hence his relative inferiority in dealing with the human figure. It is probable, however, that he was already influenced by animistic ideas, and sought, not only to imitate, but also to flatter and propitiate. Although none of his magic wands reveals any trace of it, he may not have been altogether unfamiliar with the custom, found among the cannibals on Sumatra, and reported by Yrjö Hirn,[8] of enclosing in the upper-

[8] *The Origin of Art,* 1900, p. 291.

most figure of the staff the brain of a slaughtered boy. In the interior of the caves he decorated, or in some secluded spot out-of-doors, there are likely to have been initiation ceremonies, with songs, dances, and pantomimes, such as those celebrated among the Fijians and East African negroes. In the Azilian period, the solar cult, possibly an outgrowth of muraism, sought expression in geometric art, in the circle with a cross within it or a dot in its center; and in the neolithic age the fuller growth of animism led to the earliest important architecture, the dolmen, the menhir, and the cromlech, and to the fashioning of idols, especially of goddesses. When man learned to record his experiences in a system of writing, the foundations had already been laid for all the rich art that followed.

It is not necessary or possible to indicate in detail how the older religious ideas continued to express themselves in art, or how the powerful development of animism affected the various forms of art. A few suggestions must suffice. In Egypt totemism had an extraordinary longevity. Mammals, reptiles, fishes, and birds were worshiped. Gradually, but never completely, this ancient religious tendency yielded to other conceptions. It was reflected in art. Already among the hieroglyphic signs the excellently drawn animals and especially the large number of finely reproduced birds are very striking; and reproductions of wholly or partially zoöform divinities are common. The awe and confidence inspired by exceptionally mana-filled personalities, present and past, were intensified by animism and the funeral customs to which it gave rise. What marvelous power was ascribed to the king as "the mighty god" may be seen in the Pyramid Texts. This was undoubtedly the chief force that led in architecture from the dolmen to the mastaba and the pyramid, from the menhir to the obelisk, and from the cromlech to the open-air temple of the Fifth Dynasty, and in sculpture from the awkward neolithic idols to the lifelike representations of the divine rulers. How advancing religious thought may seize upon an old totemic emblem to carry a deeper meaning is interestingly illustrated in the case of the lotus flower. Even more significant is the effect of Ikh n Aton's reform movement in forcing a return from a conventionalized art to the concrete reality and beauty of nature. While it is true that, neither here nor elsewhere, are the artistic forms derived solely from religious motives, the impulse must not be underestimated.

The effect of religion on the art of Babylonia and Assyria is not less marked. Totemism survived. To its influence is no doubt due, to some extent, the excellence of early Sumerian and later Assyrian representations of animals. But its decline is indicated by the mixed human and animal forms of divinities, and especially by the fact that the more important gods always appear in purely human shape. The discoveries at Ur and Kish reveal an astonishingly high perfection of miniature art. The tombs and their contents are particularly important as evidences of animism. While the *zikkurat,* or temple-tower, is not, like the pyramid, the tomb of a king, it has been plausibly suggested by Franz Böhl[4] that the human sacrifices accompanying the distinguished dead at Ur are connected with a mystery play in which the marriage of a god and a divine bride was celebrated in its topmost chamber, followed by her death and burial under the building. Such a play at the New Year's festival, representing the struggle and enthronement, the death and resurrection of Marduk, has been described from early texts by Alfred Zimmern.[5] The headship of Marduk in the Babylonian pantheon and of Assur in the Assyrian, and the ascription to each of the creation of heaven and earth, find characteristic expression in art. Among the Hittites the representations of divinities in human shape on the backs of lions and panthers indicate the victory of animism, while the reliefs at Yazyly kaya, setting forth the marriage of the mother-goddess and Ḥatti (identical in name as well as in function with the later Phrygian Attis), reflect one phase of the religious interpretation, so persistent in Anatolian thought, of nature's annual course. Until the clue shall have been found to the Ægean systems of writing, it will not be possible to estimate the full significance of the extraordinary art developed in this realm. But certain religious ideas are perfectly obvious, and the appearance of landscapes, with presumably sacred trees and mountains, is of special interest.

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[4] "Das Menschenopfer bei den alten Sumerern" in *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie,* 1929, pp. 83ff.

[5] *Der alte Orient,* xxv, 3, 1928.

A rich mythology furnished the Greeks with motives for all kinds of artistic work. Because they thought of their divinities as exalted human beings, they gave them the forms of beautiful men and women, built and decorated their houses on earth in a dignified manner, praised them with songs and instrumental music, told interesting stories about them, and used the incidents to adorn their epic tales and to suggest their dramatic problems. Only emblems loosely attached hint at a distant totemism. If Phidias and Praxiteles gave majesty, and Scopas grace, to the human form, it was the image of the divine that these masters endeavored with their chisels to bring out of the marble. Of the works, now lost to us, by the great painters, Polygnotus, Zeuxis, Parrhasius, and Apelles, we know that some were of a distinctly religious nature. Even Alexander, whom Apelles limned, was a god. In the eastward reach of the Hellenistic spirit religious systems, originally not favorable to creations of beauty, found in a modified Hellas-born art a medium of expression. The indeterminate in thought cannot produce the determinate in art. Neither pantheistic Brahmanism nor atheistic Buddhism, neither Confucianism, Taoism, nor Shinto could seriously occupy itself with the human form divine. Yet the brooding soul of the East found a way of expressing itself in statues of the Buddha informed by the breath of Hellenism; and its influence was felt in India, Turkestan, Indo-China, China, and Japan, in spite of certain signs of immaturity in over-decoration and excessive symbolism. Out of the mysteries there grew in India the drama, finding its climax in Kalidasa and Bavabhuti.

As Christianity spread in the Græco-Roman world and freed itself from the inhibitions of its Jewish origin, it made use, first tentatively and then more unreservedly, of the existing art forms. Animal symbols, such as the fish, the lamb, and the dove were employed; and the new divinity appeared with the features of Dionysus and Apollo. A god had descended to earth and lived as a man among men. With him the Old Testament heroes stepped for the first time into plastic art and were followed by apostles, saints, and angels, in frescoes and mosaics. The tendency could not be checked. Even Tertullian[6] condemns only the representation of pagan gods, but permits the Christian to be an artist. In the Leucine Acts of John,[7] the apostle chides very gently his friend Lycomedes, who had had him painted: "What thou hast done now is childish and imperfect; thou didst paint the dead picture of a dead." The basilica became a church, with its apses, aisles, and decorations. The love of beauty began to be cherished in the convents. Then came Francis of Assisi who hymned the Sun and brought men back to nature and simplicity.

The time was ripe for a distinctive Christian art. So far as the form is concerned the Gothic is derived from the Romanesque; but the spirit that manifests itself in the cathedrals at Chartres, Amiens, Rheims, and elsewhere is due to a fresh religious impulse and a loving observation of nature. This exquisite art had the stamp of sincerity. It was democratic in the sense that the common people could enjoy and appreciate it. Before the invention of printing the churches provided picture books that could be read by all. It was Christian. From Giotto to Tintoretto, from Wilhelm Meister to Quentin Massys, painting and sculpture worked predominantly with religious themes. They reflect the same sentiments as the *Stabat mater* and the *Dies iræ,* and the same cast of thought as Dante's *Divina Commedia.* The Renaissance made no immediate change in this respect. The great masterpieces of Michelangelo, Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, and Correggio dealt with familiar Christian subjects. The Renaissance brought the young European nations into quickening contact with pagan Greek culture. Its deep significance has been set forth by Jacob Burckhardt.[8] But it was not a religious sentiment that carried into Christian art the gods and goddesses of Greece. Faith did not transfer its devotion to those Hellenic divinities. The technique gradually acquired by the artist welcomed the new material, made a more accurate rendering of nature possible, and led the way toward secularization. Yet even in the Baroque the religious feeling persists. "The hand that groined St. Peter's dome wrought in a sad sincerity." Rembrandt's art stands as the sign of a new age. ushered in by the mighty movement of religious reform. In the Protestant world it is unique. It is in touch with the past, while pointing to the future. The Christian tradition is still potent and the religious sincerity unmistakable, but there is a fresh return to nature, a scientific interest, a technical mastery, a freedom of spirit that betoken the passing of the old.

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[6] *De idolatria,* viii.

[7] *Acta apostolorum apocrypha,* ed. Lipsius-Bonnet, II, p. 167.

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[8] *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien,* 1860.

In estimating what is most easily recognized as religious art, the mistake should be avoided of assuming that it is solely due to the religious sentiment. The peculiar genius of a people, its environment, its general civilization, its economic conditions must be considered. Essentially the same religious conceptions do not find the same expression everywhere. Nature does not elicit the same response. Different religions avail themselves of identical forms of art. Industry and commerce increase resources and facilitate exchange. Artistic ability varies. It is difficult to say how far the slaves of Cheops were goaded to their gigantic task by the consciousness that they were constructing the eternal home of their mighty human god, or the builders of the Parthenon were inspired by extraordinary reverence for Pallas Athene. Imhotep, who built in stone at Sakkara, was also Zoser's prime minister. Political interests and personal ambitions, pure love of beauty and creative capacity, have much to do with Greek art. We do not know whether Ibn Muhammed, who constructed the Taj Mahal for Shah Jahan, was a pious Muslim as well as a past master of the Persian style of architecture. There were opportunities for gaining fame and wealth, or securing a modest livelihood, only in furnishing certain types of buildings, sculptures, painting, and music, needed in the cult. It may be true that Christianity has sung itself into the heart of man as no other religion. Its Gregorian chants, and stately Latin hymns, and Lutheran chorals, the cantatas, oratorios, and music-dramas it inspired, form an incomparable treasure ever to be cherished. But it is by no means inconceivable that the Germanic peoples by virtue of their native capacity would have given to the world master-musicians, even if the course of their religious life had been different. Not a deepening of religious feeling, but an improvement of instrumental technique, seems to be responsible for the new development of music in the seventeenth century. India has produced no "Parsifal."

Although it owes its existence only in part to pious devotion, this art has in every age and people profoundly affected religion. It has preserved in permanent form significant experiences and afforded stimuli to fresh experiences. It has lent dignity and beauty to the cult and given concreteness to the products of religious imagination. It has nourished the feeling of reverence and the sense of mystery. That the houses built for worship have been the noblest structures erected on earth is not a matter of indifference. As "the conscious stone to beauty grew," religion gained stability and power. When the Greek sculptors invested their divinities with a majesty and grace never seen before, they weaned men's minds from many unworthy conceptions fostered by the rank growth of mythology, and rendered a distinct service to religion. The Virgin Goddess on the Acropolis of Athens, Isis and her son Horus, the "Mother of God" and her infant child Jesus, as symbols of "the eternal feminine" in nature, are unconscious protests against a purely masculine conception of the divine. Veneration and affection for men and women who have lived nobly, acted unselfishly, suffered patiently, and remained faithful even unto death, have, without a question, been intensified by contemplation of their images. Religious emotions have been quickened, strengthened, and purified by the strains of music, from the simplest chants to the great creations of a Händel, Mozart, Bach, Beethoven, and Wagner.

Nevertheless, a strong religious sentiment has often put a ban on certain arts. Thus the Jews were forbidden by the second commandment of the decalogue (Ex. xx, 4; Deut. v, 3; cf. also Deut. v, 23) to make a graven image or the likeness of anything that is in the heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the water under the earth. It may be true that only graven or molten images were originally intended, but all pictorial representations came naturally to be included, and Ezekiel (viii, 10) condemns "the idols of Israel portrayed upon the wall round about." There is no evidence that the Jews lacked artistic ability in this direction. Hiram, the Phœnician, was not wholly responsible for the images in Solomon's temple. The bronze horses dedicated to Shemesh, the sun-god, and the Bronze Serpent destroyed by Josiah (2 Kings xxiii, 11), and the images seen by Ezekiel were no doubt the work of native artists.

Sculpture and painting had to be sacrificed, not because of inability to use chisel or brush, nor because the conception of Israel's god prevented it, since he still could be described in literature as a human being seated on a chariot driven by living creatures, but because the representation of Yahwe in the form of a bull was found inadequate, and every likeness of a thing in heaven, on the earth, or under the earth suggested some god that must not be tolerated by the side of him. But when the æsthetic feeling is denied one outlet, it seeks another. If religion may not use the plastic arts, it lays hold of music and poetry: David's harp, Isaiah's oratory, Job, Canticles, and Jonah make amends for whatever losses in other respects religious anxiety may have caused. Zoroastrianism had no temples and at first apparently no images; but in course of time Ahura Mazda's form was set forth in sculpture, and during the Achæmenian, Seleucid, Arsacid, and Sasanid periods Persian art developed without hindrance until the arrival of Islam. Original Buddhism had no gods, and therefore no temples, altars, images, hymns, or prayers. It was indifferent rather than hostile to the arts, since neither Brahmanism nor the popular cults had produced anything noteworthy in this realm. But as time went on and foreign impulses were felt, the needs of the community, the missionary spirit, and the growing veneration of the founder brought stupas, chaityas, relics, processions, paintings, statues of the Buddha, and poetry.

Christianity rejected the heathen gods and, as it spread, zealously destroyed their images and sometimes their temples, but made its peace with the arts and gradually employed them for its own purposes. In his poem "Great Is Diana of the Ephesians," Goethe describes the goldsmith, engaged in adorning with animal figures the girdle of the goddess, who hears the cry brought by the wind from a wretched folk that there is a god in the brain, behind the absurd little brow of man, more glorious than the being that suggests the breadth of the divine; he sends his boy to the market place, but remains at his pious work in the hope that he may see the face of his goddess. The Christian artist saw the infinite godhead incarnate in the Galilean teacher, and yearned to behold, in his humble art, the countenance of his god. Muhammed repudiated all the gods but Allah, maintained that this god had no son or daughters, abhorred the idols, and understood that Allah had through his prophet Moses forbidden all images. Islam, therefore, prohibited sculpture and painting. The love of beauty took refuge in the arabesque, the minor arts, and poetry. No prohibition could prevent the poet from painting glowing pictures, any more than the mystic from praising the cup of wine. Especially in Shi'ite Persia there was a tendency to go beyond the border line. The contest between the image-breakers and the image-worshipers in the time of Leo the Isaurian (717-742) and his successors does not seem to be due, in any marked degree at least, to Muslim influence. Various motives entered in, but the most important appears to be a reaction against gross superstition, ambitious monasticism, and ecclesiastical domination from Rome. The struggle ended, so far as the iconoclastic movement is concerned, with a compromise, banishing statues, but leaving painted ikons.

The Reformation put a ban on image worship everywhere in Protestant lands. Only a limited use of images was permitted. The churches were stripped of everything that reminded of the rejected religious teachings and sentiments. The Bible was opened, and the picture books were closed. The sermon took the place of the mass. Invaluable art treasures were destroyed in Scotland as well as in Germany. Iconoclasm was not limited to the Anabaptists, nor practiced by them as a rule. The leading thinkers among them were lovers of peace, but this radical movement attracted some turbulent elements. The loving hands of Protestants are to-day making honorable amends for the errors of their fathers by bringing to light mediæval pictures which they endeavored permanently to hide from the eyes of men; and Rembrandt, the Mennonite, atoned for the sins some followers of his sect, in misdirected zeal, committed.

As the process of secularization continued, the appeal of nature and humanity grew stronger, and art occupied itself in steadily increasing measure with subjects far beyond the narrow range allowed for it by ecclesiastical tradition, the restraints of the past became less effective. An earnest religious feeling reacted against this tendency. In pietistic circles, members were forbidden to dance, to play cards, to listen to certain musical instruments, to attend the theater, to visit art galleries, to read novels, on pain of excommunication and everlasting punishment. Perhaps the most comprehensive and carefully elaborated protest against the character and spirit of modern art is that made by Leo Tolstoy.[9] He criticizes with justice much that is praised as high art, denouncing its inanity, ambiguity, straining for effect, meretriciousness, and lubricity; its triviality, snobbishness, and commercialism. He makes a noteworthy plea for simplicity and brevity, truthfulness, intelligibility, and significance. Some of his suggestions as to the function of art as a means of "evoking, under imaginary conditions, sentiments of brotherhood and love" are worthy of most serious consideration. He is in essential agreement with Plato when the Greek philosopher puts upon the lips of Socrates the question:

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[9] *What Is Art?* 1897.

> Ought we not to seek out artists of another stamp, who by the power of genius can trace out the nature of the fair and the graceful, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a healthful region, may drink in good from every quarter, whence any emanation from noble works may strike upon their eye or their ear, like a gale wafting health from salubrious lands, and win them imperceptibly from their earliest childhood into resemblance, love, and harmony with the true beauty of reason? [10]

But to Tolstoy beauty is in no sense an end, and art has no other legitimate object than to

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[10] *The Republic,* III, 401.

"transfer from the sphere of reason into the sphere of feeling the truth that the good of men is in their union among themselves," to preach what he regards as true Christianity. He finds that the attempts by the æstheticians to define beauty have been contradictory and futile. Accepting the general impression that beauty is what pleases us, he breaks the staff over it. "Goodness is the eternal, highest purpose of our life"; "beauty not only does not coincide with goodness, but is rather opposed to it"; "the more we abandon ourselves to beauty, the more we depart from goodness." While we cannot define the absolutely beautiful, any more than the absolutely good, there does not seem to be any fundamental reason for assuming such a conflict between goodness and beauty. Santayana [11] has well described beauty in nature as "a result of the functional adaptation of our senses and imagination to the mechanical products of our environment," and beauty in the fine arts as "a result of the intentional adaptation of mechanical forms to the functions which our senses and imagination have already acquired." These results necessarily vary in perfection. Even if beauty is that which pleases, and enjoyment is a legitimate part of man's experience, there are higher types of pleasure struggling with lower for recognition, and an education of the senses, the imagination, and the artistic appreciation is possible. Æsthetic pleasure enters into all our mental activities. Santayana also has called attention to the fact that "in the case of a theory our first concern is naturally the adequacy of our instruments of comprehension, but that we are also influenced more than we think by the ease and pleasure with which we think in its terms, that is by its beauty." Regard for orderliness, symmetry, and harmony, is essential in the realm of thought and action as well as in that of the feelings. Satisfaction of the sense of beauty may be rightly sought, and not merely accepted as a consequence of thinking or acting in a correct way. To have the joy of beholding a beautiful scene in nature or an inspiring work of art may be worth careful planning and real sacrifice. There is an element of truth in the claim that art should be cultivated for its own sake without ulterior motives, that in order to accomplish the best of which he is capable the artist must be free in his choice of subjects and manner of treating them, follow his inner impulse, and satisfy himself. He need not leave his craft or sacrifice the liberty its exercise requires, and betake himself to some sacred place or different vocation, to be a truly religious man. But he cannot be indifferent to the effects of his work; he must add to his artistry love of justice and truth.

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[11] *The Sense of Beauty,* 1896, p. 165 and p. 139.

In this field, as everywhere else, the inadequacy of the past to meet the needs of the present is felt. It is not sufficient to build, or carve, or paint, or sing in the old ways, and on the old models. There is an artistic urge that cannot be held back. It struggles for new expressions. It reaches out for finer symbols, grander, truer to life, more significant, more pleasing. A fresh religious experience may assist the birth and growth of a new art, furnishing loftier ideas, nobler sentiments, higher social purposes. It will emancipate itself from the bondage to historic schools and go directly for inspiration to nature and to the clearer revelation of life's meaning. By the aid of scientific technology its most glorious creations will find their way to the humblest homes. "A wave of light and joy will lift mankind again."

CHAPTER X

MORALITY AND RELIGION

It is widely recognized to-day that morality and religion are distinct social products, originating in different psychic tendencies. The moral consciousness is not a creation of religion, and religion is not a creation of conscience. Both ultimately go back to the instinct of self-preservation, are produced by the necessities of man's existence. But while morality seeks to meet these necessities by establishing proper relations between the social units and between these integers and society as a whole, religion seeks to meet them by establishing proper relations between society and its units, on the one hand, and impersonal or personal powers above their level, felt, desired, and conceived of as the highest objects of devotion, on the other hand. In one case, the psychic force operates horizontally, as it were, dealing with relations within the group; in the other it operates vertically, as it were, ascending above the group. Because of these different directions, and the differentiated character of their operations, they may be regarded, in a sense, as distinct psychic forces. This distinction is accentuated by the fact that, in morality, the volitional element, the control by the will, is stressed, while the specific of religion is its devotion of all the mental faculties to something that controls and that, temporarily or more permanently, in varying degrees of intensity and adequacy, presents itself as the highest.

Although distinct, the two tendencies never operate in isolation in man's life. They constantly affect each other. As man is a religious being, whatever form his religion may take, so he is also a moral being, whatever his morals may be. His morality influences his religion; his religion influences his morality. Both are affected by the growth of his mentality, his science, his technology, his industry and commerce, his art, his social arrangements, the changes in his environment. The interaction of morality and religion has had the effect of making religious conceptions and practices a reflection of social customs and ideas, and of validating moral behavior by religious sanctions. Incidental to the growth of both religion and morality, which is not uniform or with equal pace, divergent interests and claims seem to develop. It sometimes appears as though religion were incongruous with the noblest deliverances of man's moral consciousness, or a high type of morality were inconsistent with the deliverances of man's religious consciousness. Especially is this impression strong when religion seems to speak with authoritative voice in sacred scriptures, laying down moral precepts as well as rules of religious faith and practice. A conflict is then inevitable between those who accept these books as being, or containing, infallible oracles coming from the supreme authority in all matters, and the highest object of devotion, and those who do not accept them as such. A similar conflict may also arise between those who, while recognizing the fallible human character of all sacred literature, raise up as another infallible authority their own conscience which they regard either as the voice of God in the soul, or as a natural endowment of the soul by which man knows intuitively what is right or wrong, and those who do not accept this view of the moral consciousness. Such an inconsistency between morality and religion may easily be inferred when a strongly entrenched religious system, with its gods, sacrifices, sacraments, prayers, and communion with personalities in a supersensible world, is abandoned for what appears to be a purely moral system in which these conceptions and practices have no place. To those who identify religion with these particular ideas and sacred customs such a change may seem to imply a renunciation of all religion, and a substitution for it of what they look upon as "mere morality," while those to whom right conduct in the various human relations appears as the supreme concern may regard everything that has to do with a higher reality and man's relation to it as incongruous with the claims of morality, and a substitution for it of "mere superstition." A more searching analysis, however, will reveal that even where the external authority of infallible oracles is set aside, the infallibility of the individual conscience is denied, and some widely prevalent expressions of religion are rejected, the religious sentiment persists. Religion continues to lift morality to ever higher altitudes; morality continues to purify and refine religion.

Ethics as a science deals with the moral consciousness. The facts that it observes lie in the field of *mores,* customs. But it is not directly concerned with the description of customs as such. That belongs to the province of sociology, which in this respect is to it an auxiliary science. Nor is it directly concerned with the whole realm of consciousness. That belongs to psychology, which in respect of ethics is also an auxiliary science. Ethics has to do with *mores* in the sense of approved customs, conduct, character, and with consciousness as it expresses itself in approval and disapproval. The aim of ethics is the discovery of the good, what constitutes good conduct, and what constitutes the ideal good. From its point of view it examines and classifies customs and ideas relative to conduct, relates them to the mental development, and arranges them under general laws in the sense of observed sequences and with reference to a reasoned standard, which itself is a generalization. It is in the nature of science that no such generalization, no such reasoned standard by which customs and ideas relative to conduct may be judged, can have the attribute of finality, but is always subject to improvement and restatement, as the data of the moral consciousness become more perfectly apprehended.

Students of ethics who recognize evolution as a fact are in the main agreed, not only that society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness and that custom, which implies obligatoriness as well as habitualness, is the mother of morality, but also that the sense of obligation has been gradually developed from purely mechanical reactions, simple primary sensations of pain and pleasure, like and dislike, emotions of anger and gratification, instinctive preferences and avoidances. Society antedates humanity. The social life of the animals has its customs. These are not only habits, repetitions of the same action with a relatively small amount of conscious volition, but also types of activity marked by a relatively high degree of conscious volition directed toward the accomplishment of what is felt and cognized as the thing to be done. Anger and indignation on the part of the social group indicate disapproval of any other course. This has been well pointed out by Edward Westermarck.[1] Such customs have been observed and carefully studied in various species of animals. When they are said to be formed by instinct, it is important to bear in mind that instinct is based on experience, implies the exercise and growth of the mental faculties, and is not infallible in its operations. There can be no question that, whether we call him man or beast, *Pithecanthropus erectus,* in certain emergencies, acted as he did, not only because his remote ancestors, of whom he knew nothing, had so acted and left him as an inheritance, of whose character as such he was not aware, a disposition to do as they did, but also because the social group to which he belonged followed this course and his own experience caused him to approve of it. In other situations he rebelled, and the expressed disapproval of the group filled him with remorse, because he shared their sense of obligation to the custom.

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[1] *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas,* I, 1906.

Observations of the life of backward peoples, reinforced by a study of more advanced peoples, have led to the conclusion that in the earlier periods of man's history custom reigned supreme. What it demanded was right; what it forbade was wrong. It was a hard taskmaster, but necessary for the education of the moral consciousness. To it we owe the development of a reproving and approving conscience. This has been set forth in a particularly lucid and convincing manner by George F. Moore.[2] But because of the stagnation of custom and the arrested mental development among savage peoples of to-day the effectiveness of this tyranny of custom in primitive human society has occasionally been overemphasized. It is sometimes averred that the countervailing power of dissent was practically non-existent. Yet there must have been, not only rebels who regretted their non-conformity, but also dissenters in whom the clan's disapproval did not create a reproving conscience, because they did not share it. They may have been elders with riper experience or youth with fiery enthusiasm. Many circumstances may have given rise to a dissent that caused no remorse, such as acquaintance with groups having different customs, removal to a new environment, the development of a new technique, personal sympathies, interests, and idiosyncrasies, enlargement of the mental horizon, and specifically religious influences. Without the assumption that this type of dissenters existed and that their activity was effective, the progress of morality that may be observed cannot be explained. Conformity to custom, where it was approved, tended to give stability to the moral consciousness; non-conformity, where there was no remorse, tended to modification and growth of the moral consciousness.

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[2] *The Birth and Growth of Religion,* 1924, p. 69.

Early religion in all its manifestations profoundly affected morality. It not only added a new class of *mores,* derived from the social customs of the human group, though the relations were with other objects, but the peculiar qualities of the mana, wherever it was found, the totem, or the mura-mura, presented themselves as, in a special way, desirable and fit to give direction to conduct. On the animistic stage, when the objects of devotion became increasingly human in character and the religious interest was more and more attracted by a world beyond, with its departed souls, spirits, and gods, the relations to it reflected indeed the social and political development in the human groups, but the divine beings became the responsible guardians of the customs. Their jurisdiction extended to the whole range of *mores,* profane as well as sacred. What they demanded was right; what they forbade was wrong. Where worship concentrated on a single divinity and monotheism developed, the will of the one existing god became the law. To be known and obeyed, this law must be revealed. As all things are subject to his will, his jurisdiction extends to all forms of conduct, and the civil law cannot be dissociated from the religious law. When civil law was committed to writing, monotheism required that the revelation of the divine will, when written down, should embrace both civil and religious duties. This explains what seemed at first a strange circumstance, that the Babylonian, Assyrian, and Hittite laws, even though ascribed to this or that divinity, were in substance purely civil codes, while the Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim laws included both civil and religious statutes. Where there were many gods, the manner of their worship differed. It is also important to observe that custom had a tendency to deal with endless minutiæ, while the written law for practical purposes had to confine itself within narrow limits, and therefore tended to arrange types of conduct according to principles.

It is concern about these principles that chiefly leads to new developments in morality and religion. Generalized statements of what these principles are serve as the starting point for generalized statements of what they imply and what modifications they need. In this way a standard is sought. When justice and mercy become the dominant features of this standard, the demand arises that they shall also be the chief characteristics of the world beyond. God must be righteous and merciful, and these qualities must characterize his government on high of departed souls and spirits. The conceptions of a just and merciful god, of a hell in which his justice is exhibited, and of a heaven in which his mercy is shown, are joint products of morality and religion. When the difficulties involved in the idea of an individual god, conceived of as just and merciful as well as omniscient and almighty, whether in view of his assumed government of this world or his assumed government in heaven and hell, force the abandonment of these conceptions, that is again a result of the coöperation of morality and religion. While recognizing with gratitude the relatively great value such and similar conceptions have had in the education of the human race, the moral and religious consciousness can no longer entertain them, when their inadequacy becomes evident, and they are recognized as obstacles to further growth.

More or less independently of current theological thought, though not of religion in the sense here used, ethics has pursued its inquiry about the good and its quest for the ideal. Some of its tentative conclusions may be briefly recalled, especially to point out the religious element involved. To affirm, as L. T. Hobhouse[3] does, that "the first steps towards a rational reconstruction of ethics are to be found in Greek ethics, and the resulting movement of thought" is not to deny the importance of many earlier contributions. The so called "golden rule," in its negative form, laid down by Confucius, Laotze's reference to nature, and especially to love, as indicating the way of life, the sympathy with suffering and demand for rightness of all mental functions emphasized by Buddha, and Micah's conception of justice, mercy, and humility before God as all that is required of man, are significant formulations of ethical thought, chiefly concerned with principles of conduct, although not losing touch with religion. But scientific methods are more obviously applied by the great Greek thinkers. In essential agreement with Socrates and Plato, Aristotle maintained that the good is that at which everything aims, and that it is to be found in the performance of that function which nature assigns. The function of each class of beings consists in the active realization of its own specific character, and since the specific character of man is that he is a rational animal, reason must be the guide to the fullest realization of what is potential in him. Whether Plato conceived of his ideas as entities separate from things or immanent in them as attributes (a question discussed with keen judgment by Cosmo Guastella [4]), and whether he regarded the social ideal as an actually existing reality in some realm of being or only as a subjectively construed pattern

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[3] *Morals in Evolution,* 1915, p. 548.

[4] *Saggi sulla teoria della conoscenza. Parte prima: La causa efficiente,* I, II, 1905. Cf. the author's review of this work in *The Philosophical Review,* 1907, pp. 91ff.

by which the wise man should govern his conduct, there is obviously, in this thinking, a religious orientation.

The Stoic formula that living consistently with nature is the proper rule of conduct, and that life in harmony with nature is, therefore, the highest good, is based on these conceptions, but goes beyond them. The consciousness of what constitutes the specific nature of man has deepened; the dignity of the human personality, regardless of accidents of birth, has been recognized; the barrier between Greek and barbarian, free and slave, has been broken down; the law of the city-state has given place to the universal law of the world-state; all men are brothers and fellow citizens of the world; God is the father of all men, and the true cosmopolis is the ideal community. Divinely animated nature is marked by order, inflexible laws, beauty, and harmony, but it is a stern reality, and stern is the morality which seeks to follow it. Its religious element made Stoicism a tremendous force.

Christianity emphasized self-sacrificing love, divine and human, as the highest good, both as a means and as an end. The effect upon ethical thought as well as character was profound. Much that was typical of Stoicism was retained, and even more strongly accentuated, such as its universalism, its conception of divine fatherhood and human brotherhood, its sense of the dignity and intrinsic worth of the human personality, and its insistence upon control of sensuous desires and passions. But there was also a return of the idea of pleasure as the highest good, to be found in harmony with the revealed divine will and communion with God and his saints already in this world, and perfectly in the world to come: self-effacement and subordination here, complete integration and enjoyment there. But this involved an infallible revelation, a new cleavage between the elect and the non-elect, and a dualism between a present evil world from which man may be saved and another perfect world in which, however, there is an everlasting hell as well as an everlasting heaven.

The inevitable reaction led back to the Stoic formula. But what is life according to nature? It has been sought in the simple life of primitive man, supposed to be in the state of nature, or in the more complex life resulting from the process of evolution. Independence of the wants created by the advance of civilization, or satisfaction of the wants of a more fully developed being, has been stressed. Our greater acquaintance with savage and primitive life has made it clear that, whatever relative good it holds, the social ideal for us is not to be found there, but independence of a multitude of wants, control of the appetites, and inner satisfactions belong to this ideal. Our present knowledge of variations and the way in which they are brought about cannot furnish a norm for human conduct. The process of nature brings forth a fuller, but not necessarily a better life. When hedonism regards pleasure, or the sensation of pleasure, as the sole or the highest good, and utilitarianism considers the greatest amount of pleasure for the largest number as the supreme good, the desired is confused with the desirable, that which is worthy of being desired, and the widest possible distribution of desired things is confused with the greatest amount of pleasure. But that evolution also involves a growth of the moral consciousness, that action in harmony with its demands brings satisfaction, that morally approved relations to all that exists, or is thought to exist, in whatsoever realm, give pleasure, and that the effects in a general way show such pleasure to be worthy of being desired, are facts capable of observation and verification.

As typical of a reaction against the cruder forms of hedonism and utilitarianism the searching study of ethical principles by George Edward Moore[5] may be cited. He starts with the postulate that "good," as a predicate applied to things, persons, and actions, is indefinable, denoting one, unique, simple object of thought among innumerable others. He further maintains that our investigations of "good as a means" cannot hope to establish more than that a certain kind of action will generally be followed by the best possible results, while judgments stating that certain things are themselves good, if true at all, are universally true; and he suggests that the term "organic whole" may be used to denote a whole whose value is neither identical with nor proportional to the sum of the values of its parts. Moore then proceeds to examine the theories he designates as "naturalistic" and "metaphysical." Hedonism and utilitarianism based on evolution are rejected; and so likewise the theory of a perfect, supersensible, eternal universe as the sole reality, chiefly on the ethical ground that, if what really exists is such, there is nothing to realize in man's experience on earth, and no incentive to moral effort, and that, if there is something for man to realize, and hence scope for moral endeavor, sole reality cannot be ascribed to a supersensible universe. To Moore the world we know through sense-perceptions is real. It includes immaterial as well as material things, evil as well as good things. Time, space, and causality are realities. All moral laws are simply statements that certain kinds of action will have good effects; and since all effects can never be ascertained, these statements can only have relative validity. "Not a single question in ethics can be answered except by a causal generalization." Out of man's experience grows the conception of the ideal. By calling a state of things "ideal" may be meant that it is good in a high degree. A comparative valuation of known goods should be the starting point for an inquiry as to the absolutely perfect as well as the best possible state of things in this world. Personal affections and æsthetic enjoyments include *all* the greatest, and *by far* the greatest, goods we can imagine. It is only for the sake of these things—in order that as much of them as is possible may at some time exist—that anyone can be justified in performing any public or private duty; they are the *raison d'être* of virtue; these highly complex organic unities form the rational ultimate end of human action and the sole criterion of moral progress. Hedonism is not the sole end; but the most valuable things we can know and imagine are certain states of consciousness which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects. Not the widest distribution of desired things, but the greatest possible appreciation and enjoyment of goods that are better than everything else is the goal of moral progress. The religious ascent, which even in this view is unmistakable, is not to a supersensible eternal universe which alone is real, but to the highest thing conceivable or possible according to the laws of nature within a universe including immaterial as well as material objects, known to us, directly or indirectly, through the senses.

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[5] *Principia Ethica,* 1903.

Felix Adler,[6] in his ethical philosophy, represents, with marked independence and deep moral earnestness and insight, another tendency of thought moving away from the current forms of hedonism and utilitarianism, but in a different direction. He lays down at the outset the postulate that there is in every human being an ethical quality which he designates as worth. Uniqueness, indispensability, and preciousness constitute this worth. Its existence can be verified only in a moral experience which begins by attributing it, and proceeds by establishing such relations as will bring forth that which is unique, indispensable,

[6] *An Ethical Philosophy of Life,* 1918.

and precious. This makes it possible to formulate a universal law: "So act as to elicit the best in others, and thereby in yourself." The principle applies to all human relations, between individuals, individuals and groups, groups and other groups. The supreme function of each individual and group is to bring out the ethical quality. The moral consciousness grows by following the moral law. As a result of this growth there comes an increasing awareness of the relation of the individual as a member of an organic whole which, from a necessity of thought, must be recognized as having unity and multiplicity. But this organic whole differs from physical organisms. The relations of its integers are not the same as those of the members of a natural body. The organic whole may be designated as a "spiritual" universe rather than "rational," which may be taken as meaning purely intellectual. "Only as a member of the infinite spiritual universe does man possess the two-fold attributes implied in worth—inviolability with respect to outsiders and indefeasible, intrinsic preciousness." The spiritual universe is a necessary postulate. It exists as "the product of the reality-producing functions in their ideal completion"; and is required if the idea of right is to have validity. The spiritual universe, or ethical manifold, supersensible, perfect, and eternal, exists in so far as there is a right. Nature has only a partial reality; it is but a screen through which the glory of the wholly real world shines. "The purpose of existence, both of the individual and the race, is so to work in the finite world as to become possessed with ever greater distinctness of the conviction of the reality of the wholly real world, the infinite supersensible universe." Its beauty, harmony, and perfection, shared in by all the mental faculties of an infinite number of integers, is emphasized, as in the case of Moore's highest goods, but unlike Moore's complex organic wholes which include the material as well as the immaterial, Adler's wholly real includes nothing material. Creation and immortality in the ordinary sense disappear from this world-view. The conception of a spiritual universe takes the place of the god-conception. Faith in its reality and devotion to it as the highest, controlling the will, and satisfying the legitimate demands of the intellect and the emotions, indicate the merging of morality with religion, and religion with morality.

The significance of Adler's formulation of the moral law does not seem to be necessarily bound up with his philosophic idealism. Thus it may be maintained that, even if this world in which we live and of which we have a measure of knowledge through our senses and inferences from sense-perceptions should be the only reality and no supersensible universe, in distinction from it, should exist, the law, or generalized statement, formulated by Adler, as to the way in which the potential worth may be realized would not lose its validity. The motive force in our nature leading to a growth of the moral consciousness and production of moral excellence would still continue to operate. A genuine appreciation of the inviolability and intrinsic worth of every human being would also seem to be possible, even if it be held that the infinitesimal particles and subtle forces with which science now operates show no similarity or approach to metaphysical entities, and pointed out that the fine moral qualities, which are thought of as "hints and glimmerings" of supersensible realities, are in our experience invariably connected with personal life provided with sense-organs. On the other hand, the progress of science has greatly strengthened our impression, not only of the immensities of time and space, but also of the orderly sequences and causal connections in nature, and of the uniqueness, indispensability in its time and place, and therefore importance in the whole, of every integer. A general scheme is suggested, a universal plan. It is an intellectual necessity to seek for it, and the ignorance of science as to vast realms of reality beyond its grasp in every direction goads us on. It is legitimate to exercise our capacity for abstraction, allowing it to carry us beyond time, space, and causality, and only an unscientific dogmatism will bar the way. Whether the ideal in our mind answers, however feebly, to an objective reality or is solely a reflection of our experience in the finite world may well, like Plato's heavenly pattern, be left as an open question. In either case, the wise man will order his conduct in harmony with it. Adler's contribution to ethical thought, to morality, and to religion has been very great. His method of approach, his formulation of the moral law, his recognition of its universal application, and his conception of human experience and activity as means of producing and realizing the highest ideal are of vital importance. The fruitfulness of his dealing with numerous aspects of the great problems of applied ethics, concerning man's relations to his fellow man, the special relations of man and woman, and the relations of man to his material environment, his property, individual and collective, has been manifested in the stimulus it has given to independent grappling with these problems and to a type of fellowship in which such independent efforts to obtain a consistent view of the world are not only allowed but encouraged as required by the fundamental principle which seeks to establish the highest degree of unity in multiplicity and the highest degree of individual distinctness in the ethical manifold.

Every important step in the growth of the moral consciousness and every improvement in moral relations have had a tendency to affect religious sentiments, ideas, and practices. Among the many examples that might be cited, mention may be made of the gradual disappearance of such religious customs as human sacrifices, cannibalism, offerings of animals and fruits of the ground for the increase of the herds and of vegetation, magical rites, the burning of witches, wizards, blasphemers, and adulterers, chattel slavery, and holy tribal wars, and the gradual abandonment of such religious ideas as manaism, totemism, and muraism, animism in its various forms, the notion of acquired and transferable merits, and the conception of eternal rewards in heaven and eternal punishment in hell. Religion has profoundly influenced the idea of the good and the practice of the right. Only in proportion as morality has been informed by the religious spirit, its utter devotion to the highest, has it attained its widest reach and its deepest intensity. Morality must become religious, as religion must become ethical, if each is to perform its supreme function. True to its nature, religion must point the way upward to the highest that can be conceived. All the mental faculties of man must unite in devotion to it in order that he may realize the greatest good, which is the aim of morality.

CHAPTER XI

THE STATE AND RELIGION

As far back as we have any knowledge of a state, religion has been one of its concerns. A vast mass of literature testifies to the interest of rulers in the officially recognized cult, and there can be no doubt that the same interest in religion was shown by the chiefs of early states whose history is not known to us by written records. Wherever they have left any accounts of their doings, this aspect of their work comes prominently to view. They emphasize their worship of certain deities, their building of temples, their care for the priests, their concern about sacrifices, tabus, oracles, omens, and divination. So it was in ancient Egypt, Syria, Babylonia, Assyria, and Anatolia; in Greece, Rome, and Carthage; in India, China, and Japan; in Mexico and Peru, and so it long remained. Toleration of the religious views and customs of subject peoples was indeed practiced, partly for political reasons, partly because polytheism is not exclusive. This applies to some extent to Assyrians and Chaldeans, and more to the Achæmenian rulers and Alexander. It was particularly characteristic of the policy of Aśoka, the Khazars, Jenghiz Khan, and Akbar. But in the main such toleration did not affect the underlying conception. The right of the Roman authorities, either in the Republic or in the Empire, to declare one cult permissible and to forbid another was not questioned. Where the divine character of the ruler was recognized, his authority in religious matters was enhanced. The acknowledgment of his divinity and autocratic power became a bond of political union and seemed a guarantee of religious stability. Monotheism had a natural tendency to increase intolerance and to strengthen the authority of the ruler by the grace of God. In proportion as the transcendent majesty and moral perfection of the one divine being impressed themselves upon the consciousness, the desire grew that he be rightly known and rightly worshiped by all men, as well as the horror occasioned by a refusal to accept the true faith he had revealed and the forms of devotion he had prescribed, and fear of the social consequences of persistence in error.

The sovereign was responsible for his realm, and his will was law. If he became a monotheist, a Mazdayasnian, a Jew, or a Christian, he naturally used his power to further what he deemed the highest interests of the state, and his people as naturally in course of time accepted the change. This was the case in Osrhoene, Armenia, Georgia, and the Roman Empire. Paganism, Judaism, and Christian heresies were suppressed, while the new faith became the official religion, protected, supported, and fostered by the state. Nor was it otherwise when Christianity spread to the Germans, the Kelts, and the Slavs. Whatever the preparation may have been in the minds of men, however long the resistance may have lasted, the decisive element was the conversion of the ruler, the enlistment of the power of the state in behalf of the new religion. The Roman Catholic Church was international in its claims and interests, but it stressed the duty of the state to support it, and used its prestige and influence to enforce its demands in this respect. In countries where papal authority was rejected by the princes, the Lutheran, the Reformed, or the Anglican church became a national establishment. *Cujus regio, ejus religio* was the principle adopted.

Anabaptists and Antitrinitarians urged complete separation of state and church and general religious toleration. Especially significant are the pleas of such men as Balthasar Hubmaier and

Hans Denck. But this radical movement in the Reformation era did not appeal to any of the rulers, and was too far in advance of the prevailing sentiments of the age to gain a very wide approval even among the common people. They were as much shocked by the denial of the state's right to interfere in religious matters and the peaceful socialism in Moravia as by the resort to political power and resistance by force at Münster, as much disturbed by the rejection of infant baptism and disbelief in the deity of Jesus, the eternity of the torments in hell, and the damnation of Jews and Turks as by the moral effects of examining afresh the questions of celibacy and marriage. Persecuted for their opinions, despised as sectarians and heretics, forbidden to worship according to their conscience, and taxed for the maintenance of the state church, dissenting bodies found themselves subject everywhere to discriminatory laws. In Roman Catholic countries, Protestants and Jews, in Protestant countries, Catholics, Jews, and dissenters, were deprived of what they considered their rights as citizens, and began to look with eagerness for a larger religious freedom. Some of them, like Mennonites, Baptists, and Friends, were in principle opposed to the system; others learned by experience to distrust and resent it. Not only Roger Williams and the Baptists in Rhode Island, and William Penn and the Friends in Pennsylvania and Delaware, but also George Calvert and the Catholics in Maryland advocated disestablishment. On the other hand, John Wesley[1] as late as in 1787 declared: "If the Methodists leave the Church of England, may God forgive them!" Only after his death did this body separate itself from the national church. Many pious men and women suffered in silent resignation, without protest or doubt as to the fundamental principle, looking upon their treatment as abuse of a legitimate power, and fearing the spirit of free inquiry and the rising clamor for the rights of man.

Among the peoples of Eastern Europe, not recognizing the Roman See, emperors and kings exercised authority; the Greek Orthodox Church allied itself with national aspirations, especially after the fall of Constantinople; and dissent was nowhere tolerated. In spite of the favored treatment accorded in Muslim lands to followers of religions having a sacred book, such as the Jews, the Christians, the Mazdayasnians, and the Mandeans, civil discrimination and intolerance grew, largely in

[1] Cf. J. H. Riggs, *The Churchmanship of John Wesley,* 1878, quoted by Fredrik Nielsen, *Statskirke og Frikirke,* 1883, p. 133.

consequence of a developing orthodoxism and the Christian Crusades. In the more civilized nations of Eastern Asia, the rulers allowed and prohibited Christian propaganda according to their personal preferences, their concern for the effect upon native cults, their interest in Western science, or their suspicion of ulterior motives. As for the most backward peoples, ignorance, superstition, savagery, and the tyranny of custom made it especially difficult and dangerous to introduce among them new forms of religion, freedom of worship, or a helpful exchange of ideas.

It was the growth of liberal thought and democratic tendencies in Western Europe and in America that led to the separation of church and state. Neither the permanent disestablishment of the church in the United States nor the temporary disestablishment in France would have been possible but for the aggressive questioning of religious dogmas and of the accepted basis of society by the encyclopædists and their sympathizers. This movement itself was due in no small measure to the progress of science, the deistic tendencies, and the development of representative institutions in England. Defective as it was, the Toleration Act of 1689 gave evidence of a civil liberty unknown in France since the Revocation of the Edict of

Nantes in 1685. Jean Le Clerc, the Dutch Remonstrant in Amsterdam, long served as an intellectual mediator between the two countries, and Voltaire was profoundly influenced by his sojourn in England. While men like Thomas Paine, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson were deists rather than atheists, the ideas of the *éclaircissement* affected them and other leaders in the American Revolution very strongly. Many other causes cooperated in bringing about the result, such as the distance from the mother country, the habits of independent action, the rivalry of religious organizations, the opposition to the British government, and the impossibility of acknowledging the ecclesiastical authority of a ruler whose civil authority was no longer recognized. There were also many reasons why a complete separation of church and state could not be quite carried out. The more important were, no doubt, attachment to a particular cult and concern for its prestige, fear of consequences disastrous to morality, and anxiety for vested property rights.

But the adoption of the Constitution of the United States of America by the Congress in 1789, and its ratification by the necessary number of states in 1791, marked an epoch-making advance toward full religious freedom. Article I, section 3, sponsored by Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, declared that "All executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this constitution," but "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States"; and the First Amendment, due to James Madison, of Massachusetts, declared that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the exercise thereof." Thus, for the first time in history a sovereign and independent state, through its chosen representatives, laid down, as a part of its fundamental law, the principle that there should be no establishment of religion, no prohibition against its free exercise, and no religious tests as qualifications for public office. In course of time it was recognized in the constitutions of all the several states, although direct public support of the church did not cease in New Hampshire until 1818, and in Massachusetts until 1833. Survivals of the old régime, out of harmony with the new principle, continue to exist. The federal government still appoints chaplains and builds chapels, and it issues calls to prayer and thanksgiving proclamations. In the constitutions of many states religious professions are made; and some of them impose religious tests. In Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and South Carolina, office-holders must not deny the being of Almighty God; and in North Carolina and Tennessee, they must believe in God and in the future state of rewards and punishments.[2] In some states affirmation is not allowed as a substitute for the oath. Upon the statute books of many states, there are blasphemy laws, and Sunday laws, based in part on religious grounds. In Mississippi and Tennessee teachers in any institutions supported in whole or in part from public funds derived by state or local taxation are prohibited from teaching that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals, the reason being that such a doctrine is contrary to the Bible. This is clearly an establishment of religion. As Blewett Lee[3] rightly observes: "It is the preference by law of a religious doctrine that establishes a religion." The Constitution of Utah (1895) for obvious reasons stresses the separation of state and church more than the others.

But in all the states church property is still exempt from taxation. No provision for such exemption was made in the constitutions of Massachusetts (1780), New Hampshire (1784), Vermont (1793), Connecticut (1818), Maine (1819), Rhode Island (1842), New Jersey (1844), Wisconsin (1848), Iowa (1857), and Maryland (1867). The first exemption laws, however, were passed in Massachusetts (1837), New Hampshire (1842), and New Jersey (1857). In thirty-eight states the original constitution or subsequent amendment provides for exemption; in thirteen of these certain enumerated property is exempted; in twenty-five the legislature is empowered to exempt, and in two of these (Colorado, 1886, and Virginia, 1902) to supersede.[4] When one class of property is thus exempted, the burden of taxation falls upon the others. In reality all are taxed for the support of religious organizations. As long as practically every citizen is a member of some church, this departure from the principle may easily be overlooked and involves no serious injustice. It is certainly to be preferred to the subsidizing of a single sect. But when the majority of the people no longer belong to any church, the matter must appear in a different light. It is perhaps too sanguine to expect that ecclesiastical corporations possessed of great wealth, or congregations struggling with poverty, will of their own accord take the initiative and renounce special privileges that they have long enjoyed. Yet a growing sensitiveness to the demands of social justice encourages the hope that no forcible resistance at least will ever be offered to an equitable reform of taxation in this respect.

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[2] Cf. Edwin C. Goddard, in *Michigan Law Review,* X, 1912, pp. 161ff.

[3] *Virginia Law Review,* XIV, 1928, p. 105.

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[4] Cf. Carl Zollmann, in *Michigan Law Review,* XIV, 1916, pp. 646ff.

It is a melancholy reflection that separation of church and state has so seldom been brought about except as a result of revolution or war. The leaders of the French Revolution were very slow in reaching the conclusion that the state should neither support nor suppress any form of religion. Churches were used to promote the cult of reason, liberty, equality, and fraternity. Like Rousseau, Robespierre insisted on recognition by the state of Almighty God, immortality, and future rewards and punishments, and a cult of the Supreme Being was established. The religion of patriotism had no enthusiasm for such virtues as tolerance and moderation. Priests loyal to the head of their church were persecuted, and Talleyrand's plea for religious freedom made little impression at first. But in September, 1794, the idea of a national church was abandoned, and freedom of worship proclaimed. Napoleon's Concordat of 1802 put an end to this régime, but, brief as it was, it marked a distinct improvement of the religious situation. The story has been told in detail, from different points of view, by A. Aulard[5] and Pierre de la Gorce.[6] A century later the church was separated from the state by the elected representatives of the people in 1902. Among the South American republics, severed by revolution from Spain and Portugal, several have followed the example of the United States. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Ecuador have no state church. In Mexico the church was definitely separated from the state by the Constitution of 1917. The attempt to put it into effect at first caused much disorder and official disregard for the rights of free exercise of religion, but a peaceful settlement seems to have been reached. The British Dominions, Canada, New Foundland, Australia, New Zealand, and the South African Union, have no established church, and the same is true of the Irish Free State. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 led to the abolition of the official religious cult. The Russian Revolution of 1917 brought about the disestablishment of the Greek Orthodox Church, and the Constitution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics recognizes the right to a free exercise of religion as well as to so-called anti-religious propaganda. Step by step the Turkish Revolution led to the adoption, in 1928, of an amendment to the Constitution eliminating the article declaring that Islam is the religion of the republic.

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[5] *Le christianisme et la révolution française,* 1925.

[6] *Histoire religieuse de la révolution française,* I-V, 1909-1923.

Some European nations that are among the leaders in civilization and popular self-government have not yet separated the church from the state. Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland still maintain a national church. Others, like Switzerland and the Netherlands, divide public funds between different religious bodies, and Czecho-Slovakia reserves to the state certain rights in connection with ecclesiastical appointments. The German Revolution abolished the principle of a state church. Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution (1919) declares: "There is no state church."[7] But the same article also provides not only that "the religious societies remain public corporations in so far as they were such heretofore," and that others may be granted like rights, but also that "the religious societies which are public corporations are entitled to raise taxes upon the basis of the civil tax lists, in accordance with the provisions of the Land laws."[8] This is understood by René[9] to imply that "the right to levy taxes, granted to religious corporations, is limited, as a rule, to their members, but they may also exceptionally levy on certain other taxables, particularly juridical persons, stock companies, etc., to the same extent as on their coreligionists, if the state laws authorize this." According to Article 136 "no one may be forced into the use of a religious form of oath." The theological faculties in the universities are maintained at public expense, and religious instruction forms a part of the curriculum in the public schools.

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[7] *Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 11 August 1919 nebst Ergänzungsgesetzen,* Herausgegeben von Karl Pannier, Leipzig, 1919.

In all of these countries the free exercise of religion is guaranteed by the law. But various reasons are advanced in favor of preserving the *status quo,* or not severing completely the connection between state and church. Such are the attachment of a large part of the population to a particular form of worship, the continuity of cultural development, the desirability of universal moral training, the danger of uncontrollable ecclesiastical interference, the relatively slight expense, the likelihood of greater intelligence and liberality in a national establishment than in a private organization, and the opportunity of majorities to obtain influential spokesmen for their social and political ideas in the election of priests. History, however, has clearly shown that devotion to a particular type of religion is not diminished by the withdrawal of support by the state. The growth of the historic sense, with its intellectual, æsthetic, moral, and religious appreciation of the past, furnishes a guarantee against any violent break of the cultural continuity. Ethical instruction need not lose the warmth and purity of moral sentiment by giving up the admixture of specific religious propaganda. Public opinion, properly educated and free to express itself, may be trusted in the long run to counteract undue influences. A principle of justice to all should not be set aside, because its violation entails comparatively small expense, or because unsubsidized religious societies may become reactionary. The election of priests as public officials by universal suffrage, regardless of the religious views of minorities, to further political aims, whether radical or conservative, is a two-edged sword dangerous to the moral integrity of both church and state. There are many signs that disestablishment is not far off in any of these countries. It may indeed become more complete there, inasmuch as it is easier for a people by peaceful legislation to deal with national and communal property than with the vested rights of private property.

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[8] The German text reads: "*Die Religionsgesellschaften, welche Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechtes sind, sind berechtigt, auf Grund der bürgerlichen Steuerlisten nach Maszgabe der landesrechtlichen Bestimmungen Steuern zu erheben.*"

[9] *La constitution allemande de 11 Août 1919,* 1921, p. 252.

As regards religious instruction in the public schools, a distinction should be made between compulsory indoctrination in the tenets of a particular creed and provision for the study of religion as a subject that may be freely elected. While the former is altogether incongruous with religious liberty, there does not seem to be any objection in principle to the latter. Such instruction may have as its aim either to facilitate scholarly investigation of religious ideas and customs or to convey more general information concerning them. A further distinction must, therefore, be made between the higher institutions of learning and the primary and secondary schools. The place for special research is in the university. There is no apparent reason why the fact that it is supported by the state should debar any university from offering opportunities for the study of religion. It would seem, however, to entail an obligation not to limit these opportunities to a preferred type of religion. Courses should be available, dealing with the various forms of religious thought and practice, the literature especially cherished by various religions, and the history of various religious organizations. Until recently such nonsectarian teaching has not been possible. Theological education was naturally looked upon as a means of furnishing a special cult with a trained ministry, and public support not only seemed necessary, but actually in a measure served a good purpose. Whatever reservations may justly be made, it should be gratefully acknowledged that civilization owes a great debt to the educated clergy of the various religions, and to the generosity of rulers and states as well as private individuals who made this training possible. Exaggerated claims may be made for this, as for every type of education; but no thoughtful student can deny either the stimulating effect it has had upon scientific research in many fields or the necessity, under given historic circumstances, of official recognition and pecuniary assistance. The priests were once well-nigh the only educated persons, and intellectual training in one direction tends to awaken curiosity and speculation in other directions. But when theology has come to be understood as a science dealing with all the religious phenomena of man's life, and the duty of the state to foster, for the common good, all branches of science has become recognized, provision for the scientific treatment of religion in the universities appears to be both unobjectionable and desirable.

The educational value, however, of such instruction depends in a marked degree upon the maturity of the student's mind and the competence, impartiality, and sympathetic approach of the teacher. It is true that at present only a small part of the population in any country has an opportunity of attending university courses. The demand for universal education is a result of the modern democratic movement, and its sponsors have naturally hesitated as to the expediency of introducing the subject of religion in elementary and intermediate schools. The effect has been that, so far as the state and the community are concerned, the mass of the citizens have either been left without any instruction on this subject or been subjected to one-sided sectarian teaching. History has been taught without acquainting the student with its important religious movements, sociology without a reference to the character and significance of religious societies, and literature without including some of its most widely read and influential productions. Or students have been required to learn sectarian catechisms and textbooks, to take part in prescribed religious exercises, and to receive instruction in science from teachers obliged to teach in harmony with religious tenets held by a majority of the taxpayers. A part of the problem can undoubtedly be solved by a recognition of the fact, well established by pedagogic experience, that no subject should be introduced in primary education that is at this stage beyond the child's capacity to grapple with profitably. As for the secondary schools, the dangers peculiar to the age of puberty must be borne in mind, but they may be obviated by an objective and yet sympathetic treatment calculated not to stir unduly the emotions or force the will, by teachers trained in the scientific methods of the university, and the subject of religion should not be obligatory. There should, of course, be the fullest freedom for parents and social groups to supplement all public instruction, in the home, and in private schools.

In view of the obvious growth of political life toward a world-state, the question may finally be touched upon what the attitude of the *res publica humana,* the Republic of Man, should be to religion. Has the League of Nations any duties in this respect? Should the all-inclusive and democratic association of free peoples, of which the present League, with all its limitations and frailties, is an adumbration, concern itself with religion? It must clearly insist that there shall be no religious tests imposed as qualifications for any office or public trust under it, no interference by it with the free exercise of religion, and no official recognition, support, or suppression by it of any religious organization as such. But it may also further its own high ends by calling the attention of the world to intolerable conditions existing anywhere in contravention of these principles, and it may by peaceful methods seek to improve them. It may legitimately promote the cause of morality and religion by such actions as will tend to remove some of the most formidable obstacles that stand in their way, and by fostering on the largest scale scientific and educational work. If religion is understood as devotion to the highest, however it may be conceived, there is nothing with which the state, large or small, or a society including the whole human family, can be more deeply concerned than with it.

CHAPTER XII

RELIGION IN THE FUTURE

EVERY chapter of this book has had to do with some aspect of the coming religion. There has been throughout a search for the direction in which man's religious life is moving. The manner of approach to each subject has, no doubt, suggested a dominant historical interest. In so far as this impression is correct, the reason is obvious. A retrospect seemed indispensable. We cannot know the future except through the past. In order to foresee how a thing will behave we must be acquainted with its habits of behavior. It is necessary to have a definite idea of what it is, what it has been, and what its relations are to other things. The past is no more, but it exists as a relatively present reality to the consciousness, and from its nature and tendencies inferences may be drawn as to the future. Without such inferences there can be no continuity of human development. No field is cultivated, no structure erected, no enterprise undertaken without a vision of what may be expected. The complexity of man's nature and the shifting course of his cosmic environment render prediction extremely difficult. If our knowledge of the past is fragmentary and relative, our knowledge of the future cannot be otherwise than in many respects vague and uncertain. Yet an increasing measure of foresight is necessary for the ordering of our life. Religion as a whole, in its varied manifestations, must present itself as an object of reflection, if a forecast is to have any marked significance. In dealing with so vital a subject, the mind cannot occupy itself exclusively with observing historic facts and tracing their genetic connection, however engrossing and important this purely scientific work may be. It is impelled by the very nature of such research to turn inquiringly toward something that is still in preparation, that is waiting for birth in the womb of time, the nascent reality, the permanently abiding. Without affecting either the methods or the results of objective historical investigation, a deep interest in the future has accompanied this study of religion and often found direct expression in the preceding pages. It has also naturally influenced many an evaluation. What appear to be some of the more distinct probabilities may be set forth, briefly, tentatively, and modestly, in these closing paragraphs.

There is little hazard in predicting that certain religious sentiments, ideas, and activities will continue. Catholic cathedrals and shrines, Protestant churches and chapels, Jewish synagogues, Muslim mosques, Hindu pagodas, Buddhist stupas, Shinto sanctuaries, and Chinese ancestral halls will be visited by millions of people. The feelings expressed, the doctrines proclaimed, the forms of worship, the social organization will long preserve in the main their present character. Relatively soon there will be no officially recognized national religion anywhere. The support of the state will be withdrawn in every form. Free exercise of religion will be guaranteed by law. Religious tests will not be required for public office. Adherence to one cult or another will cease to be a badge of respectability. The number of professed followers of any creed will decrease in comparison with the growth of population. This trend is unmistakable in the United States, some of the other American republics, and the British dominions. It is already obvious in France, the Soviet Union, and Turkey, and will no doubt be clearly seen in Germany and many other countries as a consequence of the separation of church and state. But religious devotion has deeper roots than custom and convention, material comfort and social prestige.

The great historical religions will live as long as they satisfy in a measure spiritual needs. The chance of longevity will increase in proportion as they become dependent solely upon their own inner resources, are maintained by the religious sentiment alone, and learn to adjust themselves to the character and growing demands of civilization. To all appearances these religious systems, with all their characteristic external forms, may long remain intact. The adherents of each may be sincerely convinced that it will stand to the end of time and ultimately be victorious over all its rivals. In view of their marvelous survival, even small and dwindling cults may inspire this confidence.

Great changes, however, will take place within these organizations. Some of them will come as the result of efforts for unification. The Roman Catholic Church will not abandon its endeavor to win back into the fold the seceded Greek Orthodox churches. It will strenuously insist upon papal authority and doctrinal conformity, and this may prove a serious obstacle. But the patriarchate of Moscow has followed those of Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople into comparative obscurity, and nationalism no longer needs ecclesiastical support in the Balkan states. The church in Russia is weak, and it is not impossible that it may be willing to give up its opposition to the *filioque,* the doctrine that the Spirit proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father, for the effective assistance Rome could give. On the other hand, there are many precedents for concession by the Roman See in such matters as the use of the vernacular in worship, the marriage of priests, or other local customs. Neither a return of the Anglican Church to Roman allegiance nor an organic union with the Greek Orthodox churches is probable. Even disestablishment, with its inevitable defection of radical and indifferent elements, is not likely to leave this historic church entirely in the hands of those who would welcome an affiliation with Rome. It is equally improbable that a formal union will ever be established between it and the Greek Orthodox churches. Nevertheless, efforts in this direction have been seen; and it is interesting to observe the participation of both the Greek Orthodox and the Oriental churches in the Councils of Stockholm (1924) and Lausanne (1927). These councils do not represent an attempt on the part of the seceded churches to form a solid front against the mother church. She was cordially invited to take part in a sincere effort to bring about unity. As long as a doctrinal basis of fellowship is sought, even by the

Anglican, Lutheran, Reformed, and other Protestant churches, her reluctance to do so is quite understandable. Yet it is by no means inconceivable that at some time in the future an Ecumenical Council may be held, representing the various churches of Christendom, under the presidium of an enlightened pope.

Loosely organized bodies, like the American Federation of Churches, will coöperate for moral and religious ends. Missionary societies will pool their resources. Smaller denominations will merge. Local groups will unite as community churches. The desire for expansion and effective work, inherent in all organizations, will undoubtedly affect in this direction, not only the various Christian communions, but also the other religions. Congresses will be held at stated intervals where Christians, Jews, Muslims, Parsis, Brahmins, Buddhists, Confucianists, Taoists, and Shintoists, polytheists and atheists, monotheists and pantheists, will meet to exchange views, to learn from one another, and to consider ways and means of furthering their common interest, the cause of religion. In none of these movements toward unity need there be any compromise of conviction; in all of them there will of necessity be a shifting of emphasis from the things that divide to the things that unite. This implies change, however unconscious it may be. Distinctive tenets that have seemed to be of primary importance will take a secondary place.

Enthusiasm for unity easily degenerates into a passion for uniformity. Standardization forces dissent. Undue pressure from without leads to schism. The free exercise of religion encourages separation. Czarist Russia and the United States of America have been the homes of numerous sects. The opprobrium once attached to such terms as "schism," "separatist," and "sect" will soon be a thing of the past. Nothing will seem more natural than that groups, finding themselves out of harmony with the prevailing tendencies of thought and practice within a certain religious communion, organize new societies for the furtherance of what appear to them vital interests. Some of these will be more conservative than the organizations they leave. Fundamentalists in one church may find that they have more in common with fundamentalists in other churches than with the majority in their own denomination, and a deep concern about the infallibility of the Bible or the second advent of Christ may lead them to form a new organization. Other groups, more progressive than the rank and file of their coreligionists, will constitute themselves as separate bodies. An increasing number of distinct religious communities may be expected. They will be of widely divergent types. Whether old or new, their manner of life will be influenced by the possibility and exercise of effective dissent. When men are free to come and to go, they may hesitate to leave, or depart with a blessing. Even those who are not conscious of deviating in the slightest degree from the doctrines once accepted will find it increasingly difficult to express, or to reflect upon, the possibility of eternal torments being in store for beloved friends and relatives, upright men and women, and innocent children, because of erroneous opinions or neglected ceremonies. Disposition and conduct will improve. The principle of wholly voluntary association will itself make for unity in multiplicity.

In the case of the great prophetic religions the growing historical interest in their founders will produce far-reaching changes. These mighty personalities are being approached from a new point of view. Century after century they have stood before the minds of men as objects of veneration or worship, all-sufficient revealers of truth, infallible guides, deliverers from evil, masters to be implicitly obeyed. Awe and curiosity, fear and trust, devotion and speculation, loyalty and love have raised these figures far above the ordinary level of humanity, enveloped them in a luminous haze of myth and legend, and transformed them out of all semblance to their original character. In the cult their followers have been constantly reminded of their unique position. Personal relations to them, as they appeared to a concrete imagination, have formed a most significant part of the religious experience. Above all other prophets of Israel and Judah towered Moses as the mediator of Yahwe's eternally valid law; above all former recipients of Allah's revelation, Muhammed; above all spokesmen of Ahura Mazda, Zoroaster; above all human beings, Gautama, the Buddha; above all men and angels, Jesus, the Christ. Whether a complete apotheosis was effected, or the mediator remained a man, though constantly and intimately associated in thought with the supreme being, or the illumination was considered as coming from within rather than from a divine source, the only possible way of salvation seemed inseparably connected with the founder.

But through the canonization of scriptures, presenting the words and deeds of these spiritual heroes, precious records have been preserved that have incessantly created a desire for a return from undesirable and depressing conditions in the present to an inspiring past flooded with light and replete with power, and for a more accurate acquaintance with that past. Hence the urgent demand that men should go back to the early church or to the historic Jesus, to Moses or the later prophets of Israel, to Confucius or Laotze, to Zoroaster, Buddha, or Muhammed. Hence the countless practical efforts to reproduce the forms, and to revive the spirit, of a pristine faith. The keener historic sense, the discovery of fresh material, and the adoption of scientific principles of interpretation give promise of a more precise knowledge. There will be a wider and heartier coöperation. Christian students will investigate the classics of other religions. Jews and Muslims, Buddhists, Parsis, Brahmins, and Confucianists will occupy themselves with the teachings of Jesus and the history of the Christian Church; independent scholars will make their contributions. On all sides, the habit of dealing objectively and sympathetically with every phase of religious life will banish the lingering vestiges of a self-satisfied, arrogant, and supercilious attitude. But the reconstruction of the past becomes an increasingly arduous and difficult task. The methods of research will be ever more exacting as the work goes on. When no external evidence exists in documents contemporaneous with the reported events, when the story is inconsistent and interwoven with legendary elements, and when the discourses are obviously modified or expanded to harmonize with later conceptions, there are often formidable obstacles in the way of determining what is probable. Under such circumstances it is natural that sometimes even the historical existence of the hero may be put in doubt, as in the case of Moses,[1] Zoroaster,[2] Laotze,[3] and Jesus.[4] All such questions, honestly raised, will have to be answered, not by dogmatic affirmation, but by arguments. If the

[1] Cf. Eduard Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme,* 1906; N. Schmidt, "Moses" in *The New International Encyclopædia,* 1916; and on the other hand, especially Hugo Gressmann, *Moses,* 1913.

[2] Cf. H. Kern, "Over het woord Zarathushtra en den mythischen persoon van dien naam," in *Mededeelingen van de K. Akademie van Vetenschaapen te Amsterdam,* XI, 1867; C. P. Tiele, *Geschiedenis van den Godsdienst in de Oudheid,* II, 1895, pp. 90ff.; James Darmesteter, *Le Zend Avesta,* 1892-3; and on the other hand, A. V. Williams Jackson, *Zoroaster,* 1899; Karl Geldner, "Zoroastrianism" in *Encyclopædia Biblica,* 1903.

[3] Henri Maspero, *La Chine Antique,* 1927, pp. 487ff.; and on the other hand, Julius Grill, *Laotzes Buch vom höchsten Wesen und vom höchsten Gut,* 1910.

[4] Bruno Bauer, *Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte,* 1841-1842; A. Kalthoff, *Was wissen wir von Jesus?* 1904; William Benjamin Smith, *Der vorchristliche Jesus,* 1906; A. Bolland, *Het leiden en sterven van Jesus Christus,* 1907; Arthur Drews, *The Christ Myth,* 1910; Georg Brandes, *Jesussagnet,* 1928; and on the other hand, N. Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth,* 1905; Shirley Jackson Case, *The Historicity of Jesus,* 1912.

doubts on this point are set at rest, there still remains the necessity of drawing the line between what may be accepted as an original saying and an historic fact and what may be regarded as a subsequent accretion and an incredible statement. Here subjective judgment must decide, and its convincing force will depend upon its reasonableness.

This process of sifting and inference that will characterize all genuine study in the future will necessarily affect the attitude toward religious leadership. Men will be led to reflect upon the real function of the prophet. Is his usefulness seriously impaired when we can no longer be quite certain as to the events of his life, the deeds he accomplished, and the words he actually uttered? If some of his hopes and fears were not realized, some of his predictions were not fulfilled, some of his opinions reveal the intellectual limitations of his time, and some of his acts betray the frailties of human nature, can he still be a spiritual leader? His importance will be looked for in the dominant traits of his character and his general outlook upon life, his sincerity, courage, and striving for perfection, the depth of his insight and the reach of his foresight, and his capacity to inspire his fellow men with love of truth, loyalty to conviction, noble sentiment, earnest moral endeavor, and devotion to high ideals. Such primary regard for the essentials will permit the recognition of many prophets in every age and country and make it easier to discover the prophetic quality in the present. It will also prevent exaggerated claims and impossible demands as well as indifference, neglect, and hostility in connection with prophetic leadership in the future. Whoever shall greatly assist the growth of a worthy life will have a chance of exercising an ever-widening influence and of winning and maintaining a place in the esteem and affection of the human race.

As within the various religious societies the tendency to shift the emphasis from myth and legend, dogma and creedal statement, rites and ceremonies, to the demands of a growing moral sense, becomes more and more marked, a struggle between conservative and progressive forces will be inevitable. This may, by concessions and compromises, gradually lead to a *modus vivendi,* allowing freedom and coöperation and the preservation of the external forms of cult and organization. But a violent break with the past is also possible. Structures long undermined may suddenly fall. There may be a débacle. Something may occur that to late-born generations will appear as a catastrophic change. This has often happened in the long history of religion. Evolution is not always a slow process, advancing almost imperceptibly, step by step. There are accelerated movements and cataclysms. Whether a relatively quiet development or an outburst of concentrated revolutionary activity lies before us will largely depend upon the attitude of the leading religious societies, when some paramount moral issue arises, and upon the character of the religious life among the masses of men not affiliated with them. If the nations are summoned by their own selfish interests to another world war, what will Catholics and Protestants, Jews and Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus, Taoists and Confucianists do? What influence will they exert on public opinion? How faithful will they be to their professed ideals? How far will they lend the sanction of religion to a futile and barbarous method of settling differences? When the real causes of war become clearly apparent and efforts are made to remove them, what will their attitude be toward the movements that seek to protect the weak against the arrogance and greed of the strong and to substitute fraternal coöperation for ruthless competition? A supine acquiescence in mass murder or an intolerable economic system may toll the death knell of moribund organizations, or loyalty to moral convictions, in a supreme test, may prolong their existence and avert a danger threatening the progress of human civilization.

Millions of men and women to-day have no connection with any religious society, and their numbers will increase. They are often considered, and sometimes regard themselves, as without religion. But the elative force that lifts them upward to a greater or less extent operates within all of them. There is no human being entirely devoid of devotion to what to him appears as the highest. In many this religious sentiment is very intense. The objects of devotion vary. As in the religious societies, some individuals seem to be chiefly concerned about their own welfare; others center their devotion on some beloved personality; others devote their lives to an institution or a cause that attracts them. To the scientist, the search for facts; to the artist, the quest for beauty; to the engineer, the perfection of his technique; to the laborer in any field, his work, may become the supreme interest. In times of war, patriotism becomes a religion; in times of peace, prosperity. Revolutionary ideas fill men with religious fervor. Socialism or communism, cosmopolitanism or nationalism, lays hold of them with all the force of religion.

They spend their lives in the service of great philanthropic causes, the elimination of poverty, disease, and ignorance, the promotion of justice and peace, the improvement of moral relations, the dissemination of some well-considered view of the world. In so far as these efforts involve a genuine consecration to what is conceived as the highest, they are manifestations, some of them very important, of the religious impulse.

But whether they can adequately meet the deeper spiritual needs of the multitudes that are drifting away from the traditional beliefs and the old cult societies, is a momentous question. Attachment to a single personality or small social group, despite idealization and purity of affection, may narrow the sympathies and cause indifference to other relations. The scientist's passion for facts may produce a specialization that contracts the vision and obliterates all interest in other things, or a sterile skepticism rather than a fruitful love of truth. The delight in beauty and artistic ability may coexist with disregard for truth and duty. Efficiency in all kinds of vocational work may be sought without consideration of its functional character. Patriotism may be more concerned about the power and prestige of one's own country than about its righteousness and proper attitude to other peoples. Prosperity may be interpreted solely in terms of material wealth. Even enthusiasm for social improvement may be so exclusively directed to the amelioration of external conditions that it loses sight of their secondary importance and inability in themselves to furnish incentives to the highest type of living or satisfaction of man's deepest cravings. Conformity to generally prevailing customs may have no intrinsic moral value; and the acceptance or elaboration of a world-view, be it ever so rational, comprehensive, and profound, may have as little effect in guiding the religious instinct into profitable channels as a mysticism that flees from the world beyond the bounds of reason as well as of the senses. A survey of the tendencies at work within the organized religious societies and outside their reach cannot fail to suggest inadequacy to meet the situation, a distinct trend of thought and activity, and the probability of epoch-making changes.

By all the signs of the times we are encouraged to believe that we are on the eve of a great revival of religion. From the unfathomed depths within a quickening stream will issue forth. The spirit that will bring a nobler order and a truer harmony is already brooding over a chaotic world. It is a spirit of creative power and penetrating insight, of righteousness and sympathy, of peace and joy. There will be a fresh manifestation of what religion in its essence is and always has been. The coming religion will be scientific. It will not be hostile to science, nor grudgingly admit its methods and results, nor make of it a handmaiden to serve the ends of apologetics. Nor will it raise the tentative conclusions of science into dogmas, putting its stamp of approval upon a theory because of its novelty or rejecting another because of its age. For it will have no dogmas to defend, no binding creeds, written or oral, no accepted myths or legends. But it will welcome every new discovery, show hospitality to every new interpretation, maintain the freedom of research, and rejoice in every advance of knowledge. This coming religion will be æsthetic. It will be deeply concerned with the emotional life. But it will guide and satisfy the feelings without giving them an undue sway over reason and the moral sense, or forcing them into stereotyped expressions. It will draw upon the rich stores treasured up in the primary impulses of man's nature, purging, refining, and elevating them. Without fostering a self-centered hedonism, it will recognize the legitimate yearning for felicity, and minister to universal well-being by attention to every phase of human life. It will banish the dreadful specters of the past, the fear of death and the horrors of hell, reduce the ugliness and relieve the monotony of existence. Under its inspiring influence new forms of beauty will be created and a new art flourish, spontaneous, wholesome, and uplifting.

The coming religion will be ethical. Its dominant interest will be the perfectionment of man's moral relations. While certain principles to be followed in the conduct of life have been insisted upon in all religions, it will stress the supremacy of righteousness and the growth of moral perception. It will inspire an eager quest for the right and an ardent love of what conscience approves and demands. It will clarify the moral sense, raise its requirements, and enhance its power. As its ideals rise, their attractive force will increase. In distinction from all earlier forms of religion, it will produce an autonomous morality, not imposed by external authority, but by inner compulsion. It will make its appeal to all the mental faculties in man, touching the springs of action, operating from within, and transforming individual and social life. Under its benign influence the individual will look upon himself as fulfilling an indispensable function, however modest, in the whole, and upon the whole as a spiritual organism functioning in and through its integers. Principles of morality will be applied to the larger social units, vocational groups, corporations of all kinds, nations, and political aggregations. Redress of ancient wrongs, removal of long entrenched evils, abolition of harmful institutions, and reform of intolerable conditions will be sought with enthusiasm, intelligence, and purposeful effort. But the value of all such improvements will be gauged by the extent to which they manifest the growth of justice, mercy, and peace and minister to the deeper spiritual needs.

The coming religion will seek to express itself in new types of fellowship. In the past the basis of religious fellowship has almost invariably been a common creed, a common experience, a common ritual, a common organization. The religion of the future will not ask for the acceptance of articles of faith, however abbreviated; a peculiar experience, whatever its depth; participation in prescribed ceremonies, though they may be interpreted as merely symbols; or unquestioning obedience to ecclesiastical authorities, though their decisions may often be wise. It will need no infallible prophets, no mediating priests, no spiritual lords to send the mind of man in search of truth into the highest realms, to impart a sense of peace and security, harmony and joy, and to strengthen the will for noble endeavor and mighty achievement. It will honor and cherish its leaders, but its tendency will be to establish, not a kingdom on earth, but a republic of fellow workers. Survivals of sentiments, ideas, and practices that once had a necessary part in evolution, but remain beyond the period of their usefulness as obstacles to further progress, will present a perpetual challenge. To root out racial prejudices, ethnic animosities, economic injustices, class hatreds, slavery, and war, man's inhumanity to man, his mental sluggishness, and moral inertia is a formidable undertaking. Great crises will arise calling for intense coöperation of the forward-moving forces. An education of mind and heart and will, bringing out the finest potentialities of human nature is required. Despite many limitations and the errors associated with it in the course of the ages, religion has shown itself to be the mightiest of all the psychic powers and social instincts of man's nature. In its fuller manifestation it may be confidently expected to be equal to the great task that still lies before it.

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